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STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION
PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Res. 40

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS TO EMPLOY TEMPORARY ADDI-
TIONAL PERSONNEL AND INCREASING THE
LIMIT OF EXPENDITURES

PART 9

MARCH 13, 16, AND 19, 1953

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



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STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, at 10:30 a. m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Everett Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; and Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.

Also present: Senator Styles Bridges, Republican, New Hampshire.

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; G. David Schine, chief consultant; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk; and John Leahy, State Department, Deputy Assistant to the Under Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Yesterday we ordered certain records produced here at 10:30 this morning by some of the IAA people. I understand this situation was called to Dr. Johnson's attention; that is, the situation as far as Baker West is concerned, and that he had ordered a complete and thorough and immediate check upon it. I have been informed that the papers which the committee has requested will be necessary if Dr. Johnson is to get a complete picture of the setup himself. We have been asked to defer that request for the papers until Dr. Johnson has a chance to see them himself. I think that request should be honored. I have taken the liberty of informing Dr. Johnson's office that we will be glad to wait until he has had a chance to examine all the documents himself, if that is agreeable to the rest of the committee.

This morning we are going into a matter referred to us by Senator Bridges, chairman of the Appropriations Committee. We have asked Senator Bridges to be present. We have informed him he will have the complete right to ask any of the witnesses any of the questions and take any part in the proceedings he cares to. I have done that subject to the approval of the committee. I assume there is no objection to that. So, Senator, we welcome you as an ex officio member of the committee today.

Senator BRIDGES. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say the matter referred to us was the question of the so-called *Vagabond* project or *Courier* projects 1 ship acting as a transmitter, which has been completed, and 2 pro-

posed, which I believe \$4 million has been requested in the present budget.

Before we get into that subject, we have a witness here who was requested to appear yesterday morning, and who notified us he could not be here because he said the notice was too short. He is here this morning, so, Senator Bridges, we will put this witness on first. He has nothing to do with the *Vagabond* project, incidentally.

Mr. Hlavaty.

Mr. COHN. He is accompanied by counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you hold up your right hand.

In the matter in hearing before the committee, do you swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Hlavaty. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JULIUS H. HLA VATY, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, BRONX HIGH SCHOOL OF SCIENCE, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY RALPH SHAPIRO, COUNSEL

Mr. COHN. May we have your name for the record?

Mr. HLA VATY. I am Dr. Julius H. Hlavaty.

Mr. COHN. Dr. Hlavaty, what is your position at the present time?

Mr. HLA VATY. I am chairman of the department of mathematics at the Bronx High School of Science, New York City.

Mr. COHN. How long a period of time have you held that position?

Mr. HLA VATY. Fifteen years.

Mr. COHN. Dr. Hlavaty, is it correct that on May 29, 1952, you participated in a broadcast on schools to Czechoslovakia over the Voice of America facilities?

Mr. HLA VATY. I don't recall the precise date, but that is probably right. I was on a program for the Voice of America last spring.

The CHAIRMAN. Will counsel identify himself?

Mr. SHAPIRO. Ralph Shapiro, 9 East 40th Street, New York City.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume counsel has informed the witness of his rights insofar as his counsel is concerned, but I think we should make that a matter of record.

Mr. Hlavaty, you are entitled to consult with your counsel at any time you care to, and advise with him. If at any time you want to retire for a private conference with your counsel, we will give you that right. We do not allow counsel to take part in the proceedings, however, except to advise you whenever you want to talk to him.

Mr. HLA VATY. Thank you.

Mr. COHN. Dr. Hlavaty, we have it that you are chairman of the mathematics department at the Bronx High School of Science, and the fact that you participated in this broadcast on schools over the Voice of America to Czechoslovakia last year.

My next question is, Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HLA VATY. Are you asking me that question as a teacher in the New York City school system or with reference to the Voice of America.

The CHAIRMAN. We are asking you the question, Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party? We are asking you the question.

Mr. HLAVATY. I am not a member of the Communist Party nor was I a member of the Communist Party when I participated in the Voice of America broadcast.

Mr. COHN. The question was, Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HLAVATY. I feel that that question is an improper question. It seems to me to have no bearing on the question you are investigating now of my participation in the Voice of America broadcast.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hlavaty, we are interested in that answer for a number of reasons. No. 1, we like to know whether members of the Communist Party have been used by the Voice of America. No. 2, we want to know what check has been made by them to see whether a man has been a member or not. I think that is a very, very important question. The Voice, you see, is allegedly fighting Communists. We do not think they can fight communism too effectively by using Communists. I do not think that Communists are too dedicated to a fight against communism. I think you will agree with that. The question is, Have you been a member of the Communist Party? You are ordered to answer that, unless you think your answer will incriminate you. If you feel your answer will incriminate you, you have a right to refuse to answer. That is the only ground that this committee will honor. You will not be allowed to refuse on any other ground.

Mr. HLAVATY. I think I have answered the question that I was not a member of the Communist Party when I was asked to make this broadcast, and I am not now. I do feel that it is improper for you to question me as to what my youthful beliefs may or may not have been.

The CHAIRMAN. If you do not want us to go into your youth, how old are you now?

Mr. HLAVATY. I am 46.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Communist Party a year ago?

Mr. HLAVATY. That was when I made the broadcast.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Communist Party a year ago?

Mr. HLAVATY. I was not; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Communist Party 2 years ago?

Mr. HLAVATY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Communist Party 3 years ago?

Mr. HLAVATY. I was not a member of the Communist Party for a number of years.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Communist Party 3 years ago?

Mr. HLAVATY. I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Communist Party 4 years ago?

Mr. HLAVATY. I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Communist Party 5 years ago?

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. HLAVATY. I would like to say that as of 1949 I was not a member of the Communist Party, and because I feel that investigations into my beliefs or possible associations before that are improper in the general rights a citizen has, and also the question violates the provisions of the fifth amendment, I decline to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Communist Party in 1948?

Mr. HLAVATY. I already answered the question.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Were you a member of the Communist Party in 1948? We will have to impose upon you to answer again.

Mr. HLAVATY. I decline to answer on the ground I have already given you.

The CHAIRMAN. The only grounds that we will honor here are the grounds that your answer might incriminate you. I will ask you a question, Do you honestly feel that if you were to tell us whether you were a member of the Communist Party in 1948 that would incriminate you? We must have an answer to that question before we can determine whether you can claim the right or not.

Mr. HLAVATY. May I consult counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

(Witness conferred with his counsel.)

The CHAIRMAN. I may say to the other Senators, one of the reasons why this witness was called is not because he has been such an important cog in the Voice machinery, but we have found that they have adopted a rule to the effect that if a man only does four specific jobs per month—is that it, Counsel?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That he needs no security check of any kind. We found that men who were turned down by Security for a full-time job with the Voice have been hired on a piecemeal basis, and they do 3 or 4 jobs a month, even though they have been rejected. We are calling this witness whom we incidentally know has a Communist background and the information we have is that he was never even asked by the Voice about his background, but hired to do this broadcast on the American school system.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, when was that rule adopted, because it is a direct violation of Public Law 402, which specifically in section 105 prevents that. I would like to know when that rule was adopted, and by whom, because somebody in the State Department, in so doing, is also in contempt of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a violation of Public Law 402 which was drafted by the able Senator from South Dakota, Mr. Mundt. I think there is no question about it that the rule was adopted for the purpose of voiding the effect of the law which you drafted.

Senator MUNDT. I think we should find out who deliberately violated that law, because there were no "ifs" and "buts" that you could use a Communist for 4 hours a week or a month. It was specific, total, and complete. It was reinforced by many letters by our committee at that time. Somebody in the Department of State then or now certainly was in direct contempt of Congress, and in violation of the law.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask counsel how deeply have you gone into this matter? Have we determined who the originator of this order was?

Mr. COHN. That has not been finally determined, Mr. Chairman. There has been a good deal of confusion.

The CHAIRMAN. A good deal of shifting of responsibility.

Mr. COHN. Yes. The clear fact is, though, that this practice has been engaged in.

The CHAIRMAN. That rule is still in effect; is that right?

Mr. COHN. Apparently the rule is still in effect.

Senator MUNDT. I would suggest that counsel advise the new Secretary of State that it is a direct violation of the law of Congress, and ask for its immediate rescission.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is an excellent idea.

Senator MUNDT. There is not much use having a Congress, Mr. Chairman, if you are going to pass laws and have some department downtown thumb their nose at the law and the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. May I say that all the indications we have so far is that our new head of the IIA is apparently very sincere about doing a good job with the information program.

Senator MUNDT. I think that is perfectly right. It probably has never been called to his attention. Some underling under Dean Acheson's Department of State deliberately violated the law. We ought to find out about it and correct it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hlavaty, the question was, do you honestly feel if you were to tell us whether you were a Communist in 1948 that your answer might incriminate you?

Mr. HLAVATY. I think it is perfectly possible. I don't know what "incrimination" means, and I don't know what person might say that I was a member of the Communist Party in any given year, and I don't know whether my word would be taken against his word. It is for that reason that I invoke this constitutional protection, which I understand is devised to protect the innocent, not the guilty.

The CHAIRMAN. The purpose of the law is to provide that no man need convict himself, regardless of how guilty he is. That is the purpose of the law. The purpose of the law is not for the purpose of protecting the innocent. It came down from the old English law. I think it is a good idea not to force a man to convict himself of any crime, even though he is guilty.

The question is, Do you honestly feel that if you tell us whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party in 1948, that that might tend to incriminate you? If not, you will be forced to answer this question.

Mr. HLAVATY. My answer to that question in effect nullifies the invocation of this right that I have, and that the Constitution gives me.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hlavaty, this committee must determine when a witness is entitled to invoke this right. Before we can determine whether you are entitled to this right, we must know whether you honestly feel that if you answer, your answer would tend to incriminate you.

Mr. HLAVATY. I must decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

The CHAIRMAN. You are ordered to answer that question. You understand me? I am ordering you now to answer not whether you were a member of the Community Party. I am ordering you to answer whether you feel if you answered that question, that the answer

might tend to incriminate you. We will not hear from counsel. You may consult your client.

Mr. SHAPIRO. May I make a statement?

The CHAIRMAN. You may not make any statement. You may talk to your client, and he may make any statement he cares to. You may consult with him freely.

Mr. SHAPIRO. All right.

(Witness conferred with counsel.)

Mr. SHAPIRO. I wonder if we may have the question posed again so we will be certain.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me repeat the question. Mr. Hlavaty, first I asked you whether you were a member of the Communist Party in 1948, and you declined to answer that question. My question to you now is, Do you feel that if you answer the question and tell us whether you are a member of the Communist Party in 1948 or not, that that answer might tend to incriminate you.

Mr. HLAVATY. Senator, that is a very complicated double question, and I really do not understand it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will start over again, if you think that is too complicated. You are entitled to refuse to answer any question you honestly feel that your answer might tend to incriminate you. Otherwise, you are not entitled to refuse to answer. You understand that, do you not?

Mr. HLAVATY. That I do.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if you feel that the answer will in no way incriminate you, then you are not entitled to refuse to answer. So my question to you is this: Do you honestly feel that if you were to tell us now whether you were a Communist in 1948, that that answer might tend to incriminate you? If you do not understand that question, we will try and rephrase it for you.

Mr. HLAVATY. It has been suggested to me that I say that my invocation of the fifth amendment was made in good faith. Your question reminds me, if I may—this is no time for puzzles—a double problem where two parts of a question cancel each other out, and I don't understand it. Perhaps you have heard the puzzle on how you can find out which of two chairs is an electric chair. One of them is an electric chair. The other one is good. And there is a man standing by, and you are entitled to ask him one question, and he will answer the question "yes" or "no." The only thing you don't know is whether he is a liar or whether he tells the truth. What is the question you ask him to find out which is the electric chair? Your question reminds me of what the correct answer to that puzzle is. I will give you the answer to the question if you are interested.

The CHAIRMAN. I am interested in the question that I asked you and not your electric-chair puzzle.

Mr. HLAVATY. I made my original claim in good faith, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You are ordered to answer the question. If you do not answer it, I will take up with the committee the question of what should be done about it.

(Witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. HLAVATY. On the question, Senator, when you ask me in the first place whether I was a member of the Communist Party in 1948, I decline to answer on constitutional grounds. When I invoked that,

I made the statement in good faith feeling that there was a possibility that I might incriminate myself by answering the question. Does that answer your question?

The CHAIRMAN. It may, but I think we will require you to give us a straight answer. Understand, Mr. Hlavaty, if we were to ask you what day of the week this is or where you live or questions like that, and if you were to say "I refuse to answer on constitutional grounds," we could not honor that, unless you first told us that you honestly felt that your answer might incriminate you. My question now is, and I think you may have answered it partially, Do you honestly feel that if you were to tell the committee the truth about whether you were a member of the Communist Party in 1948, that answer would tend to incriminate you? You are ordered to answer that question.

Mr. HLAVATY. I honestly do.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are entitled to the privilege.

Mr. MUNDT?

Senator MUNDT. If I understand your testimony correctly, and I want to review it because it seems to me you have gotten yourself in a pretty serious position, you were asked the question, I believe—and I came in a little late—Are you now a member of the Communist Party, to which you said "No"; is that right?

Mr. HLAVATY. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. You were asked the question, Were you a member of the Communist Party at the time you gave a certain broadcast for the State Department, and I believe you said "No"; is that correct?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I think you should know, then, because you have not been before this committee before, and as far as I can observe by looking at him, this is the first time your counsel has been before the committee, we have had quite a rash of fifth-amendment Americans before our committee, I might add, so we are kind of accustomed to working with people who invoke the fifth amendment, but, you see, you did not invoke it when you were asked if you are a Communist. You did not invoke it when you said, "No; you did not belong to the Communist Party when you gave the broadcast." So what you have done in fact knowingly or unknowingly is to proclaim to the world that you used to be a member of the Communist Party because you waited until that particular question to invoke this fifth-amendment right which you had. It is your business, not mine. I do not know where you work, or who you are employed by or what you do, but, in fact, you have proclaimed yourself to any thinking American, as a result of your testimony, that not only did you used to belong to the Communist Party, but you apparently want to conceal that fact that you have never disavowed the Communist Party, and consequently you invoke the fifth amendment to protect yourself. You have that right, and I want you to know what you have done, certainly as far as anybody who is less than an addlebrained American must understand.

Mr. HLAVATY. Senator Mundt, I think those are inferences you have drawn which are not necessarily true.

Senator MUNDT. Whether true or not, you made the implications—I did not—that nobody could fail to understand. Just positively nobody. We might just as well face up to the fact that what you have done is tantamount to admitting that not only did you formerly belong

to the Communist Party but you refuse to admit it; you refuse to disavow it; you conceal it because your involvement apparently was so deep that you are afraid that it will incriminate you. Maybe you were in the espionage apparatus. Maybe you were involved really deep. I do not know. You have the power, authority, and constitutional background, but you cannot stand in front of an intelligent American audience, either visual or hearing, and answer two-thirds of the questions, and on the third one invoke your constitutional immunity without by implication indirectly making a tremendous confession.

Mr. HLAVATY. I have made no confession. I don't feel I have to discuss what I may have believed 10, 20, or 25 years ago, when I was a boy, on a number of matters. I don't know how acts or words of mine—certainly I am not aware or conscious of any ill I did.

Senator MUNDT. At your age, you were far from a boy in 1948.

Mr. HLAVATY. Senator McCarthy, you said something about the broadcast that I think is not completely correct. I was asked to make the broadcast by one of the people—

The CHAIRMAN. We intend to go into that. First, Senator Symington has some questions to ask you.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you were a member of the Communist Party, you must know what year you joined, and you must have thought it was right to join, and if you left the Communist Party, you must have known when you left it, and you must have felt it was right to leave it. So why do you leave this thing hanging in the air? Why do you not say when you joined the party, if you joined the party, and when you got out of the party, if you got out of the party, and why?

Mr. HLAVATY. I don't see what any of these questions really have to do with the problem that you asked me in the first place. The question you asked me about my participation on the Voice of America program—

Senator McCLELLAN. You take the position, then, that the Government and the people of the United States, and the Voice of America, should not be concerned about the views and philosophy of those who broadcast on the Voice of America. Is that your position?

Mr. HLAVATY. No, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. If it is not your position and you feel that the Congress and the officials of the Voice of America should have some interest in it, then do you not think it quite proper and necessary that they know the background and philosophy of those whom they employ to carry on their service?

(Witness consults with his counsel.)

The CHAIRMAN. You should be able to answer that question without consulting your lawyer. You may consult if you care to.

Mr. HLAVATY. In the first place, I was not employed on this broadcast. It was a volunteer effort. I was asked to do what I thought was a service to get a message to the people across the Iron Curtain with some possible risk to relatives that I still have there.

Senator McCLELLAN. I do not know what the broadcast contained. I do not have the script before me, and I have not seen it. The point I make is that I am not criticizing you for accepting an invitation to make a broadcast, if you were invited. The point I am making here is that I think the American people and the Congress, who appro-

priate this money to carry on this service, certainly have a right to know the kind of people that are being used to broadcast, what their philosophies are, what their views are, and you leave us in the position here of having to ascertain from your own statements that in all probability at one time you were a Communist. There are many who drop out of the party who do not change either their views or their philosophy, and you leave us in that situation. If you do not want to clear it up, that is all right, but I insist that the people and the Congress have a right to know who is being used, what their philosophies are, and what the effect of their broadcast and expression of their philosophy might involve.

Mr. HLAVATY. But would a part of that be knowing what they did 10 or 15 or 20 years ago? At the time of the broadcast, I made the broadcast in full faith as a loyal American citizen, doing a service that I was asked to do. I was not paid for it. It was time out that I had to take. As I say, there was a possible risk to my relations in Czechoslovakia. Now should I have had different ideas in 1930 or 1935, different from those that I had in 1952, I don't think that affects what I may have said in 1952.

Senator McCLELLAN. You may not think it affects it, but I think the American people and the Congress are interested in knowing who is employed or who is used on the Voice of America to speak for America. I do not think the Congress or the American people want people speaking on the Voice of America at taxpayers' expense who are not loyal Americans and believe in our system of government.

Mr. HLAVATY. I am all of that, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. HLAVATY. I am a loyal American citizen.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is your view and your statement, and it may be true. But in order for us to determine in view of the situation you have left us here before this committee, I think it would be necessary for you to give the committee the information it seeks. You have a perfect right to invoke the fifth amendment to the Constitution if you want to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McClellan, we have other matters we would like to go into with this witness, but we have invited Senator Bridges here this morning to hear the matter of *Vagabond I, II, or III*, or commonly known as the Courier projects. Senator Bridges tells me he will not be able to be with us this afternoon. I will ask this witness to step down, but remain here, because we want to discuss other matters with you, if that is agreeable to the committee.

Senator MUNDT. We will let the witness go forever if he will answer that question.

Mr. HLAVATY. There are many things about the broadcast you did not ask me.

The CHAIRMAN. You may step down. We will give you an opportunity later on.

Who is your first witness on the Courier project?

Mr. COHN. Mr. McKesson.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKesson. You have been sworn?

Mr. MCKESSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reminded your oath still is in effect.

At this point we will insert in the record the letter of Senator Bridges, dated February 23, 1953, in which he outlines some of the

problems involved, and his request that this committee study this project.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 59" and will be found in the appendix on p. 769.)

TESTIMONY OF LEWIS J. McKESSON

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cohn.

Mr. COHN. Mr. McKesson, I think you have told us previously that you had been for some time with the Voice of America in the engineering department; is that correct?

Mr. McKESSON. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Are you familiar with the project known as the *Vagabond* project?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cohn, so that Senator Bridges may know some of the background of this man—it is in the record, I know—would you take a minute or two to briefly go over his experience and background as a radio engineer?

Mr. COHN. For the benefit of Senator Bridges, would you give us very briefly your experience as an engineer and your background?

Mr. McKESSON. I graduated from the University of Minnesota in 1927, as an electrical engineer. I have been active in radio ever since. I have been over 20 years with the RCA.

Mr. COHN. You were with RCA for over 20 years?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right. I was in the Navy doing similar types of work. Since then I have been with several private companies, including about 3 years with the Voice of America. I left there last October.

Mr. COHN. What rank did you hold in the Navy?

Mr. McKESSON. Commander.

Mr. COHN. Mr. McKesson, when you were with the Voice of America, you were in the engineering department, is that right?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Were you ever assigned to this *Vagabond* project?

Mr. McKESSON. At the initial onset of the thinking that such a project might be useful in connection with broadcasting to the world, I was asked to investigate the possibilities of such a project.

Mr. COHN. Would you tell us very briefly just what this project was to be?

Mr. McKESSON. Because of the difficulties in obtaining land-base sites close to the target areas, it was felt that a ship might become useful upon which high-power radio equipment could be mounted. There had been some history along these lines with other ships so that it was not entirely a new project.

In the middle of 1950, I did some preliminary planning. I came down to the Navy Department to discuss the possibility of such a job with a number of naval officers, ship conversion people, and so forth, and it looked like a good deal.

Mr. COHN. I might ask you, you say you were assigned to it as a project engineer at the beginning?

Mr. McKESSON. I am not sure of the words "project engineer" being used. I investigated the situation.

Mr. COHN. Did you continue to have familiarity with the project as it progressed?

Mr. McKESSON. No, sir. After coming to the Navy Department and summarizing the results of this work in a memorandum, I was ordered to other duties.

Mr. COHN. And after you were ordered to other duties, you nevertheless were familiar with what was going on in connection with this project, is that right?

Mr. McKESSON. To a limited extent.

Mr. COHN. And you conferred with the engineers who were working on it?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. COHN. And you are familiar with the amounts of money generally which were expended on it?

Mr. McKESSON. In general; yes.

Mr. COHN. As a result of your experience on this project, do you feel that there was waste of Government funds in connection with its construction?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes; I do.

Mr. COHN. You say you originally went to the Navy; is that right?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

Mr. COHN. After your consultations with the Navy, did you and they reach any conclusion as to what type of ship would be best suited for use in this project?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes; we did. At that time it seemed desirable to use the maximum possible power that we could for a number of reasons. One is that a ship will not have the same antenna facilities available that a shore base will, so that the power should be maximum. At that time we had the possibility of using megawatt transmitters, which were at that time being constructed. My work was entirely on the basis of putting a megawatt, that is a 1,000-kilowatt transmitter, on the ship.

Mr. COHN. Was there any type ship which was available and would have been suitable for that?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes. There was one class of tanker, I forget which class, which looked suitable. Also, we knew there were quite a number of naval ships, called CVE, that is the escort or baby carrier type, which also looked very ideally suited for the job.

Mr. COHN. Am I correct in stating that you submitted a memorandum to Mr. Herrick, to Mr. George Herrick, who was then chief engineer of the Voice of America, dated September 8, 1950, embodying a recommendation that a CVE ship be used?

Mr. McKESSON. CVE be considered as one of the best possibilities; yes.

Mr. COHN. And you made various other recommendations so that maximum power could be achieved in this project, is that correct?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Were those recommendations followed? Was a CVE ship used?

Mr. McKESSON. No. A small cargo ship was eventually used.

Mr. COHN. Instead of using a CVE, a small cargo ship was used?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Was it possible to use this megawatt transmitter on this small cargo ship?

Mr. McKesson. No; there was not physically enough room.

Mr. COHN. Whose decision was it to use the small cargo ship?

Mr. McKesson. I assume it was George Herrick's.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your testimony is that there were ships available in mothballs that would have been suitable and you recommended such ships, and instead of taking a satisfactory ship, a small cargo ship was selected?

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

Mr. COHN. As far as you know, Mr. Herrick and his department made the decision that the CVE would not be used, and used the small cargo ship?

Mr. McKesson. With a small transmitter as well; 150-kilowatt transmitter, instead of a 1,000-kilowatt transmitter.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKesson, what repairs were necessary because of the selection of a small ship, instead of the satisfactory vessel? What alterations?

Mr. McKesson. One thing, a small ship of that type had to be, as I understand it, strengthened considerably to take the weight of the auxiliary diesel engines required. A flight deck had to be built to handle the equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. No. 1, you had to strengthen the hull of the ship so as to take the diesel engines.

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the approximate cost of that work?

Mr. McKesson. I am not too familiar with the breakdown of those costs, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. But there were ships available in mothballs which would have required no strengthening of the hull?

Mr. McKesson. Yes. We determined that with the Navy Department, the hangar deck had sufficient strength, that is the load per square foot was sufficient to take the transmitter, all elements of the transmitter, and the diesel engines.

The CHAIRMAN. And after selecting the smaller cargo ship, they built a flight deck on it?

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say there were ships in mothballs with flight decks already built on them?

Mr. McKesson. Yes, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you think offhand of any reason why they would select a ship that needed all this repairing or altering when satisfactory ships were available at that time?

Mr. McKesson. Sir, some of the reasons given were legitimate to a certain extent. One was that a smaller ship could go into harbors where a larger ship could not go. The smaller ship did not require the same crew that the larger ship would. Those are the two main reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the cost of the alteration, if you know?

Mr. McKesson. The total cost, I have been informed, was of the order of \$2,600,000 for *Vagabond*. That is the equipment, alterations, and entire cost.

The CHAIRMAN. \$2,600,000.

Mr. McKesson. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you speaking now of the total cost or of the unnecessary expenditure?

Mr. McKesson. That is the total cost.

The CHAIRMAN. How much of that cost could have been eliminated if the correct ship had been selected in the first place, the type of ship that you as the engineer had recommended?

Mr. McKesson. I would estimate that at least a million dollars of that could have been eliminated.

The CHAIRMAN. How about this question of the balloon antenna? If you had a larger ship, could you have had an antenna without the balloon?

Mr. McKesson. That was an engineering problem which had we gone ahead with the larger ship, we would have investigated thoroughly. At that time, it was possible to erect antenna towers on the larger ship to be used either in place of or in conjunction with a balloon antenna. The planning had not gotten far enough to finally make a decision on that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question: As the time the plans were being made, did the engineers who were doing the planning know what wavelengths would be available for this *Courier* ship?

Mr. McKesson. Not specifically, no; only the broadcast medium wavelength band was to be used.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that an important element or not?

Mr. McKesson. In general the balloon type of antenna is quite flexible, and it can be used on any frequency. That is one of the big advantages of that type of installation as compared to shore based installation where you are somewhat limited after you build your antenna on what frequency you can use.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire there? Is not that pretty good justification for using the balloon type antenna for a ship which is going to move from country to country and continent to continent where you have to change the wavelength to meet the local conditions?

Mr. McKesson. Yes, that is a very good justification.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you feel that the use of a balloon antenna is not a mistake if you have the proper ship and you know how to handle the balloon.

Mr. McKesson. I feel at the time there were a number of questions which have been since largely answered. At the present time the balloon antenna does have a useful location. In some parts of the world the possibility of using the balloon are greatly reduced, and in other parts the balloon can be used almost every day of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I get your testimony at this point to be that the construction of the *Courier* ship and the use of a balloon antenna in and of itself may be a desirable part of the Voice project, but the question here is what waste was occasioned because of bad engineering or bad planning?

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That resolved itself to that?

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, will you continue?

Mr. COHN. I want to go into this first, Mr. McKesson. Instead of having the Navy plan this out, is it a fact that the Voice of America then went to a private engineering firm known as the Rhoades Co.?

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Did you feel the Navy should have been in on that rather than the Rhoades Co.?

Mr. McKesson. I felt the Navy was the best qualified people to do such work, because I was familiar with another conversion, to a certain extent, the purpose of which is classified, but it was very similar to the work which had to be done on the Navy ship.

Mr. COHN. Would there have been any cost to the Voice of America if the Navy had done this?

Mr. McKesson. I believe that would have been handled on a strictly cost basis by transfer of Government funds from one agency to another.

Mr. COHN. And there would not have been the necessity of paying to a private contractor as much as was actually paid, is that correct?

Mr. McKesson. There would not have been a profit and cost-plus figures involved.

Mr. COHN. There would have been no profit or cost-plus figures involved.

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Do you know what kind of a company this Rhoades Co. was? Was this their specialty?

Mr. McKesson. I know before the war they were specializing in smaller yacht type of design, sailing vessels and so forth. I do believe they had experience in larger vessels during the war.

Mr. COHN. In any event, this Rhoades Co. was used, is that right?

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Is it correct that the Rhoades Co. made certain recommendations and a certain budget was provided?

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

Mr. COHN. In constructing this ship, did the Voice engineering department stay within that budget?

Mr. McKesson. As I understand it the first estimates made by the Bethlehem Steel and Todd Shipbuilding were considerably in excess of what the anticipated cost was to have been.

Mr. COHN. What do you estimate the total waste to have been on this project? I am going to ask you to break it down then.

Mr. McKesson. You mean on the *Courier* type of vessel?

Mr. COHN. Yes.

Mr. McKesson. I estimated that it could have been done for six or seven hundred thousand dollars less than it actually was done.

Mr. COHN. Would you tell us why?

Mr. McKesson. There were numerous delays. There was redesign a number of times, all of which cost money. With better engineering, electronically, especially, I think some of the changes that had to be made later could have been avoided initially. Maybe a few other items of that nature.

Mr. COHN. Let me ask you this: After the *Courier* went into operation and continued in operation, do you know whether or not it was operating at maximum power?

Mr. McKesson. You mean where she is operating now?

Mr. COHN. Yes.

Mr. McKesson. No. I understand that because of interference with a Swedish chain of stations they are required to operate at greatly reduced power when the Swedish stations are on the air, which

of course is the maximum listener time from 6 p. m. to 2 a. m., or something like that.

Mr. COHN. At the maximum listener time, they are forced to operate as you put it, at greatly reduced power. Can you tell us the difference in power between the daytime hours and the nighttime hours when they have their maximum listening audience?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes. I understand they operate at 40 kilowatts instead of 150 kilowatts.

Mr. COHN. That is certainly a very substantial difference, is it not?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes. There is another important point which ought to be brought out, that for some months during the winter they have not been able to fly the balloon at which time they had to operate on the ship's antenna. That is quite a small antenna, and I do not have the exact figures, but being quite familiar with Navy antennas on shipboard, I do not believe they can put more than 30 kilowatts into that antenna.

Mr. COHN. That is when the balloon is not going?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right. There is one other point. That antenna is very much more less efficient than the balloon antenna, by about 15 percent. So the total power radiated is approximately 15 percent of 30 kilowatts, instead of 30 percent of 150 kilowatts under those conditions.

Mr. COHN. Those certainly are conditions which should be remedied before, I assume, further funds are appropriated. Would that be your feeling?

Mr. McKESSON. They should be investigated to see if there is not a better solution to the problem.

Mr. COHN. Have any of these balloons blown away?

Mr. McKESSON. I have heard that three of them have, I believe.

Mr. COHN. How much does it cost to buy one of these balloons commercially?

Mr. McKESSON. I believe it is in the neighborhood of \$20,000. However, I also understand the Coast Guard was able to obtain balloons at no cost from surplus material.

Mr. COHN. Have you also heard that they have purchased a number of them at the sum of \$18,000 apiece?

Mr. McKESSON. That may be correct, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see if I get this picture. You say the balloons that blew away were war surplus and did not cost them anything, but they have had to replace them and the cost of the replacements has been \$18,000 each?

Mr. McKESSON. To what extent they have used the new balloons, I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many new balloons they purchased?

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you have five balloons? You only use one balloon to hold up the antenna; do you not?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right. It is a question of spare parts, you might say.

Senator BRIDGES. They were getting ready for a fleet of ships; were they not?

Mr. McKESSON. I could not answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a bit confused by these five balloons they bought. Would you say that for this one *Courier* project they would need five balloons?

Mr. McKesson. If they did not have the war surplus balloons, that might be a little on the high side, but I do not think you can object to it too seriously on a ship going to certain locations of the world. In fact, during some of the initial considerations of this, there was talk of sending it to the Korean area where you might expect a few balloons to be shot down in addition to blowing away.

Mr. COHN. I think this point is important. You have told us about the reduced power at which the *Courier* has to operate due to this frequent trouble on the one hand, and due to the fact that when they cannot get the balloon up, I assume due to weather conditions they have to operate on the antenna on the ship, which means very greatly reduced power.

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Was there any advance planning? Did they stop to figure out before they did this just where the ship was going, and make arrangements for maximum power?

Mr. McKesson. No; my knowledge of that was that it was a very confused situation right up almost to the day or two before she left for her trip. Nobody knew where she was going.

Mr. COHN. If they used a CVE ship, is it true that they would have achieved 12 times the power that is possible under these conditions?

Mr. McKesson. Yes; that is right.

Mr. COHN. Approximately 12 times the power?

Mr. McKesson. With directive antennas of balloons, and a 1-mega-watt transmitter.

Mr. COHN. Do you feel that the receiving equipment now in use by the *Courier* is adequate?

Mr. McKesson. No; I do not. The reason for that is that they are still, as I understand it, using the receiving equipment aboard the ship, and with the high power they are using on the medium wave and the shortwave transmitters, the interference to the present receiving facilities greatly limits their ability to get good program material.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you cannot have the receiving equipment and the broadcasting equipment in close proximity?

Mr. McKesson. It is difficult to operate under those conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. So it would be necessary when you have a *Courier* ship to have the receiving facilities land-based or based on other ships some distance away?

Mr. McKesson. That would be very desirable.

The CHAIRMAN. What distance would you set, approximately?

Mr. McKesson. Five miles is desirable, if you can get it. A little greater is better yet in most cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what planning was made to have proper receiving facilities when the broadcasting facilities were constructed?

Mr. McKesson. Yes. I recommended certain material which was put aboard the ship for shore-based receiving facilities, but I do not believe that has ever been put in use since the *Courier* started operations in the Mediterranean.

The CHAIRMAN. As far as the receiving equipment is concerned, that is simply a large powerful radio receiving set?

Mr. McKesson. Yes, but it is not physically large. It could be put up in a farmhouse. It would not involve necessarily building expensive buildings.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing expensive about the receiving equipment?

Mr. McKESSON. It is expensive as compared to the receiver you have at home, but by comparison with the total project, it is very small.

The CHAIRMAN. Roughly what would good receiving equipment cost?

Mr. McKESSON. The equipment itself would run between 20 and 25 thousand dollars for one good receiver, and we would have to add the antenna and installation cost on that, another 5 to 10 thousand dollars probably.

The CHAIRMAN. When you are talking about receiving equipment, you are referring to the equipment which could be used to receive the material from the New York desk, or some place else?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would be broadcast over your broadcasting facilities.

Mr. McKESSON. That would be connected to the ship with UHF or VHF radio circuits, or the possibility of telephone lines might be presented in some cases.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a bit of confusion on my figures here. You testified either today or the other day, and I have your testimony of both days—I have it all in mind so I do not know which day you testified to the particular part—but your testimony, as I recall, was that if the proper ship had been selected, the *Courier* project could have been constructed at a total cost of around \$600,000, or thereabouts. In other words, if you selected a ship that did not need to have an additional flight deck, one with a hull strong enough so you did not have to rebuild the hull, the total cost would run about five or six hundred thousand dollars.

Mr. McKESSON. No, I think that five or six hundred thousand dollars is the amount that I said the present *Courier* was overexpended.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Assume that the Congress decides that we want to authorize additional *Courier* projects—incidentally, this one was never authorized by the Congress—you know something about the ships that are in mothballs at the present time and are available, what would you say a reasonable cost per *Courier* would be, selecting the proper kind of ship, the ship with the type of hull that would not need rebuilding?

Mr. McKESSON. I would recommend that the power would be maximum which at this time would be 1,000 kilowatts. If a CVE carrier in operating condition—and I believe there are quite a number of them who have had very little service since the war, I believe there are a number of those. The ship modifications I do not believe should run over, well, 3 years ago, \$1 million. It would be up 20 percent or more than that possibly now, so \$1,200,000 or so, plus the cost of equipment which would run approximately \$900,000 for the transmitter. Six or seven hundred thousand dollars for the diesel engines, plus incidental equipment, which would be another two or three hundred thousand dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the total cost if you have one of the most powerful transmitters, 1,000 kilowatts; is that right?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It would run roughly \$2 million?

Mr. McKesson. I was just going to add up those figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you do that?

Mr. McKesson. I said \$900,000 for the transmitter, \$1 million for the ship modification, \$700,000 for the diesel power, \$200,000 for incidental receiving equipment and so forth. That is \$2.8 million, if my addition is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. How would that compare with the *Courier* ship now in operation insofar as power and range is concerned?

Mr. McKesson. If the directive antenna was used—and, incidentally, that same directive feature can be used to protect a transmitter which is operating on the same frequency—if that was used, the energy toward the target would be 12 times what the present *Courier* can deliver.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your total figures again?

Mr. McKesson. \$2,800,000.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the present *Courier* cost about \$2,600,000; is that right?

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You say there was a waste of six or seven hundred thousand dollars, or roughly that, in connection with the present *Courier*; would you say that a new *Courier* ship, if efficiently constructed and the right ship selected, would cost \$2,800,000? I assume the additional cost is because of the transmitting facilities which are 12 times as powerful.

Mr. McKesson. That is right. I would say this is a poor way to do engineering.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I wanted your figures, Mr. McKesson, is because there has been a request of the Congress that we appropriate \$3,714,000 to begin operations on another *Courier* project.

Mr. McKesson. I don't know what is involved in that figure, so I would not be prepared to say exactly whether it is correct. It seems high.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you cannot plan a project here at the witness table. Also you have been going over this in some detail, but your testimony is that we could get the most powerful transmitter on the proper type of ship with a total overall cost not exceeding \$2,800,000, roughly.

Mr. McKesson. I believe that is correct.

Mr. COHN. I assume, too, that some substantial sums of money were saved as a result of the fact that the Coast Guard did get into this situation and take it over?

Mr. McKesson. That is right.

Mr. COHN. We will be able to develop that from Admiral Richmond later. As I understand your testimony, particularly with reference to what we should know before money is appropriated for other ships along these lines, the first situation is a CVE ship was available or could have been used, and you could have had 12 times the power. Would that have meant that the operating costs would have been 12 times as high?

Mr. McKesson. No, obviously not. The estimate at the time indicated the operating cost of that type of ship would be around, as I remember the figures I had, \$773,000 a year.

Mr. COHN. What is the ratio?

Mr. McKESSON. By the time you add the radio part to that, it might be approximately twice what the present *Courier* costs the Coast Guard to operate.

Mr. COHN. So for twice the operating cost, we would have achieved 12 times the power, by the use of a CVE and a megawatt transmitter.

Mr. McKESSON. I would like to say that the CVE part of this never got to the point where the Navy was formally requested to state whether one was available or not.

Mr. COHN. That request was never made to the Navy.

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

Mr. COHN. If it had been and the CVE was available, it would have meant 12 times the power at only twice the operating cost?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

Mr. COHN. You told us the receiving equipment here is wholly inadequate, and I assume that is something which would have to be corrected; is that right?

Mr. McKESSON. It is corrected on the present *Courier*, but they have not chosen to put it into use.

Mr. COHN. They have not put into use the proper receiving equipment?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

Mr. COHN. No. 3 is that you have told us it operates by using 150 kilowatts during the daytime but when they can reach the maximum listening audience, it goes down to 40 kilowatts, and, as a matter of fact, when the balloons cannot work due to the weather, it goes down to 30 or even less?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right, to 15 percent of 30.

Mr. COHN. 15 percent of 30, which is certainly a very substantial reduction.

Mr. McKESSON. As compared to the 150 kilowatts.

Mr. COHN. I assume your recommendation would be that before a lot of money is appropriated, and they make plans for a new one, they should know where they are going to send it, and what they have in mind, and make sure the frequencies are available, and the power situation is taken care of, so that at the important hours it does not go down to almost nothing.

Mr. McKESSON. I would say where that 15 percent of 30 kilowatts comes. For engineers, they might think that is a little strange, but a six-tenths wavelength antenna, which the balloon is, will have a field strength of approximately 265 millivolts per meter, at 1 mile per kilowatt. I do not have the exact figures of the ship antenna, its effective height or resistance but I think the value will be 100 millivolts per meter. If you work that out mathematically you find it is 15 percent. Actually it is 14.4 percent.

Mr. COHN. Furthermore, I think you made the point if the services of the Navy had been used, rather than a private contractor, the Government would not have had to pay a profit and go into a cost-plus arrangement such as it did in this case; is that right?

Mr. McKESSON. That is true, if the Navy had done the work. However, the Navy also occasionally uses private contractors.

Mr. COHN. Would the Navy have been available? Were they ever asked to do this?

Mr. McKESSON. Preliminary investigation at that time indicated that the Navy would be interested in it. Officers at my level who I talked to indicated that they thought it would be possible. It did not go to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. COHN. A request was not made to higher authority to see if the Navy could do this work or not?

Mr. McKESSON. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Now, let me ask you this: The Coast Guard, of course, mans this *Courier*. Now, did they call on the Coast Guard at the outset to see what the Coast Guard could contribute and what recommendations the Coast Guard could make toward saving money?

Mr. McKESSON. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. COHN. As far as you know, the Coast Guard didn't come in until some time later; is that right?

Mr. McKESSON. After the ship was pretty well designed and partially constructed.

Mr. COHN. This, of course, is one item that you have named for us. Now, were there any other items handled by the Voice Engineering Department that you regarded as not having been handled properly, such as this one?

Mr. McKESSON. Well, I have a list of a number of other items here, which are quite technical and would require days to go into details. However, I would like to just mention what they are.

Mr. COHN. Could you do that, very briefly? And then we could decide which ones we want to go into in further detail later.

Mr. McKESSON. Coherent transmissions.

Proper use of phase modulation.

Optimum use of the twilight curtain for getting signals into Russia and satellite countries.

Improper use of Rhombic antennas on certain areas and stations, primarily those in the United States and Okinawa and the Philippine stations.

Improper design of curtain antennas, which, of course, has been partly covered and will be covered additionally.

General Sarnoff suggested some years ago the possibility of, as he called them, \$2 receivers as a means of getting additional listeners behind the Iron Curtain. That was investigated by several people privately, but the voice sabotaged it.

Mr. COHN. Didn't they ever follow that up?

Mr. McKESSON. To my knowledge, they followed it up, but as to the receivers that resulted, one type of receiver was very expensive and the other type of receiver used transistors, which I imagine would cost several hundred dollars, which are not in the throwaway class. I don't think our Treasury is that big.

The present megawatt stations, some of which are under construction, are using low antennas, which result in the same situation that Mr. Gillett spoke about yesterday, where the loss in listeners in the fading range is very high.

They have not investigated and used to the best advantage single-side band transmissions both to targets and relays. When it is used to target directly, you use a modified signalside band, so that an ordinary receiver can receive it with a considerable gain.

Another point of interest to propagation people is that along the geomagnetic equator, which is near the Philippine station, the propa-

gation in the east and west direction of vertical polarization is greatly absorbed. This is in exactly the direction they expect this station to operate, and in my belief additional tests should be made and consideration given to people such as the Bureau of Standards that know the answers to some of these questions as to what the field may be. It may be too low to give any program service to that area at all.

The VOA uses clippers at all radio stations, which result in very poor quality, and in my opinion do not gain what they are supposed to. We have a recording of these clippers in operation, and if the committee would like to go into those at some time, we have made tentative arrangements to place them on a speaker here.

Randomizing of frequencies, locations, and languages has not been used.

Transmission into enemy skipzone areas has not been used.

I believe considerable gain can be had by operating on Russian frequencies.

There have been excessive delays in construction, resulting in restrictions on the expanded program of the Voice.

However, there is one point I want to make clear here: That I believe Mr. Weldon, who has designed the megawatt transmitters, both the shortwave and the longwave, has done an exceptionally good job, and I believe all engineers in the industry will back me up in saying that he has done a wonderful job under extreme difficulty.

MR. COHN. Now, Mr. McKesson, about the last thing I have to ask you is this:

First, if I may, Mr. Chairman, for the record I will call to your attention a memorandum directed to Mr. Reed Harris, dated May 19, 1952, which has been supplied to the committee, and which might shed some light on some of the conditions which have been described. It was submitted by the Voice in New York to Mr. Reed Harris. It is entitled "Contract Administration for VOA Facilities Project." It states, in part:

On the score of site audit, from a fiscal and administrative point of view, the Department is wide open (except to the extent that our engineers have performed some of these functions despite their lack of training or of responsibility and authority).

The memorandum goes on to say at a later point——

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that memorandum from?

MR. COHN. The memorandum is under the name of the then Director of the Voice, Mr. Kohler, and it was addressed to Reed Harris, and was dated May 19, 1952.

It goes on and it states, on page 5 of the memorandum:

We are not able to tell where we stand financially on our various construction projects, and must rely on the contractor to provide information as to expenditures. This has proved wholly inadequate, even for our needs, and, of course, is downright dangerous to the Government's financial interests.

Now, may I ask that this memorandum, Mr. Chairman, be made a part of the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 60" and will be found in the appendix on p. 770.)

MR. COHN. Mr. McKesson, my last question is this, in somewhat of a summary form. You have told us about these 16 items. You and others have testified about this Baker West, this \$10 million project,

which, it turns out now, in the opinion of the Bureau of Standards and everybody else, was clearly mislocated. And as to the Bureau of Standards, of course, they were never asked for a report, but a private consultant was paid \$600,000 for this and other projects. But that opinion, a unanimous opinion, was submitted to the IIA in July of 1952, and they did nothing about it until this committee began its investigation. You have named some 16 other projects in which you state the Engineering Department was derelict in its duties. We have this memorandum. We had the testimony of Mr. Pratt, adviser to President Eisenhower, concerning the incompetence of the Engineering Department.

Now, do you think that all of these items, which involve I think almost every major engineering project the Voice has had, has in your opinion fallen into a pattern while you were with the Voice Engineering Department and observing all of these things?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes; I do; and in the projects I was concerned with, I tried to correct it. I believe I did correct some of it. But it became an impossible thing for some of us to do what we considered a proper job.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this. Assume you were the chief engineer, or assume you were in Mr. Reed Harris' position, or that of whoever was the final authority at that time, the man responsible for the engineering. I am not speaking now of the material broadcast. But assume you were in charge of all the construction, deciding what type of antenna, what type of transmitters, would be built. If you wanted to thoroughly discredit the operation, if you wanted to thoroughly sabotage it, would you not have done almost exactly what has been done?

Mr. McKESSON. I think it was very much along those lines, and I think you are correct. If I was a saboteur, I would do things like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly what has been done?

Mr. McKESSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bridges or Senator McClellan?

Senator BRIDGES. In your judgment, there has been waste in this project, No. 1; there was not proper investigation, 2; and in your judgment, before Congress authorizes further funds for anything of this kind, you think there should be rather a complete investigation into this subject by the Voice, with a report to the Congress, and that they should have competent engineers to do it, rather than some of the people they have had?

Mr. McKESSON. That is my opinion; yes, sir, very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. COHN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. McKesson.

Incidentally, I understand that you and other engineers have drafted what you think would be a feasible plan if the Voice is to be continued. We will be interested in that plan. In the meantime, I would suggest that it might be well to submit it to Dr. Johnson.

Mr. McKESSON. Yes, sir. I will try to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Just glancing over the plan casually, it seems to have apparently a lot of merit, although the committee cannot put itself in the position of drafting a plan for the Voice. I think you

should submit that to Dr. Johnson, and I would like to get his reactions to it.

Mr. McKesson. Yes, sir; I will.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your next witness?

Mr. COHN. Admiral Richmond.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you take the stand? You may bring anyone with you that you care to.

Admiral RICHMOND. I need no one, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your right hand? In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Admiral RICHMOND. I do.

Mr. COHN. Would you give us your full name, please?

TESTIMONY OF ALFRED C. RICHMOND, REAR ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT AND CHIEF OF STAFF

Admiral RICHMOND. Alfred C. Richmond, rear admiral, United States Coast Guard, Assistant Commandant.

Mr. COHN. You are the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard; is that right?

Admiral RICHMOND. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Admiral, are you thoroughly familiar with the project known as Vagabond Day, or the Courier?

Admiral RICHMOND. I was in on the original consultation with representatives of the State Department, and followed it with interest, but, of course, after the outfitting was started, my knowledge of that is based on the records that we have at Coast Guard Headquarters.

Mr. COHN. And you have consulted those records at the request of the committee; is that right?

Admiral RICHMOND. I have consulted those records.

Mr. COHN. Now, Admiral, is it a fact that the Coast Guard was not called in on this originally when the plans were first being made?

Admiral RICHMOND. From the testimony given here this morning, that is correct.

Mr. COHN. Do you feel that had they been called in originally at the time the plans were about to be formulated, and consulted about the whole thing, in view of the fact that they were eventually to man the thing, a more economical job could have been done?

Admiral RICHMOND. I believe certainly we could have given a great deal of advice in things that later involved changes, and undoubtedly economies would have been effected; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: In view of the fact that the Coast Guard would ultimately be manning that ship, would it not be the normal thing to have you called in at the time the project was initiated? Would that not be the normal procedure?

Admiral RICHMOND. I would say "Yes, sir," but if I may I would like to explain to the committee exactly how the Coast Guard got into manning of the *Vagabond*.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, before the witness does that, may I say that because I have another meeting that I have got to preside at, I will ask the committee to excuse me, please. I want to thank you

for going into this matter, and I have four members of the staff of the Appropriations Committee here now working on this thing as observers, and we appreciate the wholehearted cooperation of your committee and your able counsel, who has been investigating this subject. I hope as a result of it we are going to first show the complete disregard of funds which the Voice used in going into this subject, and the waste resulting, and also the necessity for having better planning, and, third, a complete revision of the engineering staff on a more competent basis. I think that your investigation will probably show that, and if it does that we will have at least a basis to proceed on.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say, Senator Bridges, that we have been taking a tremendous amount of testimony so far, and every competent engineer who has been before us, I believe, has agreed that the entire setup falls into a pattern. And not merely this *Vagabond* project; I think that is one of the least wasteful, though it is very wasteful. But on all of the projects you have the same pattern, a pattern that would appear to be a deliberate attempt to discredit, to sabotage, any attempt to have an effective operating Voice of America. And I heartily agree with Senator Bridges when he says your engineering setup over there needs a complete and thorough revision. It is hard for us at this time to know where to place the blame, as to why incompetent engineers were hired, whether it was deliberately done. We have been trying to find the key to this entire situation. We know it is extremely bad. And I may say to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, whenever you have any other project that you want checked into, we have a good, competent staff to do it.

Senator BRIDGES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Admiral RICHMOND. On January 22, 1951, three representatives of the Voice of America—Mr. Herrick was the senior one—visited the Coast Guard headquarters. I am not sure of the names of the other two. I think it was a Mr. Kaplan and possibly a Mr. Walker. They outlined this plan for a mobile station. They indicated that the type of ship had been selected.

Mr. COHN. They told you the type ship had already been selected; is that right?

Admiral RICHMOND. They indicated they had selected the type and were sure they could get it from the Maritime Commission.

Mr. COHN. There was no mention to you of the possibility of using a CVE or anything like that?

Admiral RICHMOND. It is only within the last day or so that I even knew a CVE was ever contemplated. The general outlines of the project were discussed, and what they asked was that the Coast Guard undertake the manning of the ship, or if we would be willing to consider the undertaking. I represented the Coast Guard at that conference and told them that, although we were not seeking the job, in line with our statutory responsibility of cooperation with other Government agencies, we would consider the matter, under three conditions: (1) that there would be a formal request from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury for Coast Guard cooperation; (2) that in the event it was decided that the Coast Guard should man the ship, at the time the Coast Guard undertook the manning of the ship, not the conversion but the manning of it—we had nothing to do with the conversion—there should be an advance of funds at the beginning

of the year, of which we would keep a strict accounting, but they would have to pay in advance for the manning; and (3) that before the manning was done, there would be a firm agreement between the State Department and the Coast Guard, as to areas of responsibility. Because you gentlemen can well understand that in a combined operation of this thing you can get into many differences of opinion.

Following that, on the 9th of February, a request was received by the Secretary of the Treasury—I might say a letter was received dated the 9th of February—from the Under Secretary of State, directed to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Coast Guard cooperation, setting forth the general outline of the plan that had been discussed earlier.

The matter was considered at Coast Guard Headquarters, and at February 20 the then Acting Secretary of the Treasury answered and said that the general terms of the plan were acceptable, and the Coast Guard would undertake to cooperate in this project and name a designated Coast Guard representative to meet with the Voice of America people.

Such a meeting was held early in March, and on the 9th of April, the prospective commanding officer was ordered to New York to go to the Hoboken plant of the Bethlehem shipyard along with the engineer or prospective engineer officer and a machinist. At the same time, we set up a staging schedule for the balance of the personnel for the vessel.

Do you want me to follow through the whole history of this, sir?

Mr. COHN. No; I don't think that is necessary. Maybe we can do it this way, but I didn't want to go into it with you. Through the Coast Guard agreement you were to take over the *Courier*. Are you familiar with the fact that Commander Wev has made an estimate as to the amount of money that was saved by the Coast Guard eliminating from the modification costs that had been planned by this Rhodes Co., this private contractor, various items?

Admiral RICHMOND. I am familiar with Commander, now Captain, Wev's letter.

Mr. COHN. I am sorry. Captain Wev.

The CHAIRMAN. Do not start demoting these naval officers.

Admiral RICHMOND. No, he was a commander at the time. Captain Wev's letter—in which he indicated certain changes that had come about after the ship arrived at the yard but before work was started based on recommendations—

Mr. COHN. Made by the Coast Guard?

Admiral RICHMOND. Made by ourselves, and an agreement that I would say involved the manning of the broadcasting room itself. Originally, the plan was that we were to deliver power to the board, and that was our only responsibility.

Mr. COHN. About how much money was saved by these modifications?

Admiral RICHMOND. At that time he indicated that he figured the estimated savings would be \$1,200,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, I understand from the witnesses that have been interviewed that originally it was planned to have an extremely plush job. and that the Coast Guard cut down on that and cut out the trimmings and saved considerable money on that score. Would you care to go into that?

Mr. COHN. Is that a fact, Admiral? In other words, various modifications were suggested by the Coast Guard, which would put complete emphasis on this from a utilitarian point of view and eliminate anything which was more elaborate than necessary?

Admiral RICHMOND. There were two main alterations, if I may enlarge upon them.

First, the original plans—and they were very rough plans—of the conversion of this vessel, the *Coastal Messenger*, had contemplated moving the deckhouse from aft amidships and placing the balloon platform aft. Furthermore, there was contemplated, as I indicated a moment ago, the carrying of the broadcasting staff. That crew would have required a breaking down or cutting up of the space. A military service, as you know, operates for its men on the basis of dormitories. I have pictures which I can show the committee of crew's quarters, for example.

Mr. COHN. What type of thing were you able to eliminate?

Admiral RICHMOND. Staterooms, a lounge, and particularly the change for the stateroom for the broadcasting personnel, civilian broadcasting personnel.

Mr. COHN. You were able to eliminate the lounge and the stateroom?

Admiral RICHMOND. As an example, originally they had planned to have from 15 to 20 State Department people on there. At the present time, there are only three. Because the work that was being done by them is now being done by Coast Guard enlisted personnel.

The major change, and I don't know that the Coast Guard alone can take credit for this, was that the original plans involved changing the after deckhouse forward and putting the balloon platform aft. As a result of these changes, the original structure of the ship, as far as the deckhouse was concerned, was left intact, and the balloon deck was put amidships. In other words, there was just a superstructure deck built over the amidship section. That, of course, saved two things. It saved the elimination of a deckhouse and the rebuilding forward. It also eliminated the running of lengthy or relatively lengthy high-powered transmission through the ship, because the balloon deck is now over the transmitting room.

Mr. COHN. And Captain Wev has estimated that all of these various items, the elimination of the lounge, the radio situation, the staterooms, all these things, amounted to a saving of approximately \$1,200,000?

Admiral RICHMOND. At that time. That was the estimate.

Mr. COHN. Let me come to this, if I may, Admiral. Are you aware that the Voice of America engineering department insisted on the installation of vapor-phase cooling for the diesel generators?

Admiral RICHMOND. I am, and have read the record on it; yes.

Mr. COHN. Did the Coast Guard regard this as necessary, or unnecessary?

Admiral RICHMOND. At the time, the Coast Guard was against the installation of vapor-phase cooling on the diesel generators for the transmission.

Mr. COHN. Do you know how much this installation cost?

Admiral RICHMOND. I do not.

Mr. COHN. We have gotten an estimate of approximately a hundred thousand dollars. Do you know whether that is accurate?

Admiral RICHMOND. I don't think that is the estimate for the installation. I have heard that by insisting on that it cost a hundred thousand dollars additional. Personally, I don't believe it.

Mr. COHN. What was your estimate?

Admiral RICHMOND. I would say probably, over conventional diesel generators, \$15,000.

Mr. COHN. About that, you say. And you say you objected to this. Is that right?

Admiral RICHMOND. We recommended against the installation of the vapor-phase cooling on the diesel generator system.

Mr. COHN. Did you recommend it because in your experience you had found it would not be the most effective thing?

Admiral RICHMOND. I wouldn't say most effective. We had utilized it on one occasion and had trouble with it. It has had very little marine experience, and we felt that it was inadvisable to put aboard a ship that would be staged in some outlying area something that hadn't been tested, fully tested.

Mr. COHN. I see. And by the way, would you see if it would be possible to ascertain the exact figure? Maybe we shouldn't ask you about that. We might be able to get that from the engineering department.

Admiral RICHMOND. As to the cost of installation?

Mr. COHN. Right.

Admiral RICHMOND. Yes. Because we didn't know what the cost was.

Mr. COHN. Am I correct in assuming that you are still, with respect to future projects of this kind, opposed to that decision?

Admiral RICHMOND. I would say at this stage we would be against vapor-phase cooling.

Mr. COHN. By the way, I think we ought to go into that for just a second, too. Is it a fact that when you had to go about the task of acquiring materials for use in the *Courier*, instead of going out and purchasing them, you went around and acquired various surplus property and requisition supplies from the Maritime Service in the Navy and effected a saving of about \$200,000, which would have had to be spent if they were purchased on the commercial market?

Admiral RICHMOND. Naturally in outfitting the ship we attempted to do it in the most economical way possible, and availed ourselves of every possible source. The answer to that is, "Yes; we went to the Maritime Commission." A specific item was the balloons already mentioned this morning. Captain Wev arranged for the transfer of 5 balloons at an estimated cost of \$18,000 for stocking.

Mr. COHN. Right. Now, my last question would be this, Admiral Richmond. You have heard some discussion here this morning about a request for an appropriation for some additional ships, along these lines. Is it your opinion that if the planning is handled in a proper manner and if the right people are called in at the very beginning and all these items we have gone over are given careful consideration and planned out by competent engineers in consultation with the Coast Guard or whoever would man them, the ships would not have to cost as much as this project has cost, and that savings might be effected?

Admiral RICHMOND. I think that is a reasonable assumption, based on the grounds that any delayed project is going to certainly cost you considerable.

Mr. COHN. I have nothing more of Admiral Richmond, except to thank him for coming up here, and effecting these economies which we have heard about.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we should thank the admiral for saving \$1,200,000? You are going to make him unpopular with the IIA if he saves that much money; that is, the old management of the IIA, I should say.

Thank you very much, Admiral.

Admiral RICHMOND. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veldhuis, I just want to apologize to you. You have evidence of tremendous importance to this investigation. We thought we would get to you this morning.

I am sorry we did not get to you this forenoon.

I wonder if we could impose on you to be available at such time as you would be called. I assume that will be next week. We want to give you sufficient time to develop fully the evidence which you have. I think it is of very great importance.

In view of the fact that you have a lawyer, Mr. Hlavaty, I assume your trip down here is costing you something. I do not believe we should have you come back again. I assume you would prefer to have your testimony completed today. Right?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So we will adjourn until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Would you give me the spelling of your name again, sir?

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF JULIUS H. HLAVATY, CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, BRONX HIGH SCHOOL OF SCIENCE, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY RALPH SHAPIRO, COUNSEL

Mr. HLAVATY. H-l-a-v-a-t-y.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hlavaty, have you done any work for the Government of any kind other than the broadcast for the Voice of America?

Mr. HLAVATY. Not in recent years. During the war, I was called on to help construct examinations in mathematics.

The CHAIRMAN. During the war? What department?

Mr. HLAVATY. I think it was the Army. I could look that up.

The CHAIRMAN. You worked for the Army during the war. How many years, and what salary did you draw?

Mr. HLAVATY. I don't recall. It was during the 3 or 4 war years. I was occasionally asked to make an examination or to check on another examination, and they reimbursed me at an hourly rate equivalent to the pay I was receiving as a chairman in the New York City school system.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you correct examination papers at that time, or did you draft them? Just what were your duties?

Mr. HLAVATY. I made up questions, and I helped draft examinations.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you correct any of the papers?

Mr. HLAVATY. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you did not have the task of passing on the grades or the eligibility of anyone at that time?

Mr. HLAVATY. Certainly not.

The CHAIRMAN. And were you a member of the Communist Party at that time?

Mr. HLAVATY. I answered the question this morning. I decline to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. On the grounds that that answer might incriminate you?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Hlavaty, I assume you are of Czech origin, are you not?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir; I am.

Senator DIRKSEN. Were you born in Czechoslovakia?

Mr. HLAVATY. I was. It was Austria-Hungary at the time I was born there.

Senator DIRKSEN. At what age did you come to the United States?

Mr. HLAVATY. At the age of 14.

Senator DIRKSEN. I assume, of course, you suffer some distress of spirit over what has happened to the freedom of the Czech people, do you not?

Mr. HLAVATY. I do.

Senator DIRKSEN. And you would like to see that freedom restored?

Mr. HLAVATY. It was for that reason that I took part in that broadcast that I was asked to participate in.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, I want to take a moment to develop a little background with reference to your refusal to answer the chairman's question this morning. And for the moment, certainly, I do not quarrel with your answer, but I would rather put the thing on another ground.

I assume you have been following somewhat the activities of this committee and what it has been seeking to do.

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir. I thought at the present time it was the question of the Voice of America. And I have not been asked about that yet. That is why I would like to develop what that program was and how I got into the program.

Senator DIRKSEN. Well, I just wanted to summarize for you somewhat in this fashion. We are concerned, obviously, about a free America, and we are concerned about those instrumentalities for which the Congress appropriates and creates, to carry American sentiment and American viewpoint and American interpretations abroad, on the theory that it certainly will strengthen the free world, and it will be in the interest of the perpetuity of the freedom of our own country.

Now, if, for any reason, whether based on assumption or allegation, there is at least a reasonable suspicion that everything is not all right, it becomes then the responsibility of some agency, whether it be this or any other committee, to make an investigation.

We go on the theory that perhaps at the outset these may be assumptions, they may be allegations, they may be well founded, or they may be ill founded. Only adducing the truth will determine that finally.

Now, in that general exploration, of course, there are two lines to follow. One is what facilities, physical facilities, you use, in the form of transmitters and so forth. Were they properly located? Were they efficiently constructed? And was it done on a sound basis? Or was there perhaps an attitude that would give rise to the belief that everything was not all right, and that one might describe it as a bit of polite and very subtle sabotage? That is one line that you investigate.

Now, the second line that you examine is the material that is broadcast. And that involves first, of course, the people that do it, and secondly, the substance of the material that is used. Because if it does not express America, and if it does not go to an objective, such as seeking to roll back communistic sentiment and to substitute therefor what we think is the true sentiment, the free sentiment, that we hope somehow to impress upon the hearts and minds of people, then we ought to look and see what is wrong. So take first of all——

Mr. HLAVATY. If I may interrupt for a moment——

Senator DIRKSEN. Just let me finish the thesis, and then I will ask a question.

Now, in investigating, of course, the type of material, that will include the scripts, how they are done, what sentiments are expressed, whether there is a misinterpretation of what we believe is the American viewpoint, quite aside from what the purveyor of the idea may think. And then, secondly, of course, there are the people. Now, if I, for one, were going to subvert a program of that kind, I think just as a natural consequence I would start first of all with people, and get those that I think will express an opposite viewpoint, or at least who can very subtly give a turn to a phrase or to a word so that it does not express America at all, as a matter of fact.

That gets back, then, to the question that was asked you this morning. The chairman asked you whether or not in a given year you had been a member of the Communist Party. You declined to answer because of the immunity that is granted under the fifth amendment. I will not quarrel about it now. It could be entirely on good ground, and I would always rationalize it, I think, on behalf of the witness if it were a close question.

But I would say this to you, having listened this morning to your testimony as far as you got. It would seem to me that you, a born Czech and a naturalized American, would be so interested in this thing called freedom that on patriotic grounds you might serve your country, you might serve your city, by stating very freely, instead of taking refuge in constitutional immunity, whether or not you had been a member of that party in any given year. I put it on that ground. And I think there is something of a patriotic duty, quite aside from the legal immunity that is involved, to answer the question. But I do not think I, for one, would compel you to, if you insisted on finding refuge in the fifth amendment.

Mr. HLAVATY. May I speak to that? The reason I am here today is I think traceable back to the fact that when I graduated from high school I won a medal on cooperation in government. And when I was asked by the Voice of America representative to speak, I didn't seek

the opportunity to speak on the program, but when I was asked to speak I said "Yes," after I found out what they wanted on the program. They wrote the script. I submitted the contents to my immediate superior at the school, because it was a description of the school in which I teach, which is a very special school; in fact, I would like to say the best high school in the world. And I was proud to say all those things. But I did not write any part of it.

I do want to say something about the second point that you make, Senator, because I feel that very deeply. I think I am acting as a loyal American citizen when I invoke constitutional guaranties. Because I disagree with Senator Mundt when he said this morning that citing the fifth amendment is a confession of guilt. I don't think it is. I think it is a guaranty which particularly in difficult times it is important for Americans to cite. It puts the burden of proof on the accuser, not on the defender. And I don't know who, what person, for any motive whatsoever, might charge me with something which is not so or which is not true. And that is why I invoke that.

Senator DIRKSEN. Well, frankly, granting everything you say, the weakness in the case that you make lies simply in the fact that, first, you are not being charged with anything. This is not a judicial proceeding at all. This is just an investigatory proceeding seeking to develop the facts with respect to an activity of the Federal Government that we seek to make as efficient as we can in the interest of our country. Now, that is the first thing.

But secondly, out of all your testimony this morning, I could not help but feel—and I never asked a single question this morning; I just listened—I could not help but feel, sir, that you gave to my mind and I think to the mind of every listener who may have been in this room that you were a member of the party in some year. You made exceptions to given years. You said, "In that year I was not." "In that year I was not." "In another year I was not." Then, when we came to still another year, you said, "I decline to answer."

Now, how could one go away without the impression that in a given year not too far back you were a member of the party, and that it came within that time when this program was first started, in 1947?

Now, if we are trying to make this the Voice of America—it is a good name; the Voice of America, American opinion, American sentiment—I think you would serve your country if you very freely said, "In that year I was." Because you are not being charged with a crime. If I am familiar with the laws of the land, it is no crime to be a member of the Communist Party. But at least it does give to us some information I think we need as to who was selected to broadcast these sentiments to all the wide world and what the background is.

Mr. HLAVATY. In all the questions, there hasn't been one question yet about the contents of the program. What I actually said, though it wasn't anything that I wrote, I agreed with most of it. I suppose you have a text of it. I brought a text with me. Unfortunately, it is in Slovak, but if you would like to hear what is in it, I could give you a running translation of what I did say. And by no stretch of the imagination could it be considered as anything which might subvert—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hlavaty, have you taken any interest in politics in New York?

Mr. HLAVATY. Off and on; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are aware of the fact, I assume, that the Liberal Party broke away from the American Labor Party; that the Liberal Party was the anti-Communist element of the American Labor Party; that the American Labor Party has been cited twice as completely Communist controlled. Are you aware of that?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are aware of that?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been aware of that? You knew that last year; did you not?

Mr. HLAVATY. I knew that such statements were made; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew they were cited as Communist controlled.

Mr. SHAPIRO. What do you mean by "cited as Communist controlled?"

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Attorney, I told you you may take no part in the proceedings. You may talk to your client if you care to.

Mr. SHAPIRO. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. Understand this: You may talk to your client. He may talk to you whenever he wants to. If you want a private conversation with your attorney, we will give you a private room for that. The attorney will take no part in these proceedings. If you think he does not understand a question, you may talk to him whenever you want to.

(Mr. Shapiro confers with Mr. Hlavaty.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will mark these as exhibit 61.

(1952 election primarily enrollments were marked "Exhibit 61" and will be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. We want to welcome Congressman Van Pelt here. Representative VAN PELT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you hand this to the witness, Ruth?

Mr. HLAVATY. I understood you to say about that that there is an opinion held by many people that the American Labor Party is or was Communist-dominated. Is that what you meant?

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Do you know that it has been cited——

Mr. HLAVATY. Is that a technical word that I don't understand. Is that a technical word?

The CHAIRMAN. It was named officially by the Un-American Activities Committee, and I believe it was named by the California Un-American Activities Committee, as Communist-controlled. Your answer to that was "Yes." Now, if you want to change your answer, you may change it.

Mr. HLAVATY. Well, I have no idea what is in that book.

The CHAIRMAN. You know it has the reputation of being Communist-controlled? You have known all along that this had the reputation of being Communist-controlled?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify those two documents which were handed you?

Mr. HLAVATY. This is the primary enrollment for the year 1952, and it shows that I enrolled in the American Labor Party.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other one?

Mr. HLAVATY. This other one is not me. And I am very much disturbed by it.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose is that?

Mr. HLAVATY. This is an enrollment blank signed by my wife.

The CHAIRMAN. For 1952?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hlavaty, have you attended meetings of the Communist Party or Communist cells?

You may advise your client at any time you care to, Mr. Attorney.

(Mr. Shapiro confers with Mr. Hlavaty.)

Mr. HLAVATY. I must decline to answer that question on the grounds of the fifth amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. On the grounds that your answer might incriminate you. How many years have you taught school?

Mr. HLAVATY. Twenty-four years.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty-four years. And your job as of today is what?

Mr. HLAVATY. I am the chairman of the department of mathematics at the Bronx High School.

The CHAIRMAN. How many students are at that school?

Mr. HLAVATY. 2,400.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever attended any Communist Party meetings or any cell meetings which were attended by any of your students.

Mr. HLAVATY. I must decline to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. On the grounds that the answer might incriminate you?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever attempted to recruit any of your students into the Communist Party?

Mr. HLAVATY. I am afraid I must decline to answer all such questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You can decline to answer that. You have a right to. If, as you say, you honestly think if you told us the truth, it would incriminate you, you have the right to decline to answer.

Mr. HLAVATY. That isn't the way I would say it, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only ground upon which you have the right. Otherwise we will not grant you that right. You are only entitled to the right to refuse to answer before this committee if you honestly think that if you told this committee the truth it would incriminate you. You are not entitled to decline on the ground that perjury might incriminate you. You understand that. It is only if you honestly feel that a truthful answer would incriminate you.

Do you understand the question?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And your answer is that you decline to answer on the ground that your answer might incriminate you?

Mr. HLAVATY. On the ground of the fifth amendment; yes, sir.

Senator, you still haven't asked me what I was called down here for and brought away from my work for. I made a broadcast, a patriotic and unpaid act, and you haven't asked me anything about it.

The CHAIRMAN. We know you read a broadcast over the air, Mr. Hlavaty, that was prepared by someone else. We have that. It will be made part of the record.

(The broadcast material referred to was marked "Exhibit 62" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. We are now going into your background.

Mr. HLAVATY. But this—

The CHAIRMAN. One of the reasons why you are here, Mr. Hlavaty, is to demonstrate the lack of wisdom in the present rule adopted by the Information Administration. It is a rule which is in direct conflict with Public Law 402, which was drafted and introduced by Senator Mundt. That law provides that anyone who works for the information program in any capacity must pass a loyalty test. We find, as I have explained to you this morning, that where people flunk that loyalty test, then, instead of being hired on a full-time basis, they are hired on a piecemeal basis.

I would like to ask you this question. Has anyone at the Voice ever asked you whether you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HLAVATY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be willing at this time to give us the names of those people who attended Communist meetings or cell meetings with you?

Mr. HLAVATY. I must decline to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. On the ground that that might incriminate you?

Mr. HLAVATY. On the grounds of the fifth amendment; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You regard the Communist movement as an international conspiracy, do you?

(Mr. Shapiro confers with Mr. Hlavaty.)

Mr. HLAVATY. It is a matter of opinion. I agree with that statement, however.

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer was what? What is your answer to that, sir?

Mr. HLAVATY. What was the last question?

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Do you consider the Communist Party not a political party but rather an international conspiracy?

Mr. HLAVATY. It is a matter of opinion, but I agree with that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree with that?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That being the situation, as an American, you having been naturalized and having had all the benefits of an American citizen, if you agree that communism is an international conspiracy against this country, do you not think you have a duty to sit down and tell us all about your connection with the Communist Party, the people with whom you have been associated?

Mr. HLAVATY. I think I have a duty to answer all the questions on your present inquiry on the Voice of America, and I would answer those questions fully and truthfully, as fully and as truthfully as I possibly can.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked you whether you have attended Communist cell meetings. We have asked you whether you tried to recruit students into the Communist movement.

Mr. HLAVATY. But all those questions have nothing to do with the Voice of America or what I said there or how I came to say what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot force you to give the names of the people who were with you in the movement. I was just suggesting that if

you claim to be a loyal American, if you concede that communism is a conspiracy against this country, you do owe a heavy duty. But I cannot force you to do that.

You had a question. When you made this broadcast, did you start out by announcing your name?

Mr. HLAVATY. The broadcast was started by a general introduction by the person who was interviewing me.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you identify yourself? Were you identified?

Mr. HLAVATY. I was identified when I was asked, and that is on page 3—

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Were you identified?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir; I was.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I do not think I have any further questions of this witness.

Senator McCLELLAN. I think in fairness to the witness, Mr. Chairman, he should be given an opportunity to submit for the record the script of the broadcast that he has referred to, and that he also should be prepared to tell the committee how he happened to make the broadcast, for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The script is part of the record.

Mr. HLAVATY. I may say there that it seems to me that my name tomorrow is going to be spread over all the newspapers in the country, and what I said here, which would be the strongest defense that I would have, will not be in there. I appreciate that you want to introduce it into the record. I would like to explain how I came to make this speech.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am just asking you so that you can explain.

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say for Senator McClellan's benefit, as I have said before: The broadcast was not prepared by this gentleman. There has been no claim, as far as I understand, that it contains any Communist propaganda.

Is that correct, Mr. Cohn?

Mr. COHN. None whatsoever.

Mr. HLAVATY. May I explain how I came to make the talk?

Senator McCLELLAN. I think in view of the fact that the witness has been questioned about his associations and his affiliation, with nothing else before the committee other than that, the assumption might be that in this broadcast there was something that favored communism or indicated maybe he was following the party line or something.

Just in fairness to you, I think that should be at least filed with the committee as a part of its record, and I think you should be permitted to tell how you happened to make the broadcast.

Mr. HLAVATY. Thank you very much.

Senator McCLELLAN. You understand, I am not taking a position of agreeing with you in all the positions you have taken, other than that you have the right to take them under the Constitution. I am not at all condoning some of your attitudes. But, as a matter of fairness, I think this should be in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McClellan, the witness has been notified that he has the right to make any statement he cares to make. He can do that.

Mr. HLAVATY. First I would like to explain how I came to make this broadcast.

Last year, I was invited to speak to one of our classes in world literature on Czech and Slovak literature. I did so. It happens that one of the students in our school is the daughter of someone in charge of the Czechoslovak Division of the Voice of America in New York, and this girl carried the news back that the chairman of the mathematics department read some Slovak poetry and discussed Czech and Slovak literature, and the mother came to see me and spoke to me and to my principal and asked me whether I would be willing to take part in an interview.

The CHAIRMAN. What was this person's name?

Mr. HLAVATY. Mrs. Winn.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. what?

Mr. HLAVATY. Mrs. Winn. W-i-n-n, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know her first name?

Mr. HLAVATY. I don't, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Does she work for the Voice?

Mr. HLAVATY. She came to me from there. I don't know what position she occupies there. And she said they had a series of programs called This Is America, factual accounts illustrating facets of American life, and she thought that a program which would explain one particular educational provision that the New York City school system was making would be a very interesting program. Our school, as some of you may know, is a special school for gifted children, and since this involved the school, I felt I ought to go to my principal and say I had been invited to make this talk and, "Should I take part in it?" He saw no objection to it, and this script was submitted.

First, there is a long introduction about the school, and then there is a series of questions addressed to me. It is in the Slovak language. And I answered the questions. It explains how we admit students into the Bronx High School of Science, what kind of curriculum we offer, what extracurricular activities, what enrichments there are, and some of the great things that our graduates have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to tell us who prepared the script?

Mr. HLAVATY. I don't know who did. I was asked then to come down on my own. I wasn't paid for this in any way. I came down, and we read the script over. And the actual full reading of it I believe was recorded, and the broadcast was made several days later.

There was a very interesting consequence after that. Several days later, I received a telephone call from them that they had received a letter. It developed a childhood friend of mine heard this broadcast in a displaced persons' camp in western Germany, and he wrote to me. He recognized me. And he identified himself.

Now, that is what the broadcast contained.

I would be very glad to read any parts of it if you would be interested, and I certainly would appreciate having it made a part of the record.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Hlavaty, let me ask at that point: You answered the question of the chairman to the effect that in this interview preceding the broadcast you made manifest to all the listeners who you were.

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Your first name, and your last name?

Mr. HLAVATY. No; as I look at it, I was simply—the introduction said that this person interviewed the principal, and the principal “told me that the chairman of the mathematics department is Dr. Hlavaty, who comes from Czechoslovakia, so I went to see Dr. Hlavaty and begged him to tell us something about the school. Listen to what he told us.” And then the interview begins.

Senator DIRKSEN. Do you keep up some contact with people back in Czechoslovakia? By letter and otherwise?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Are you pretty well known back there?

Mr. HLAVATY. Well, I came to this country 32 years ago, and I have relations there. I don't know that I have any kind of reputation there.

Senator DIRKSEN. Well, here is the thought that occurs to me, quite aside from whatever sentiments may have been expressed in that script. If, for instance, I were the interviewer, and I should suddenly start one of these international broadcasts by saying, “You are now about to hear from Mr. Earl Browder”—Mr. Browder might read the Ten Commandments, yet behind the Iron Curtain people would know certainly who it is, would they not?

Mr. HLAVATY. They would not know me that way.

Senator DIRKSEN. Well, I am speaking about Mr. Browder. They would know that Mr. Browder was broadcasting, then. They would know who he is. They might be very cynically curious about it, but on the other hand, they might say, “Well, evidently we are making progress in America, because now Mr. Browder is being used and his talents employed for this purpose.” But now you come on. Now, I would not for the world say that you were a member of the Communist Party. I would not follow up any such allegation, no matter what impression you may have given from what you expressed this morning. But would it not be reasonable to assume that back in Czechoslovakia when your name was announced and you did maintain those contacts, if you had been a member of the party in America, there would be some who would say, “Well”——

Mr. HLAVATY. May I speculate as to what the reaction might have been on the part of the people who were there?

Senator DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. HLAVATY. They would know that in 1921, as a very poor boy of 14, I went to America, and I received such opportunities in America that I was able to reach so distinguished a position as chairman of mathematics of the best high school in the world. I think that would be a very good kind of propaganda for America.

Senator DIRKSEN. But what would the invading hosts say over there to their leaders who have subverted the freedom of Czechoslovakia, if you had been a member, and, by the peculiarities of those apparatuses that seem to work, they would identify you at once? Then what?

Mr. HLAVATY. I have no idea.

Senator DIRKSEN. It would discount everything that was said in the script.

Mr. HLAVATY. I have no idea, really. Senator.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, one other thing I would like to ask about is this: You mentioned a moment ago that your name will doubtless

appear on the front page. That might be a warranted assumption. And it is one of the reasons why I try to be cautious not to injure anybody. But on the other hand, look at the other side of this responsibility. You have neighbors and you have friends in New York. Doubtless they knew that you had been invited. Maybe you told them. Maybe they found out in another way that you were going to do a broadcast on invitation by the Voice of America.

Now, you said that you had been identified with the American Labor Party in New York. Some neighbors, some friends or associates, who are Americans and taxpaying Americans and have to support this sort of thing might say, "Well, how strange. Here is the head of the mathematics department in a very prominent high school with more than 2,000 students, whose background we know, and he is invited to participate and lend his voice over the air waves for a broadcast to a foreign land."

Mr. HLAVATY. But, Senator, you see how unfair you are in this?

Senator DIRKSEN. I am trying, my dear sir, to be very fair, and if there is anything in what I say that is unfair, I will take it all back, every bit of it.

Mr. HLAVATY. You say something about my background. I am distressed today about what is happening to me. I have a reputation from New York to California as a teacher of mathematics. Three weeks from today I am supposed to teach a model lesson at a national conference of mathematics teachers.

In my own community I am shown as a selfless giver of himself to every community activity. That is how I am known. Not by the fact that maybe some time I registered in the American Labor Party. That is something that most people probably don't even know. And I think if anything, that is what should be weighed against this. What is happening here today means, if not actually, potentially, the end of a career which I with all modesty can say was a distinguished career in education. In education, mind you. In New York City I rose to every single distinction that a teacher of mathematics could gain, not by my opinions but because I am a teacher and because I am a teacher of mathematics.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that Communist teachers should be employed to teach in the high schools?

Mr. HLAVATY. I have had occasion to pass on the qualifications of teachers—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that Communist teachers should be employed to teach in the high schools?

Mr. HLAVATY. Let me finish, Senator. I haven't had a chance to say very much in my own defense. I really haven't.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, Mr. Hlavaty, you are getting a lot more opportunity than you normally would get. The House Un-American Activities Committee used to have a rule which I think was an excellent rule. That was that when a man came up and said, "I refuse to tell you whether I am a member of the Communist Party, because if I told you the truth, it would incriminate me," he was ordered to step down. He was not heard from after that. We are giving you unlimited time to be heard. And I am not sure this is the correct rule. I think I might favor the rule the House committee had while Senator Mundt was on that committee. We may yet adopt that rule. I do not know. That is on the theory that when a man says,

"I can't tell you the truth about my connection with an international conspiracy, because if I told you the truth, I might go to jail," I am not sure we should hear him any further. But we are permitting you to do that, and then we are allowing you to continue.

The question was: Do you think that Communist teachers should be employed to teach in the high schools?

Mr. HLAVATY. I think a teacher should be judged by what he says on the job. I agree with Senator Taft, who says that when you put a teacher in a job you should watch him, and if he does a job, that is it, whatever his opinions may be. If he is guilty of any conspiracy or of any crime, it certainly should be provable. I wouldn't ask a man what his opinions were to decide whether he is a good carpenter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that he should be allowed to teach if he tries to recruit his students outside of class hours into the Communist Party?

Mr. HLAVATY. Absolutely not.

The CHAIRMAN. You think he should not. Do you think he should be allowed to teach if he takes part in Communist activities outside of the classroom?

Mr. HLAVATY. Absolutely not.

The CHAIRMAN. If he was a Communist, he would be taking part in Communist activities outside of the classrooms, would he not?

Mr. HLAVATY. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you do not know whether a Communist would be a Communist outside of the classroom?

Mr. HLAVATY. There again, I don't know what you mean by Communist activities. If he is engaged in anything treasonable or wrong, then he should be removed from the job, no matter how competent he is. But if he is competent on the job, and has private activities and opinions I think—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is wrong to belong to the Communist Party at this time, in view of your statement that it is an international conspiracy? Do you think that is wrong?

Mr. HLAVATY. I don't know. If it were wrong, it should be written into a law.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you feel that unless something is written into a law it is not wrong?

Mr. HLAVATY. Well, I didn't make that general statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that, now.

Go ahead, Senator.

Senator DIRKSEN. I want to examine for a moment this observation that has been made on several occasions when witnesses have gone back to quoting Senator Taft. You say that as long as you show high efficiency and competence in a given field there should be no inquiry about anything else?

Mr. HLAVATY. May I say what I mean about that? I mean not just whether I can teach the Pythagorean theorem perfectly. But if a teacher does a good all-around job, he is a good influence on the children, he teaches his subject matter, he rears and develops good loyal Americans, I would say that such a person, whatever his opinions outside the classroom are, is entitled to stay on the job.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, before I pursue it further, let me ask: Is this high school in which you teach a tax-supported school?

Mr. HLAVATY. It is a public school.

Senator DIRKSEN. A public school. So the citizens through their taxes support this school?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Now, it would occur to me in all honesty, Mr. Hlavaty, that you might never have uttered a subversive word of any kind in the classroom, and you may have been able to lead youngsters through the mazes of Euclid better than probably anybody who ever taught the fourth dimension or quadratics; but if the youngsters said, "There must be something to this Communist business, because here is our very capable teacher, and he has some truck with it, and he is identified with it," you would not have to say a word, if at once the symbolism of the thing, that has its greatest influence upon young and formative minds, took hold. And I think I can draw somewhat on my own impressions when I was in grade school and high school. I thought the sun rose and set on the teacher. But you say that is your business. Yet, this is a tax-supported school. I think I disagree with you. No matter what your competence may be in the field of mathematics, I think there is a subtle influence that goes out from your conduct and your identity with organizations. If they seem to subvert the basic principles of America, it has a decided effect upon the youngsters. And I do not think you can take the easy answer and say that so long as you show that proficiency there should be no exploration of anything else.

Mr. HLAVATY. On the question of influencing children, I think I am an expert on that. For 25 years I have been at the business.

Senator DIRKSEN. I have no doubt of it.

Mr. HLAVATY. And you influence children in two ways. Anybody who is a teacher knows that to teach anything you have to explain clearly and drill and go over and go over. A hint won't do it. You can't teach the addition of fractions that way. You can't teach parallel line theorems that way. You have to go over them.

The second influence on children is what kind of person the teacher is, whether he is a person who in all his activities has an integrity about him and has an honesty about him. Now, if there is a person who has those qualities, that is what I mean by all-around competence; I don't mean just pure technical efficiency in teaching any particular thing. If those two things are there, I think that person should be a teacher. Now, if it can be demonstrated that people with red hair don't have one or another of those characteristics, throw them out on the ground that they have red hair. But you would have to establish that first, wouldn't you?

Senator DIRKSEN. I can give you a far better illustration, I think. Because I remember the dean of a dental college who used to chew tobacco around the clock. And you would be surprised at the number of students on the campus who thought that was good because the dean did it.

Mr. HLAVATY. Some of my students fold their handkerchiefs the way I do and during the proper seasons carry flowers in their button-holes because I do, and I always felt that was a sign that I was influencing them. But I don't think I ever taught anybody to chew tobacco.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask you a question?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe it is wrong to teach belief in God in a school?

Mr. HLAVATY. It depends on what the school is. I think in this country we have a separation of church and state. I think it is proper in religious schools to teach belief in God.

Senator SYMINGTON. You said that you were a good American. Is that right?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe in God?

I am only trying to help you. I do not understand your concept. Let me rephrase it to you this way. If you did believe in God, would you like your children taught by a Communist?

Mr. HLAVATY. This is another confusing question. May I ask my attorney?

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not want you to answer if you do not want to. I would like to say you are the most confused witness we have ever had. I do not want you to ask your counsel on that. I withdraw the question.

Senator MUNDT. Just one question along that same line. You have stated that you think the Communist Party is an international conspiracy, I believe. Since you agree with the committee that the Communist Party is an international conspiracy, I wish you would explain how you can reconcile your statement that you think a teacher who fits your concept of competence should be permitted to teach even though he be a member of the Communist Party. Because if he be a member of the Communist Party he is contributing to an international conspiracy which seeks to destroy all such schools as that in which you teach.

Mr. HLAVATY. Well, I think—I don't know too much about this, but wouldn't you have to establish in the individual person's case that he subscribes to the things which we usually associate with communism? I mean, we don't just identify a person by the group that he may choose to belong to and automatically judge him on that basis.

Senator MUNDT. That was not the question. We asked you a question about a man who was a member of the Communist Party, and you said you thought a member of the Communist Party should be permitted to teach provided he had the general all-around competence and did nothing in the schoolroom or with the children that led them in the direction of communism. My point is that if you belong to the Communist Party you are ipso facto contributing to an international conspiracy which seeks to overthrow our way of life, which is now providing the arms and ammunition and the lives in Korea to kill off some of the kids you taught in your school. I just do not follow you at all. You think that that type of teacher, regardless of his competence, is fit to teach in a tax-supported school?

Mr. HLAVATY. No; as I say, if the individual person who is a member of the Communist Party can be shown to subscribe to those principles which make communism an international conspiracy, then by all means he should not be allowed to teach.

Senator MUNDT. I do not care what he subscribes to. If he belongs to the party and pays his dues, that helps the conspiracy. I do not care if he is a wooden Indian in front of a cigar store; if he walks by and gives the dues collector a dollar every quarter, he is contributing to the overthrow of our way of life.

Senator McCLELLAN. You keep referring to the fact that it should be established that he is a member of the Communist Party, or, "if it could be established." You can appreciate the difficulty any committee or any board of school supervisors or any other official tribunal would have in establishing those facts if all of those who have knowledge of them took the same position that you take today, can you not? You are not being helpful. You may be protecting yourself, but you are not being helpful to this committee, or to anyone else who would like to establish those facts as you say they should be established before any judgment is rendered.

Mr. HLAVATY. Of course, there we come to a question of what the committee is investigating.

Senator McCLELLAN. It is investigating the thing that it is asking you about, obviously.

Mr. HLAVATY. I thought it was the Voice of America.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, it is the Voice of America and how it is conducted and who is running it and who is being used to carry out this program and what they believe in and what their philosophy is. That is the only way we can investigate the Voice of America and come to any sound judgment about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. You said that a man that was a good carpenter—

Mr. HLAVATY. May I answer your question for the record? I do believe in God. But it seemed to me a wrong kind of question.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is why you wanted to ask your counsel?

Mr. HLAVATY. Whether it was a proper kind of question.

Senator SYMINGTON. The reason I asked the question is that I wanted to understand you. If a man is a good carpenter, you say, it makes no difference what he believes beyond the fact that he is a good carpenter.

Mr. HLAVATY. I once read an essay by Macaulay in which he discusses whether Jews should have civil rights. I don't know whether you have read that essay. He says a man's orthodoxy of belief may decide whether he should be archbishop of Canterbury, but should not decide whether he ought to be allowed to cobble shoes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, in other words, if you are a good mathematician working on the development of children's minds, it would make no difference whether you were a Communist too, as far as the teaching was concerned. Is that right?

Mr. HLAVATY. I can't see how particular beliefs, religious beliefs or political beliefs, could affect your teaching of mathematics.

Mr. COHN. By the way, did you attack communism at all in that script?

Mr. HLAVATY. This was not political.

Mr. COHN. No; there was nothing one way or the other on the subject of communism, was there?

Mr. HLAVATY. No.

Mr. COHN. So, certainly you were not coming out against communism or anything like that. You were merely talking about the school system and what goes on. At that time you were a registered member of the American Labor Party, which you have told us today you knew was Communist controlled. Do you not think that is pretty material to this?

Mr. HLAVATY. Mr. Cohn, I didn't say I knew that. And secondly, I have not attended a meeting of the American Labor Party in, oh, maybe 7 or 8 years. I didn't register at every election. Sometimes I did. Sometimes I did not.

Mr. COHN. Sir, you proclaimed to the world in a public registration for the year 1952 that you were joining up with the American Labor Party, a party that has been cited as a Communist front, which you have told us here you knew.

Mr. HLAVATY. But I had no feeling that I was—it might have been—

Mr. COHN. This isn't '48, or 10 years ago. This is the year in which you made this broadcast.

Now, I want to ask you this.

I am sorry. Did you want to comment on that?

Mr. HLAVATY. When I registered with a listed party, I knew that many people considered it a left-wing organization. To me it wasn't a matter of particular consequence when I registered. Really it wasn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hlavaty, you just got through telling Senator Dirksen that your students thought so much of you that they would fold their handkerchiefs the way you folded yours and they would wear flowers the way you did. Do you not think that when they learned that you were supporting an organization, were a member of an organization, that was publicly proclaimed as a front for and doing the work of the Communist Party—

Mr. HLAVATY. There isn't a student in the school who knew how I registered.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish. Do you not think they might imitate you, then, too?

Mr. HLAVATY. If they knew it. But I thought that was a private affair of mine how I registered. My students didn't know that. And I certainly didn't tell them how I registered.

Senator DIRKSEN. But, Mr. Hlavaty, the pollbooks are subject to inspection by anyone who wants to go and look at them.

Mr. HLAVATY. But my students wouldn't go and look at them to find out how I registered.

Senator DIRKSEN. Are there no people interested in public affairs around where you live that take an opportunity to look at the pollbooks and the publications of the names?

Mr. HLAVATY. It may well be.

Senator DIRKSEN. Oh, it would be, I think. It would be.

Mr. HLAVATY. Now, I live in a suburb of New York City, and it isn't at all likely that any student of mine would know how I registered.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to show you the extent to which your activities are public knowledge, I understand the staff got your name, discovered you had worked for the Voice, because some people in the Czech community objected strenuously to the Voice attempting to dignify you by calling you over there to read this script. They called the committee's attention to the fact that you belonged to this organization officially listed as a Communist front, and that is why we checked into your background further. That is why we asked you whether you were an active Communist in 1948. That is why, after

checking into your background, we asked you whether you tried to recruit students into the Communist Party.

So I can assure you there is no secret in your community as to Hlavaty's activities outside of the classroom. I think this all has a direct bearing upon Senator Dirksen's comments in regard to the influence which a Communist teacher may exert upon his students, even though he never raises his voice in favor of the Communist conspiracy in the classroom.

Are there any further questions, Mr. Cohn?

Mr. COHN. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have anything further to state, you may go ahead.

You wanted this script made a part of the record. I think it has been received already.

Mr. COHN. We have gone into that. It contains nothing, one way or the other. This is in Slovak. I think we can obtain a translation of it in English and have them both attached to the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say the English translation might be more valuable.

I think there is one question we may have missed asking you. Do you know any Communist teachers in the New York school system?

Mr. HLAVATY. Well, certainly I don't know——

(Mr. Shapiro confers with Mr. Hlavaty.)

Mr. HLAVATY. I would say that it is a question that goes back to what I said this morning, that I decline to answer——

The CHAIRMAN. On the ground your answer might incriminate you?

Mr. HLAVATY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have that right.

You may step down.

The committee will adjourn until the next call.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 p. m., a recess was taken to the call of the Chair.)

STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

MONDAY, MARCH 16, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; and Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; G. David Schine, chief consultant; and Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk; and John Leahy, State Department, Deputy Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Senator MUNDT (presiding). The committee will come to order.

Who is your first witness?

Mr. SCHINE. Mr. Veldhuis.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Veldhuis, will you come forward, please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. VELDHUIS. So help me God.

Senator MUNDT. Will you, first of all, give your name and background for the record, so that we will know to whom we are having the privilege of listening this morning?

TESTIMONY OF ALBERT C. VELDHUIS, CHIEF ENGINEER, WIND TURBINE CO.

Mr. VELDHUIS. My name is Albert C. Veldhuis, V-e-l-d-h-u-i-s. I am chief engineer for the Wind Turbine Co. I have been connected with the Wind Turbine Co. for about 6 years or somewhat in excess of 6 years. I have been connected with the radio communications business for well in excess of 20 years and have, for the last 10 to 15 years, specialized in antenna work in low frequency and high and ultrahigh frequencies.

Senator MUNDT. Will you give us just a word about the Durban Co.?

Mr. VELDHUIS. W-i-n-d T-u-r-b-i-n-e.

Senator MUNDT. The Wind Turbine Co. Will you give us a little bit about what kind of company that it is, what it does?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The Wind Turbine Co. is a company that was originally set up to develop and produce wind power plants, which we are still doing today; parallel to that, has developed the line of broadcasting towers, antenna towers, and antennas of all sorts and descriptions. We do quite a bit of work in that field. We do the designs, the development, the construction, and the erection of such antennas in the field if the customer so desires.

Senator MUNDT. O. K.

This distinguished-looking gentleman on my left is Senator Symington, of Missouri, and I am Senator Mundt of South Dakota, and the only reason you are looking at just two members of the committee this morning instead of the full committee quota is that, simultaneous with these hearings, hearings are being held over in the House caucus room on the President's new reorganization plan, and the rest of our colleagues are there.

Mr. COHN, you may proceed with the witness.

Mr. COHN. Dr. Veldhuis, you told us you are the chief engineer of this Wind Turbine Co. Is it a fact that the Wind Turbine Co. is the company which holds the contract for the construction of antenna work for the Voice of America?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. And when were you awarded this contract by the Voice of America?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That was at the end of August 1950.

Mr. COHN. The end of August 1950.

Now, exactly what type of work were you engaged to do, by the State Department, for the Voice of America?

Mr. VELDHUIS. We were engaged to construct and fabricate the antennas and erect those antennas in accordance with plans and specifications that were supplied to us.

Mr. COHN. Now, are you a contractor in what is known as the curtain antenna program of the Voice of America?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I would think so; yes.

Mr. COHN. Would you tell us just what this curtain antenna program is?

First of all I might ask you you: What is its total estimated cost?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The total cost for the contract is around \$1,700,000. It is slightly in excess of \$1,700,000.

Mr. COHN. What is the total cost of the project, the curtain antenna project?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I do not know.

Mr. COHN. An estimate has been furnished to us of approximately \$5 million. Does that sound right?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is quite possible. In this antenna program there is involved the design of those antennas. There is also involved the towers to support the antennas that we are fabricating.

Mr. COHN. Now, how many antennas are being built?

Mr. VELDHUIS. A total of 40 antennas.

Mr. COHN. Forty antennas. For how many transmitting stations?

Mr. VELDHUIS. For six transmitting stations.

Mr. COHN. For six; is that right?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Do you know whether or not the entire program calls for 10 towers to supply 10 transmitting stations?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I believe that is true also. That is this way: that 1 location has 2 curtains, each containing 4 antennas. Other locations have 1 curtain, each containing the same 4 antennas.

Mr. COHN. What do you mean by a curtain? I know it is called the curtain-antenna program. What does that word "curtain" signify?

Mr. VELDHUIS. This particular type of antenna consists of dipoles that are suspended in front of a reflecting screen and that screen is vertical and therefore resembles somewhat and is supported somewhat the way a normal curtain is suspended. For that reason—mainly for that reason—we speak of curtain antennas, although a technically more correct name would be broadside antennas.

Mr. COHN. I see. Now, is the estimate we have received that the total cost of each of these antennas is approximately half a million dollars accurate, to your knowledge?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I don't know that. I can see how that price would run up that high; yes.

Mr. COHN. Let me ask you this: Who is the main contractor in this work? Is that the company of Francisco & Jacobus?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Those are the architect engineers.

Mr. COHN. They are the architect engineers; is that correct?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Now, the company of Welden & Carr is also in this picture. How do they fit in?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The only thing I know about that is that the firm of Welden & Carr has made a model investigation which presumably led to the present design of those antennas that we are talking about.

Mr. COHN. By the way, have you ever heard of anything like these curtain antennas before this?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. COHN. They have been used on other occasions; is that right?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Very many; yes.

Senator MUNDT. Is that the customary type of antenna used by commercial broadcasting firms in the United States?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I would say it is 1 of the 2 main types of antennas.

Senator MUNDT. Used by commercial concerns?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, yes.

Senator MUNDT. It is a satisfactory type, is it?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Very much so.

Mr. COHN. Now, Dr. Veldhuis, to go back to the beginning, as I understand it, Francisco & Jacobus were the architect engineers and, we have been advised, were what is known as the consulting engineers on the project. You say you were awarded your contract by the State Department in August of 1950. Is that correct?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Now, did you receive the contract as a result of competitive bidding?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Let me explain the circumstances surrounding that bid. On August 18, 1950, we heard, through a business friend of ours, that the State Department was about to award a contract—a sizable contract—for the construction and erection of those antennas. As a result of that, the same day the Wind Turbine Co. got in contact with the State Department and the architect engineers, and found out that the contract was to be awarded the next Monday, which I believe

was August 21. We had been able to get the State Department and the architect engineers to delay the awarding of that contract for, I believe, a week. We also have been able to obtain the plans and specifications and we made up a bid accordingly.

Mr. COHN. And you were awarded the contract?

Mr. VELDHUIS. And as a result we were awarded the contract.

Mr. COHN. Do you not know that you were the lowest bidder?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I know we were the lowest bidder.

Mr. COHN. You were the lowest bidder. Do you know, whereas you were the lowest bidder and were awarded this contract on the basis of competitive bidding, the main contract which was awarded to Francisco and Jacobus, was not awarded as a result of competitive bidding?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I beg your pardon? Would you repeat?

Mr. COHN. You received your contract because you were the lowest bidder. Do you know that in the case of the letting of the contract to Francisco and Jacobus, there was no competitive bidding? That there was merely a negotiated contract; they were not the lowest bidder?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Francisco and Jacobus?

Mr. COHN. Yes.

Mr. VELDHUIS. I would assume that there was no competitive bid. I don't know. But I presume that.

Mr. COHN. Now, your contract is on a lump-sum basis; is that correct?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. In other words, you are given one lump sum by the Government, and it is up to you to do the job within that?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. So, the Government knows in advance how much the job is going to cost them?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Do you know that the contract given to Francisco and Jacobus was not on a lump-sum basis but was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is what I understand from rumors, that it is a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. Nobody every told me so specifically, and certainly not Francisco and Jacobus.

Mr. COHN. Do you know how much above the contract price and the original estimate they have already gone?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I have no idea.

Mr. COHN. By the way, before you were awarded this contract, had you done any work in connection with erection of towers and antennas for the Government of Pakistan?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes.

Mr. COHN. Would you tell us what that was, very briefly?

Mr. VELDHUIS. We have, as a subcontractor to one of the largest companies in the United States, been awarded a contract for the design and construction of an international broadcasting antenna system for the Government of Pakistan.

Mr. COHN. And did you successfully complete that project?

Mr. VELDHUIS. We like to think that it was very successful.

Mr. COHN. Dr. Veldhuis, after you were awarded this contract by the Voice of America, by the State Department, in connection with this curtain antenna program, did you make a study of the program,

based on your background in this field and the many other similar projects you had carried out? Did you look over the plans and specifications?

Mr. VELDHUIS. We looked over the plans and specifications; yes.

Mr. COHN. Now, after you had looked over the plans and specifications, did you reach any conclusion as to whether or not the plans and specifications called for this program being carried into effect in the most efficient and economical way possible?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes. I asked myself that question.

Mr. COHN. What was the answer?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The answer to me was that there had to be very good reasons, of which I was not aware, to justify the design as it is. Of course, I couldn't know, and I don't know, what the reasons were. It was certainly not what I would call a normal design.

Mr. COHN. And was the cost, the estimated cost, of this design much greater than you felt was necessary?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I certainly think so; yes.

Mr. COHN. Even though you were the contractor who actually got the contract here, did you actually go to the engineering department of the Voice and suggest to them that this whole program might be revised and accomplished in a much more economical way by a change in design and a change in plans and specifications?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Not in that sense.

As soon as I saw the plans and specifications, it became apparent that this antenna was intended to be a broad-band antenna. I could not see any reason that would lead me to believe that this antenna would turn out to be a broad-band antenna, notwithstanding the fact that quite a bit of material and arrangement had been designed into it.

When I inquired about that, I was informed that all that was taken care of; that a model measurement had been made and that, at least in the opinion of the State Department and presumably the architect-engineers, this antenna, after it had been built, would be a broad-band antenna.

When I expressed that I just didn't know that, and that I would be very much interested to see those results of those model measurements—for two reasons I wanted to see them: First of all, if there was something in there that I didn't know of, of course I would be interested; and, secondly, if I could point out that the results of that measurement would be uncertain, would not give the guaranty to the broad-band antenna, I felt it my duty, if I knew that, to so tell the State Department and the architect-engineers. But I have never been able to obtain that technical background on those antennas.

Mr. COHN. You mean to say that you, the contractor, or one of the contractors in the situation, have been unable to obtain that information?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. Whom did you ask, and who declined it?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I asked specifically, I believe, at the second meeting at the State Department. I asked Mr. Herrick, and Mr. Herrick said: "Yes, of course, you will have to have those things. I believe I have one here." He didn't have one of the copies at his desk. And he, on that occasion, I believe, told one of his engineers to see to it that we would get a copy.

At the next meeting, when I wasn't present, I was given to understand the architect-engineers objected and flatly refused to give us a copy of the model measurement.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, Mr. Herrick said you should have them, that it was essential to your work, and then, when you sought to get them, the architect-engineers declined to let you see them. That was who?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Francisco and Jacobus.

Mr. COHN. After studying what information was available, do you feel if you had come into this in the beginning, before the plans and specifications were drawn, and had been consulted on it, you could have made suggestions which would have resulted in the saving of considerable money to the taxpayers in the planning of this program?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I believe so; yes.

Mr. COHN. Approximately how much money do you feel would have been saved if this thing had been done as economically and efficiently as possible, approximately?

Mr. VELDHUIS. You must make a distinction there between two possible ways. One way is in a given design, in a given plan.

Mr. COHN. You mean there would be two ways. In other words, if they had cast aside the plans and started over and used new plans, you feel that an amount of money could have been saved that way, and you also feel that even taking the plans as they were, that type of thing, a good deal of money could have been saved on that?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. How much money could have been saved on the first basis, if they had recast the plan and had done what you regard as a more economical and efficient job from the very beginning? What would your estimate on that be?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Maybe I can best answer that by giving you a comparison of prices for, for instance, the Pakistan system.

I am somewhat hesitant on that, because, as I expressed before, this was some subcontract to one of the big companies here in the United States, and I am, of course, not at liberty to publicly give all the prices out.

Mr. COHN. Well, what I would like you to do is just give us your best estimate, an approximation as to how much money could have been saved if these plans for the curtain-antenna program had been redone in what you would regard as a more economical and efficient way from the very beginning.

Mr. VELDHUIS. On our portion of the antenna program, that is, the antennas proper and the transmission lines, that is, excluding the towers, I think a possible saving of in excess of 40 percent would have easily been achieved.

Mr. COHN. In other words, you are the man who got the contract for this job, and in spite of that fact you say that you have looked it over, and if the thing were done properly and economically and efficiently, approximately 40 percent could have been saved on the particular part of the contract which your company is carrying out?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is for a different design.

Mr. COHN. If they had used a different design?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. How much would that have amounted to in dollars?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Well, the present contract is slightly in excess of \$1,700,000. So there is an approximate saving of \$800,000.

Mr. COHN. And that, of course, is only on your phase of the program. Is that right?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Would there have been other savings on other phases of the program?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes. I think so; although at that time it could not be corrected any more. A more economical design results in a lighter antenna, an antenna that exerts lesser loads on the supporting structures. And, therefore, the supporting structures would be designed lighter and therefore more economically.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did you bid on this contract?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That was toward the end of August 1950.

Senator SYMINGTON. How did you know that the work was being let?

Mr. VELDHUIS. We heard that through a business friend.

Senator SYMINGTON. And there was no publication of bids?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Not to us; not to our knowledge, no.

Senator SYMINGTON. Had you ever done any business before for the Government?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes, we did and do a great amount of business.

Senator SYMINGTON. For the State Department?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Also for the State Department.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did you do for the State Department?

Mr. VELDHUIS. We sold them our standard rhombic towers and rhombic antennas, for one thing.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would that type of antenna have been suitable for this job?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That depends. Our standard design of rhombic has a power limit of approximately between 50 and 80 kilowatts.

The present design, as I understand it, of those broadside antennas, has a power of 200 kilowatts in mind. We have never been told so specifically, but that is what I understand.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you made your first bid, did you bid on a fixed-fee basis, or on a straight-price basis?

Mr. VELDHUIS. We have given two bids. We gave one bid which is a fixed price for the material, the fabrication, and the erection.

The other bid was a fixed price for the material and the fabrication and a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis for the erection.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was that the same as the bid that you gave to the State Department?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Those bids we gave to the State Department.

Senator SYMINGTON. In the past to the State.

When you made your other bids, is that the way you did it?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I beg your pardon, I thought you—

Senator SYMINGTON. Say "Voice of America" when you mean that, and we can segregate the two.

Mr. VELDHUIS. All the other bids were on a fixed price.

Senator SYMINGTON. All the other bids to State. And this was on a fixed price and cost plus fixed fee; is that right?

Mr. VELDHUIS. On this one we gave the State Department an alternate, on the broadside. One was for a fixed price for material, fabrication, and erection. The other bid was a fixed price for material and fabrication, and a cost-plus basis for the erection.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is for the Voice of America.

Mr. VELDHUIS. For the Voice of America.

Senator SYMINGTON. One other question. As I understand it, steel is where you would have saved the most money. Is that right? In design?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Steel is where we would save a lot of money. Whether it would be the most money, I don't know.

Senator SYMINGTON. How much steel would you have saved, roughly, in tons per antenna, if your concept of the design had been used based on your past work as against this new design?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is very difficult to state, Senator, for this reason: The present design utilizes self-supporting towers. The towers that we manufacture are nearly always guyed towers. The guyed tower uses considerably less steel than a self-supporting tower does. There are limitations on a guyed tower. Those limitations are mainly in the manufacturing facilities. It is doubtful whether, on the present antennas, it would be possible to design the antenna in such a way that the economical guyed towers can be used. If the guyed tower cannot be used, then the saving that is obtainable in a self-supporting tower may not be too great. It may be a saving just in the tonnage. And the fabrication of such a tower is not too awfully expensive, so I believe that you can estimate, or could at that time estimate, a price of approximately 57 cents per pound. And I would guess—and this is just a guess—that on the towers something like 20 tons per tower could have been saved.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, just one more thought. Who made the specifications up?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Francisco and Jacobus, to my knowledge.

Senator SYMINGTON. Had they had experience in this field before?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Not to my knowledge.

Senator SYMINGTON. Had you had experience in this field before?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes; a great deal.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you suggest that you could make the antennas for less money if they would let you submit a design?

Mr. VELDHUIS. They would not; no.

Senator SYMINGTON. Wait a minute. I said: Did you suggest that you could make the antennas for less money if you submitted the design; your company?

Mr. VELDHUIS. At that time, when we got the bid, we understood that the towers were already purchased. The order for the towers had already gone out.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. So it had gone too far to use your design?

Mr. VELDHUIS. It had gone very far. Yes, indeed.

Senator SYMINGTON. One other question. What basis was the fixed fee figured on? What was the estimate? How did you arrive at a fixed fee, in that part of the contract which was a fixed fee?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I actually don't know the proper percentage. I have very little to do with that. Nevertheless, the fixed-fee contract was not awarded to us. The State Department took it on a fixed-price basis.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. COHN. Did you ever have any discussions with any of the people in the engineering department in which you indicated that if you

had come in at the beginning and if the plans had been competently drawn, the thing could have been done for 50 percent less?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes.

Mr. COHN. In other words, you called to the attention of the engineering department that if the thing had been done right, from the start, and this other design had been used, it might have been possible, on your particular part of the job, to save 50 percent, or approximately 50 percent?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That was intimated in the discussions, yes. Whether we at that time pronounced it that specifically, I doubt that. However, people in this field of business ought to know what projects have been executed in the whole world, for that matter. They ought to know what prevalent designs there are, what the prices are. We have submitted quotations for other designs, for other applications. A direct comparison there is possible.

Mr. COHN. In any event, you were told at that point it was too late. The plans and specifications had been drawn, they had ordered the towers, and it was impossible to redo the designs. Is that right?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Do you feel that there was any excuse for the failure to find this out at the time the plans and specifications were drawn? Is this something unusual, or is it something that, if they had gone to the right people and made the right inquiry, they should have known about?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The only excuse that I can think of is that at that time this project was restricted, and I understand that there are difficulties in obtaining open bids on restricted projects.

Mr. COHN. This was a pretty basic thing, though, wasn't it? I mean, here was a \$5 million job, and if it was possible to do it in a way that would save 50 percent of it on your part of it and I assume similar savings on other parts of it—

Mr. VELDHUIS. I would think it was before I jumped into a project like that; yes.

Mr. COHN. I would certainly think so. I might ask you this. Time might have been a factor here. Suppose they were in a hurry to get this job done. Which would have been the quicker way of doing it, the way they actually did it or the way that would have been 50 percent cheaper? Or is there no difference?

Mr. VELDHUIS. There is considerable difference in the ease of handling this material in the field. There was considerable difference in the ease of obtaining certain types of material.

Mr. COHN. Which would have been quicker?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The other way.

Mr. COHN. The cheaper way?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes.

Mr. COHN. Not only would it have been 50 percent cheaper, but it could have been done in a short period of time?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I think so.

Mr. COHN. And I assume it goes without saying that the sooner these antennas got into use, and all that, the sooner we would be able to have a wider listening audience for the Voice program.

Mr. VELDHUIS. That might be.

Mr. COHN. Now, let me ask you this. When this whole situation came up, as you have told us, they said it was too late to do anything

about it. Now, going ahead with these curtain antennas, these broad-band antennas, as they called them, could any money have been saved on the basis of their present way of doing the job?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. COHN. You say it could have?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. COHN. Even taking the way they had it planned out, you say money still could have been saved?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. COHN. Approximately how much? What percent?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I think something like 20 percent could have been saved.

Mr. COHN. Did you call that to their attention?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes. There was one phase of this project where we felt very strongly; that is, on the type of guy material. The guy material specified in the specifications is unusual, and it is difficult to obtain. Furthermore, it is more expensive and, in my opinion, less desirable than other material is that is usually used there. And we worked out a quotation for a price reduction using, instead of guy rope, guy strand, and the saving in material only amounted to \$35,000, thirty-five-thousand-and-some dollars. We submitted that as a quotation. That proposal was rejected.

Mr. COHN. They rejected that proposal?

Mr. VELDHUIS. They rejected it.

Mr. COHN. Do you know why they insisted on spending more money?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I haven't the faintest idea.

Mr. COHN. I mean, here is the situation of where the actual people who have been awarded the contract—you come in and suggest money-saving proposals; and you say they were rejected?

Mr. VELDHUIS. They were rejected.

Senator MUNDT. Do you know on whose recommendation they were rejected?

Mr. VELDHUIS. No; I don't know. Right in the beginning, it was one of the things that immediately caught our eye, the type of material specified for the guys, and we have mentioned it. We have strongly expressed ourselves on this matter, and we didn't get anywhere.

Senator MUNDT. To whom did you strongly express yourself?

Mr. VELDHUIS. To the architect-engineers, during a meeting, in the beginning. Also it has been discussed with engineers in the Department.

Senator MUNDT. Did you take it up with the chief engineer, Mr. Herrick?

Mr. VELDHUIS. We took it up with Mr. Herrick, too. And, as a result, Mr. Herrick wrote a letter instructing the architect-engineers to thoroughly investigate this matter and make a choice whether they would stick to the original specification or follow our recommendation. And I believe that in a couple of very minor cases, we have been allowed to use guy strand instead of guy rope, but in the majority of the material we were instructed to maintain guy rope.

Senator MUNDT. Most of the commercial installations use guy strand; do they?

Mr. VELDHUIS. They use guy strand. That is right. So much of that material is used that all the manufacturers can tell you that this has become an over-the-counter item that they can't make any money on it. The competition on guy strand is terrific. Everybody makes it and makes it satisfactorily.

Senator MUNDT. Can you think of any superior characteristics that guy rope might have that guy strand does not have?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Guy rope does have characteristics, some characteristics, that are superior to guy strand. It is much more flexible. In an application where flexibility is of no importance, that advantage of guy rope just does not enter into the picture. A decided advantage of guy strand is that the galvanizing is more uniform and heavier than on the thin wires of guy rope. Also, if thin wires of guy rope lose by corrosion, lose a thin layer of the cross section, that influence is a larger percentage of the cross section than if you lost the same layer on the relatively thick wires of guy strand. So the long-range strength of guy strand is better than of guy rope.

Senator MUNDT. It is more durable and lasts longer?

Mr. VELDHUIS. It is more durable. And you only use guy rope when you have to use it on account of its flexibility, which is superior to guy strand.

Senator MUNDT. All right. In the instant case, was flexibility a factor?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Not at all.

Mr. COHN. Now, I want to talk for a minute about the shackles connected with these antenna towers. We have been informed, and is it a fact, that they have had some serious trouble with the shackles at the stations in Wayne and Bethany, Ohio, within the past few weeks?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Very serious.

Mr. COHN. Is it a fact that the shackles have actually been breaking?

Mr. VELDHUIS. They have.

Mr. COHN. Now, those shackles were supplied, I assume, pursuant to specifications originally drawn up by the International Information Administration, Engineering Department; is that right?

Mr. VELDHUIS. When you say "originally," I must object there. The shackles are supplied in accordance with specifications. Those specifications supersede the original specifications.

The reason that it was necessary to have another specification is that shackles, in accordance with the original specification, were not readily obtainable.

Mr. COHN. Now, these shackles were supplied, and you say there have been instances of serious breakage in these shackles within the past few weeks. Is that correct?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That first started approximately 8 months ago.

Mr. COHN. Within the last few days.

Mr. VELDHUIS. No; 8 months ago.

Mr. COHN. When was the last break?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Last Friday.

Mr. COHN. Last Friday; is that correct?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Let me ask you this: Is it true that it appears that the reason for the breakage of these shackles is a result of corrosion in the atmosphere at these particular sites?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I am perfectly familiar with that.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt?

I wonder if counsel or Senator Mundt could give me a brief résumé of the testimony thus far?

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COHN. I think you just told us this breakage you believe was due to corrosion. Now, is it correct, then, that if there is breakage in the shackles due to corrosion, and they merely replace it with the same type shackles, you are going to get breakage all over again?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I believe so.

Mr. COHN. What are they doing? Are they replacing it with the same type so that there will be breakage all over again, or are they going out and getting the right type or doing something to counteract the effects of the corrosion?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I have no knowledge that they are doing anything else. We have been instructed to replace them with the same material.

Mr. COHN. And I assume it is reasonable to anticipate there might be breakage again. Is that right?

Mr. VELDHUIS. In my mind, there is not a shadow of doubt.

Mr. COHN. There is not a shadow of a doubt that there will be breakage all over again?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is right.

Mr. COHN. How is it possible to explain stupidity such as that?

Mr. VELDHUIS. There are things I cannot explain.

Mr. COHN. You say you can't see any explanation for that.

Have you protested this to the Engineering Department there?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes, I have. As a matter of fact, I don't believe that there is too much argument on this point. There was for a while especially in the beginning, when the first breakage occurred. And that included myself. I thought: "Well, there is a certain amount of unsatisfactory material that go into shipments, and we have to replace that as fast as possible under our guaranty." We have a guaranty for a year. Once the shackles, the broken shackles, were removed from the curtain, and we had the metallurgist investigate this, it immediately became clear that the unanimous opinion is that the breakage is due to the atmosphere surrounding the shackles, which, in the trade, is called season cracking.

Mr. COHN. But you say as far as you know they are just going right ahead and replacing it with the same thing, so it will just keep right on breaking?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. And you say this has been called to their attention, and they are still doing it?

Mr. VELDHUIS. As a matter of fact, at one site, as to the shackles that broke originally and that were replaced approximately July 1952, some of those shackles broke again.

Mr. COHN. You mean it has actually happened? The shackles broke, they replaced them, and the shackles they replaced them with also broke?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes; and if one shackle breaks, the antenna is practically out of operation.

Mr. COHN. Do you know how long they intend to keep on replacing this with the same type of thing that keeps on breaking?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The expert opinion of the metallurgists that we have consulted, and publications in the metallurgists' trade, is that this breakage can occur anywhere between 2 months and 2 years after installation.

Mr. COHN. I see. You would certainly regard this as a very serious situation then?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Very serious.

Mr. COHN. What is the cost involved in this shackle program?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The cost of the shackles themselves runs around 79 cents each. The cost to replace a shackle in the curtain depends on the number of shackles. It runs anywhere between \$50 each and \$100 each.

Mr. COHN. This small item. About how many are used in connection with one antenna?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Per curtain, there are used somewhere in excess of 480 shackles of this type.

Mr. COHN. I see. Now, you have painted a picture here, Dr. Veldhuis, at the beginning, they were spending 50 percent too much. It was shown that they could save under their current plans. They didn't do that. They have shackles breaking, destroying the possibility of the antenna operating, and they keep replacing it with material that keeps breaking all over again.

What explanation do you think there is for a situation such as this?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Actually, I don't have an explanation. If I had an explanation, I would have yelled about it long ago.

I have, on several occasions, been driven practically to despair, because I just don't understand this situation. I can't cope with this situation. I don't know what is behind it.

Senator MUNDT. It must be either the architect-engineers or the engineering counsel that the Voice of America has on its own staff. It has to be one of those two sources, does it not?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Well, it is certainly true that the architect-engineers on all occasions have sometimes expressed and always shown resentment at any observation, suggestion, advice, that we made.

Senator MUNDT. I think you testified earlier that the architect-engineers are not really specialists in this field of radio transmission; that their experience goes into some other type of construction; is that correct?

Mr. VELDHUIS. To my knowledge, they never did anything in this field.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, this was an experiment with them, something new for them to do?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I think so.

Senator MUNDT. They do not do the same kind of service for NBC or CBS or ABS, or any of the big radio concerns?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Not even remotely connected.

Senator MUNDT. And your concern has had experience, as I understand, with some of the large radio people in this country?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. Who selects the architect-engineers? Do they get their position on the basis of competitive bids, or on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis? Or are they just chosen and employed on a contract?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I don't know.

Senator MUNDT. How is it done in the trade?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Usually, when you have something in mind that you want, you go around in the trade. We sometimes employ people to be our architect-engineers. Sometimes we are consulting engineers. Sometimes we employ engineers. When you have something in mind, you go around and find out who is best suited, who has the best facilities for that particular project that you have in mind.

The secrecy that surrounded this project is best illustrated by the fact that we first knew about it 3 days before the contract for the construction was to be awarded. That was the first we knew it. And we believe that we are very much "with both legs" in this industry, and that we know what goes on.

Senator MUNDT. Would a more normal procedure have been to advertise for bids and put announcements in the trade journals that a certain contract was going to be let, so that the people who are specialists in the field would all know about it?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Normally it would. In this particular case, the fact that this project was restricted may have prevented that. I don't know.

Senator MUNDT. Restricted as to location, or as to design, or in what way was it restricted?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The whole project was restricted.

Senator MUNDT. It was pretty well known throughout the country that the Voice was building a series of transmitters. That part was not restricted. That passed through Congress.

Mr. VELDHUIS. Not at that time.

Senator MUNDT. It was not known at that time?

Mr. VELDHUIS. It was not known to us, anyway.

Senator MUNDT. What is the customary procedure after architect-engineers are employed? Does the employer of those engineers delegate to them all authority and all power, or can the man or the firm or the Government who employed the architect-engineers still veto their decisions and change them?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I can only speak for myself, and I know that when I make a design, I am eager to talk to anybody who can possibly have criticism on my designs. And I discuss my designs with those people in detail.

Senator MUNDT. Well, now, let us take the instant case. The State Department employed some architect-engineers. They employed some designs which appear to be faulty. They certainly were extravagant and wasteful. You called to the attention of the engineers in the Voice that these designs were wasteful, that they were extravagant, that perhaps they were faulty.

In that type of case, does the State Department, if it so desires, does the Voice of America, if it so desires, have the power, after it had made a contract with the architect-engineers to request them to make the changes? Or do they delegate all their authority and all their administrative capacity in the contract to the architect-engineers?

Mr. VELDHUIS. It would appear as if in this case the State Department did not have any power to effect changes in either the program

or the specifications. As a matter of fact, it has been expressed on occasions by engineers in the Department that they could not do anything at all with which the architect-engineers did not agree.

Senator MUNDT. That is the point I am trying to bring out. Is that the customary way it is handled in the trade? If NBC employs some architect-engineers, do they delegate to them complete authority then to go ahead even though it appears that a mistake had been made? It would seem to me that normally the employer of architect-engineers would reserve unto himself the right and the power to insist on changes which are indicated as necessary.

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes. I believe that is true. The letters of contract and agreement—all these will fix a large amount of responsibility on the architect-engineer, or the designer, but in all my experience, it has always been the fact that such a designer or architect-engineer is only too happy to have his own mistakes corrected, and is only too happy to receive constructive criticism, especially where there is hardly any field at all where anybody can be an expert in all the phases of such a project, and certainly not in a big project of this nature.

Senator MUNDT. Exactly.

Senator McClellan of Arkansas has a question.

Senator McCLELLAN. I did not hear the earlier part of your testimony. As I understand it, you have a contract for the construction of certain facilities?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. Including the supply of material?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. And that is a cost-plus?

Mr. VELDHUIS. No; that is a fixed-price contract.

Senator McCLELLAN. It is a fixed-price contract?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. Does that include a number of installations?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is on six locations.

Senator McCLELLAN. On six different locations?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. The contract you have is for similar services on the six locations?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. Is your contract completed?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The contract proper is completed, yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. The contract proper is completed?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. You mean by that it is only a matter of collecting the balance that is owed you?

Mr. VELDHUIS. It is a matter of collecting the balance. It is also a matter of, on one site, some argument that exists at this moment to straighten that out.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, it is a matter of judgment and final settlement; and so far as your construction work is concerned, it has been completed?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. Did you make a profit on the contract?

Mr. VELDHUIS. No, sir, we didn't.

Senator McCLELLAN. You made no profit?

Mr. VELDHUIS. No, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Then can it be said that you are disgruntled about it because of some experience you had, and that that gives rise to your testimony of criticism?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I think that that could be said. I don't agree with it, but I don't doubt that people will say that, yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, I am trying to determine for the record, so that we might weigh your testimony properly, just what motivates you now to come in and give this testimony, that is most critical of the project and the way it was handled and the architectural and engineering design of it, and so forth. Have you volunteered to give this information?

Mr. VELDHUIS. No, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Or were you first approached by the committee staff or someone else to inquire about it?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not understand. You said "That is right." Senator McClellan asked: "Did you volunteer, or were you approached by the committee staff?" I do not understand the answer.

Mr. VELDHUIS. We were approached.

Senator McCLELLAN. I understood him to say he was approached.

My only purpose in these questions: You can appreciate that as a result of everything this committee does, whether the results of its efforts are good or bad, the committee is criticized, and also these who testify critically of the program are criticized from some sources. And I am trying to make the record straight so that we might evaluate your testimony in the light of all the attending circumstances.

As I understand you, when you first were given an opportunity to bid, or about the time of your bid, you pointed out to the authorities in the VOA—or IIA is it? Well, they represented in this instance the Voice of America, did they not?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know, Mr. McClellan, whether it was the Voice engineers.

Senator McCLELLAN. The State Department authority. It is all under the State Department?

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Senator, the reason I made that comment: We find that in most of the contracting, the responsibility for what is ultimately done apparently rests in IIA rather than in the Voice officials. It is rather difficult to place the responsibility.

Senator McCLELLAN. I understand.

Anyway, you pointed out to the Government authorities, whoever they were, in charge of the construction program, that the designs of the antennas, and so forth, were all wrong, that this would make them far more expensive, and that they would not provide any additional service over and above the much cheaper and much more practical construction; did you?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes; we did.

Senator McCLELLAN. You said, I believe, that had they changed those plans and designs for the type that you considered appropriate and adequate, a saving of some 50 percent in cost could have been achieved.

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. Is that correct?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. Did you call their attention to that prior to the time that your contract was firmed up?

Mr. VELDHUIS. It was more specific than that, Senator. One of the means that we had at our disposal to convince the State Department that it might be worth their while to allow us to bid was to submit and discuss with the State Department the drawings and the plans and the specifications that at that time were completed for the Pakistan system. So they were fully aware of what we proposed as an alternate.

Senator McCLELLAN. You have used here the percentage of 50 percent that you say could have been saved. Did you specifically use those figures, or call their attention to that great saving that could be achieved by a change in the design?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Whether it was expressed as 50 percent, I don't know. I do know that several of the individuals in the Department knew exactly the price that we charged that other company for the Pakistan system; yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, you also further testified that under their own design, and with the type that you finally constructed under the contract that you had with them, a saving of 20 percent in the cost could have been achieved.

Mr. VELDHUIS. The saving of 20 percent is an estimate that I give now. At the time, as I testified before, we had one particular phase of material on which we felt very strongly, and we made a quotation on that particular piece of material; guy strand against guy rope. We made a quotation which would effect a saving of \$35,000. That was not accepted.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, you made specific suggestions to them in the course of the construction, pointing out where savings could be made?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. And that is what you are talking about when you say 20 percent could have been saved?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is right.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, as to these modifications that you suggested during the period of construction which would have resulted in a total of 20-percent savings, were they changes which would have in any way affected adversely the services to be performed by these facilities?

Mr. VELDHUIS. No; those savings would in no way affect the basic design as given to us. They are all details and parts, certain specified parts, and materials, and would in no way affect the basic design.

Senator McCLELLAN. Would they have in any way affected or shortened the life of the service of the stations or of the facility?

Mr. VELDHUIS. This particular guy strand that I am talking about would in effect have lengthened the life. However, the life expectancy of an antenna of this nature, the expectancy of usefulness of an antenna of this nature, usually is much less than the life expectancy of the components that make up such an antenna.

Senator McCLELLAN. When you pointed out how these savings could be effected, by modifying the construction or particular designs of parts, as you went along, on construction, what reaction, or what answer, was given you, as to why they were unwilling to have modified the plan?

Mr. VELDHUIS. As I said before, every suggestion was met by a feeling of resentment on the part of the architect-engineers. This is not only my own experience, but several people in our organization have the same opinion, are of exactly the same opinion.

Senator McCLELLAN. Can you account for that resentment or lack of interest or willingness to consider these suggestions in the interest of economy? Have you any explanation for it from what you believed and your contacts with them and what they may have said or how they may have acted about it?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I have a personal opinion, yes, Senator. The reason for it, I believe, is that the architect-engineers felt that they are on thin ice, they are not too certain of themselves, and therefore they are resentful of every suggestion that is made. There again, if you know what you are talking about, and you propose something, and somebody else who knows better than you draws your attention to an omission or to something that you do wrong, you say, "That is fine. Thank you very much. We are very grateful that you did make that suggestion," even if somebody makes a suggestion and you don't agree with him, then still you say, "I am very grateful that you made that suggestion, but I am not going to follow it in this case," that is my experience in engineering circles, that that is the normal procedure.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, did that polite conversation or attitude become manifest in the instance where you called their attention to this?

Mr. VELDHUIS. No, sir. They always were resentful of everything that we had to say on this.

Senator McCLELLAN. Could it be possible or probable that the reason for not making these changes in materials and certain designs was because of some peculiar or personal interest that some of them had in that particular type of equipment, that caused them to insist on holding tenaciously to the plans they had?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I can't answer that, Senator, because to my knowledge they have no interest and they have no background in this kind of work.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am trying to see what could be their motive. What would prompt them to just arbitrarily refuse to consider suggestions that might be helpful and might produce economies and savings.

May I ask you this: Do you think they simply did not know any different? Is it because of incompetency—we will put it that way—that they declined to consider these suggestions?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Yes; personally, I think so.

Senator McCLELLAN. You think it was just incompetence?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I think so.

Senator McCLELLAN. And they didn't want to admit that they had made a mistake.

Mr. VELDHUIS. I personally had the very strong feeling all the time—I still have it—that the architect-engineers, because of their own feeling, could not allow even the slightest criticism or change, because they did not want their design to be anything but perfect. They don't even know that nothing can be perfect. They didn't even know that. So they wanted at least the record that what they do is perfect, that no changes, no improvements, are even possible. That is my personal opinion, as vague as it is.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, it seemed to you they felt if they made a change in the course of construction, it would be an admission on their part that they had made mistakes, and they did not want to subject themselves to that criticism?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Exactly.

Senator McCLELLAN. And therefore they just arbitrarily insisted upon proceeding notwithstanding the suggestion to them that they were spending considerably more than was necessary to get the same results?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. May I ask you: Would other competent contractors or people in your field, you think, being acquainted with all of the facts, substantiate the testimony you have given here with respect to this waste and extravagance?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I didn't get that, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, you could only give an opinion, I assume; but would other competent contractors in this particular field, do you think, have the same view, and would they rather confirm what you have testified to here about savings that could have been made in the construction of this project?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, yes. I can go much further than that.

In this field, quite a few of the people that don't know the full background of this project are under the impression that the Wind Turbine Co. is responsible for the designs.

Senator McCLELLAN. What company?

Mr. VELDHUIS. The Wind Turbine.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is your company?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That my company is responsible for the designs. And many of our clients have said to me personally: "How could you? You ought to know better," and then I had to explain to them that I didn't do it; that those were the designs given to us.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me ask you: Were you not reluctant to enter into a contract for the construction of a project of this character, when you knew in the beginning that it involved such tremendous waste? In other words, why would you be willing to have your company identified in the capacity it was with such an enterprise as this?

Mr. VELDHUIS. That is an unfortunate circumstance. As I pointed out before, on the 18th of August 1950, we heard, through a business friend of ours, that this contract was to be awarded. That same day, our company was in New York inquiring about it and heard then that the contract was to be awarded on the 21st. The 18th was on a Friday. The 21st was the next Monday. We were, after asking for it, allowed delay in the opening date for the bids and we were allowed delay to make up our bid. That had to be done very fast.

Senator McCLELLAN. Within a week, I think you testified.

Mr. VELDHUIS. About a week. And such a short time does not leave open much time to contemplate the design itself, to judge the design on its merits or its shortcomings.

Senator McCLELLAN. Are you trying to indicate now that you did not discover all of these factors until after you had made a contract?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Not all of them. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. You had observed some of them.

Mr. VELDHUIS. Some of them, yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. Was it much worse after you had made the contract than you thought it was or might have been before you entered into the contract?

Mr. VELDHUIS. My opinion on that change: There again, it is the normal procedure that so often you get a design that you are asked to bid on, and there are phases of that design where you know better than the one who made up the specifications. And always it has been my experience that, when you discuss such differences, always the customer is appreciative of your efforts; that sometimes there are reasons that you didn't know for a certain setup, and then at least they have the courtesy to explain to you why that is, just in an effort to come to the best design possible.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me ask you one further question. In retrospect, would you again enter into such a contract with the knowledge you now have of this? Would you permit your company to become involved in it under the same circumstances, and anticipating the same results that have been achieved in this?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I don't know what the position of my company would be. I can only speak for myself. I hope never in my life to go through an experience like this again.

Senator McCLELLAN. You say you made no profit.

Was that because of your mistaken judgment in the amount of your bid? Or for other reasons?

Mr. VELDHUIS. I don't know that exactly. I am an engineer, and on the financial side of it, although I am somewhat connected with it, I don't know all the intricacies of that.

Senator McCLELLAN. I thought that might be pertinent to this inquiry, in view of the fact that you are so critical of what actually occurred and what has been done; that you might feel that notwithstanding your judgment in the beginning, you could contract for it on the basis you did, and at a profit, but that things happened subsequently, by reason of these difficulties you encountered that affected the profit result. I do not know whether that is true or not.

Mr. VELDHUIS. Some factors did, yes. There are some factors where that definitely is the case. I would say very few. But there is no reason to gripe about that.

Senator McCLELLAN. Would it be fair to say that you are simply unhappy about this whole thing because you didn't make a profit? Or would you assert under oath that it is because of the incompetency and waste, and those factors that entered into it, that you are unhappy about it?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Well, we had correspondence before. There is correspondence with the State Department that points out some of the things that I have been talking about.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, this is not an afterthought on your part since you found that you made no profit?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, no.

Senator McCLELLAN. As I understand you, in the course of the whole construction program you were pointing these things out?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Oh, yes.

Senator McCLELLAN. From the beginning of the contract on through to completion of the job?

Mr. VELDHUIS. Definitely.

Senator McCLELLAN. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you very much, sir, for coming down.

Subject to the approval of the other Senators, we will have no public hearing until Thursday morning at 10:30. In the meantime, we have a number of witnesses I would like to bring in in executive session, and I will contact your office, John, and yours, Karl, and we can arrange to have them here. I think we might have one of some importance this afternoon.

Senator McCLELLAN. I may say this: I am very much interested in all this testimony that may be presented that indicates incompetency, lack of efficient personnel, or if it goes further and shows a willful disregard for the public interest, for economy, and so forth, because I think, personally, this service that we are undertaking to provide by these facilities is vital, of great importance, and I think it is of great concern not only to the Congress but, I should think, to the State Department to ascertain if this thing has gotten off on the wrong track or is being undertaken by incompetents or people who are indifferent to the public interest. If that is the case, I think corrections should be made without further delay.

Mr. VELDHUIS. I have no personal knowledge of that.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is why we are all trying to find this out. We can appreciate that in a program of this size some deficiencies will necessarily occur. in view of the speed and the urgency of it. But that does not justify just wholesale incompetence or lack of interest and purpose to protect the Government in this program.

So I am interested in testimony that gives us an accurate picture of what the situation is.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. You may step down, sir.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., a recess was taken to the call of the Chair.)

STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, (pursuant to S. Res. 40, agreed to January 30, 1953) in room 318, Senate Office Building, at 10:30 a. m., Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas.

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; G. David Schine, chief consultant; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator MUNDT. (presiding). Counsel will call the first witness, please.

Mr. COHN. Dr. Ghosh.

Senator MUNDT. Dr. Ghosh, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. GHOSH. I do.

Senator MUNDT. You may be seated.

Mr. COHN. May I get the spelling of your name, please?

TESTIMONY OF DR. STANLEY S. GHOSH, CHIEF, HINDI SERVICE,
NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICAN DIVISION, INTER-
NATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICE, VOICE OF AMERICA

Dr. GHOSH. The name is Stanley Ghosh, G-h-o-s-h.

Mr. COHN. G-h-o-s-h?

Mr. GHOSH. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you start to question the witness, I would like to tell the other Senators that a matter of, I think, extreme importance has come up, which will necessitate hearing the security officer, Mr. McLeod, in executive session. So we will ask Mr. Leahy to contact Mr. McLeod and tell him we would very much appreciate it if he would be here at two o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. LEAHY. Very well.

Mr. COHN. Now, Dr. Ghosh, are you with the Department of State at the present time?

Dr. GHOSH. Yes, I am.

Mr. COHN. What position do you hold?

Dr. GHOSH. I am the Chief of the Hindi Service of the Near East, South Asia, and African Division of the International Broadcasting Service.

Mr. COHN. You are the Chief of the Hindi Service of the International Broadcasting Service of the Voice of America. Is that correct?

Dr. GHOSH. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Where were you educated?

Dr. GHOSH. I had my B. A. honors and M. A. from the University of Calcutta, and a Ph. D. from the University of Indiana.

Mr. COHN. Now, at the time you were studying in India and living in India, did you acquire a reputation as an anti-Communist?

Dr. GHOSH. I certainly did.

Mr. COHN. And after you came to this country and took your doctor's degree at the University of Indiana, did you teach at the University of Indiana thereafter?

Dr. GHOSH. I was on the faculty, yes; as an assistant to the chief professor.

Mr. COHN. Did you thereafter take a position in the United States Government?

Dr. GHOSH. I went to Washington, where I was with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization as a South Asia specialist.

Mr. COHN. And did there come a time when you went with the Department of State?

Dr. GHOSH. Well, there was a brief period when I was teaching South Asian world politics at the American University Graduate School.

Mr. COHN. At the American University Graduate School?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Mr. COHN. And did you then go with the State Department?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Mr. COHN. And you now hold the position, you have told us, of Chief of the Hindi Service of the Voice of America.

Let me ask you this, Dr. Ghosh. While with the Hindi Service and as its chief, what has been your aim as far as broadcasts of the Voice of America are concerned?

Dr. GHOSH. I think that could be summarized in a few points. First of all, the basic objective has been to help the implementation of the American foreign policy and to build good will between the United States and India; No. 2, to counter Communist propaganda emanating from within and outside of India; No. 3, to project the true picture of America to the people of India, so that it might help to dispel the wrong impressions which the people have about this country.

Mr. COHN. I see. Now, addressing ourselves particularly to No. 2, you say you found it to be of importance to counter Communist propaganda; is that right?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Did you find that one of the effective ways of doing that was by broadcasting over the Voice of America anti-Communist statements made by leaders within India itself?

Dr. GHOSH. I felt that was very important.

Mr. COHN. Dr. Ghosh, did there ever come a time when there was attempted interference with your program in broadcasting to India anti-Communist statements by Indian leaders?

Dr. GHOSH. Well, there was no interference from Indian leaders, but we certainly got guidance from the Embassy last summer, the summer of 1952, which asked us to stay away from broadcasting or putting undue emphasis on anti-Communist statements made by Indians and then broadcast them back to India.

Mr. COHN. And from whom did this guidance emanate?

Dr. GHOSH. It came on a teletype, and as far as I can remember, it was from the Ambassador in India, Mr. Bowles.

Mr. COHN. Is that Chester Bowles?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Mr. COHN. What was your view of the soundness of this guidance?

Dr. GHOSH. I thought it was a very unsound and unwise guidance.

Mr. COHN. Let me ask you this: At the time that Ambassador Bowles asked you to stop sending over anti-Communist statements by Indian leaders, was the Soviet Union ceasing in its campaign of attacking the United States or using anti-American statements?

Dr. GHOSH. As far as I know, they were carrying on their usual attacks in the time-honored fashion, and I think the tempo was very high. And I can cite one example right here in my files: that just prior to that the Communist newspaper, the Blitz, published in Bombay, attacked myself and the whole staff in a lead article, and I have a photostatic copy of it here.

Mr. COHN. That was a Communist newspaper? Is that right?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt?

Dr. GHOSH. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Bowles give any reason for this directive telling you not to broadcast the anti-Communist statements of Indian leaders?

Dr. GHOSH. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. COHN. Now, Dr. Ghosh, in other words, the situation was this: The Soviet Union was blasting away with its campaign against the United States. You people were attempting to counter it by telling the truth, and an important weapon in that was showing leaders within India itself were attacking the Communist movement and making anti-Communist statements.

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Mr. COHN. As a matter of fact, your counterpropaganda effort was so effective that you had been the subject of attacks by a Communist newspaper in India?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Mr. COHN. And in the face of that, a guidance comes in from Ambassador Bowles telling you to stop making anti-Communist statements?

Dr. GHOSH. Yes, sir.

Mr. COHN. And you have made your position clear on that.

Dr. GHOSH. I might add that I refused to follow that guidance, for the simple reason that no reason was forthcoming from the Embassy or anybody else. My reaction to it was immediate. I got a lengthy tape recording by a leading Indian literateur who was in Paris attending a cultural freedom congress, and I recall, as far as I remember,

that soon after I got the guidance, I got this tape, and it certainly was a very strong anti-Communist statement. I broadcast it, and I had no qualms about it.

Mr. COHN. And you did that in spite of the guidance which you had received?

Dr. GHOSH. Because in my judgment it was all right.

Mr. COHN. Yes. And you felt that the position taken in the guidance was unsound, particularly in the face of the Soviet campaign, and, as you say, no reason was given for this directive?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. Did the cablegram or communication from Chester Bowles indicate that the Government of India, of Nehru, was opposed to the type of programs which we were broadcasting in the Voice of America, and that he was relaying to you the attitude of the Government of India, or did it simply seem to be the attitude of Chester Bowles that he was relaying to you?

Dr. GHOSH. No reason was given, Senator. The only thing I got from my superior officer at that time was a little message, a brief message, which came on the teletype, asking us to refrain from using, or not to emphasize, rather, the anti-Communist, strong anti-Communist, statements made by Indians. No reason was forthcoming.

Senator MUNDT. No reason was given?

Dr. GHOSH. And as of today, I don't know what the reason is.

Mr. COHN. Now, let me ask you this: At any time during your service as Chief of the Hindi Service, have you received any message from Ambassador Bowles or anyone in the Embassy, asking you to send in anti-Communist material, or encouraging you in your campaign?

Dr. GHOSH. No. As a matter of fact, the correspondence between the Embassy and the VOA, New York, has been altogether too scanty, and it has been almost a whole year, I think, since we got even a single line out of them.

Mr. COHN. And have you ever received any encouragement in your attempts?

Dr. GHOSH. No; we have never gotten any encouragement. On the contrary, we have come to feel that we were most unwelcome.

Senator MUNDT. I understood from the testimony of earlier witnesses, and from my study of the manner in which the Voice is supposed to operate, that part of the procedure, part of the formula, is for the Embassy to send frequent suggestions and directives to New York or to Washington, indicating the type of program which should come in and the reaction of the citizens to the programs. In other words, our Embassy people are sort of supposed to serve as eyes and ears picking up the reactions, are they not?

Dr. GHOSH. I have seen nothing of the kind. At least, it was not drawn to my attention.

Senator MUNDT. So that you had to sort of shoot in the dark.

Dr. GHOSH. Not necessarily; I will say that. Because we claim to be specialists, and we keep our ears to the ground in India. We have more than one channel to know what is going on. We can read between the lines in reading newspapers, and we have other forms of communication, and we judge for ourselves, and also in consultation with superior officers both here and in Washington, as well as through the policy adviser.

Senator MUNDT. But as far as picking up the flesh-and-blood reaction of the people in India, the Voice has a very small staff in a very large country over there. Is that not right?

Dr. GHOSH. I don't believe there is anybody there.

Senator MUNDT. So that then the Embassy is not fulfilling its function, which is part of its job, to report by cable, checking on your program of this morning at 10 o'clock, cabling back at noon today, that the reaction was thus and so, believing that if you would carpenter the program in this direction, the reaction would be better, and so on. We have been led to believe that is part of the procedure by which the Voice operates. It certainly is part of the procedure by which the Voice should operate. I think I understand your testimony, then, that that would compel you to shoot in the dark, because you did not get those immediate reactions from the Embassy people there.

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Now, Dr. Ghosh, in addition to this one teletype, did there ever come a time when you received additional word that that teletype asking you to refrain or tone down these anti-Communist statements reflected the personal view of Ambassador Bowles?

Dr. GHOSH. I think that was mentioned by my superior officer at a later date.

Mr. COHN. Who do you refer to as your superior officer?

Dr. GHOSH. Mr. Dooher.

Mr. COHN. That is Mr. Gerald Dooher, who is the Acting Chief of the Near East, Asia, and African Division of the Voice of America; is that right?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. Dooher is here, and I wonder if we could have him come up at this time? He is already under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dooher, do you want to move that chair up and place it beside the witness?

Have the record show that Mr. Dooher has previously been sworn.

You are still under oath, Mr. Dooher.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Dooher, you have heard the testimony of Dr. Ghosh; is that correct?

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF GERALD F. P. DOOHER, ACTING CHIEF, NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIAN, AND AFRICAN DIVISION, VOICE OF AMERICA (PROCEEDING CONCURRENTLY WITH TESTIMONY OF DR. STANLEY S. GHOSH)

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Do you yourself have any personal knowledge concerning this incident Dr. Ghosh has related to us, namely, the fact that Ambassador Bowles asked the Voice to desist as far as the sending of anti-Communist statements of Indian leaders was concerned?

Mr. DOOHER. I was informed that when Ambassador Bowles was back in Washington—I believe the date was June 16—there were several conversations in the International Information Administration regarding the Voice of America, and that at that time he had confirmed that guidance; that he had urged that the Voice refrain from using the anti-Communist statements by Indian leaders on his

broadcasts. I believe the words were "not to place undue emphasis on these broadcasts."

Mr. COHN. Let me ask you this, Mr. Dooher. Did you ever see this confirmed in writing?

Mr. DOOHER. I saw a memorandum of conversation in which the statement was confirmed.

Mr. COHN. Was that a memorandum of conversation actually held with Ambassador Bowles himself?

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Do you recall the date? Have you checked on the date of that memorandum?

Mr. DOOHER. The nineteenth of June, I believe it was.

Mr. COHN. Was that June 19, 1952?

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Dooher, as Acting Chief of the Near East, Asian, and African Division, what was your view as to the soundness of this position taken by Ambassador Bowles?

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? Mr. Dooher, we have difficulty hearing you. Will you try and speak into the microphone?

Mr. DOOHER. Surely.

Mr. COHN. Did you feel there was any justification for this position taken?

Mr. DOOHER. I felt there was no justification for the position taken. I have felt that not only in this case but in other cases where we have been asked to tone down the anti-Communist content of our broadcasts. But here I felt Dr. Ghosh was perfectly competent to tell what his listeners would want to hear, and how far to go, and particularly in using their people to present anti-Communist propaganda against the Soviets.

Senator MUNDT. May I inquire if you were ever asked to tone down the anti-Communist content of your broadcasts in general, or was that with respect specifically to the Indian broadcasts?

Mr. DOOHER. I think this was the only reference here, this particular statement. But elsewhere it was suggested to me many times to tone down the content of our broadcasts.

Mr. COHN. From an anti-Communist standpoint?

Mr. DOOHER. From an anti-Communist standpoint. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Before we leave this Indian thing, I just wanted to ask you this: Did you ever receive any encouragement at any time from Ambassador Bowles or anyone in the Embassy in India to use anti-Communist statements of any kind?

Mr. DOOHER. No, as Dr. Ghosh said, it was a most discouraging state of affairs. We felt that we were not wanted on the air to India. In fact, we had a good deal of evidence that it was the desire of the Embassy to cut out our broadcast, to transfer the funds to operations locally in Delhi.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you think of any legitimate reason why the Ambassador would want you to refrain from using the statements of Indian leaders?

Mr. DOOHER. Not, to my mind, legitimate, sir. I felt it was an extremely effective form of propaganda.

The CHAIRMAN. How about your physical setup in India? What coverage do you have?

Mr. DOOHER. Well, that, sir, is a question I would like to defer for a couple of minutes. We have been informed month after month, day after day, up to last week, by the Embassy that our signal does not reach India. Nevertheless, within the 28 days of February, we received 1,000 letter from Indian leaders. It seems to me the Indians are hearing us, but probably those people in the Embassy supposed to hear us are not listening.

For a while, we were receiving audience mail reports from India, 1 letter a month, 2 letters a month, 3 letters a month; until Dr. Ghosh became very suspicious. So we took our own post-office box in Delhi. Immediately after taking our own post-office box, we made announcements, only on the Hindi program, that the listeners should write to us and indicate if they are listening. Within 28 days, approximately 1,000 letters were received; which is an extraordinary number from a country where literacy is not high.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not understand the sudden increase in mail. You say when the letters were sent to the Embassy, you were getting only 1 or 2 letters a month. When you had your own post-office box you got about a thousand letters a month. How would you explain that?

Mr. DOOHER. It appeared to us, therefore, that the Embassy was not forwarding the letters. And I don't know on what they were basing their decision that the Voice was not reaching India. For example, they also told us that the signal was not being heard. I believe that as late as last week we received a letter from the information officer stating that inasmuch as the signal was practically inaudible, they were not going to publish our programs in the Embassy publications. But another division of the Embassy sent us tapes of the signal, which are quite clear, and show that a signal almost as good as that of BBC is reaching India.

The CHAIRMAN. What coverage does BBC, the British Broadcasting Co., have in India?

Mr. DOOHER. According to the Embassy reports, it is the strongest signal outside of All-India Radio. However, the audience response to BBC is approximately one-eighth of the audience response to the Voice of America. I would say that in spite of our Embassy reports, the VOA Hindi broadcast has more listeners than BBC.

The CHAIRMAN. Does BBC broadcast on shortwave also?

Mr. DOOHER. BBC broadcasts on shortwave, and we use their wavelength. BBC leases its wavelength to our Hindi Service. The same wavelength, the same signal.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the local radio stations in India? Do they broadcast in shortwave, or longwave?

Mr. DOOHER. All-India Radio broadcasts on medium and shortwave to its own people. There is a very fine station in Ceylon. The Ceylonese Government broadcasts on shortwave also.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you use the same facilities for broadcasting, the same broadcasting station, as the British Broadcasting Co.?

Mr. DOOHER. To get to India, we do. We lease one of their broadcasting transmitters to get the signal to Delhi and to other parts of India.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that broadcasting station located, and how powerful is it?

Mr. DOOHER. That I don't know, sir.

Senator MUNDT. You say you lease one of their stations. By that you mean what?

Mr. DOOHER. BBC stations.

Senator MUNDT. Do you use any Indian stations in your program?

Mr. DOOHER. The Indian Government does not permit any VOA relays.

Senator MUNDT. I was trying to think of some reason for that strange and curious cablegram from Ambassador Bowles, and I thought if you were leasing Indian Government stations, there perhaps would be something in their code which would prevent local politicians or local agitators from being quoted on their stations. But you say you did not use Indian stations at all.

Mr. DOOHER. No, sir, not even for prepared package programs. I understand now that All-India Radio will not even use our records.

Senator MUNDT. We had testimony in connection with the South American broadcasts that one reason they toned down the anti-Communist content was because the South American owners of those stations insisted upon it. But that would not obtain, then, in India?

Mr. DOOHER. No, sir, it would not obtain in most of the Middle East. I have advocated all along that we should not use local broadcasting services to relay, because they immediately become the censors of our broadcasts. I do not think it is a wise thing to do. I would advocate a better signal, short wave or medium wave, from our own facilities than the facilities of a sovereign nation, which can therefore control the content.

Senator MUNDT. I am curious about another statement you made. I wanted to recapitulate and see if I have it right.

You said you were rather discouraged, because you received only 1, 2, or 3 letters a month from India, and that now you had received, as I understood it, a thousand letters during the past 30 days. Has something happened? Have you stepped up your signal? Have you increased the power? Have you changed the nature of the program? What has brought about this big change from 2 or 3 letters a month to approximately a thousand letters a month?

Mr. DOOHER. I think, sir, that Dr. Ghosh will confirm this. The only real change made was changing the post-office box.

Isn't that so, Dr. Ghosh?

Dr. GHOSH. May I add a word here?

It was our impression that the Embassy assumed that over here in New York we do not understand the Hindi language, although we are supposed to be broadcasting in Hindi. So they painstakingly translated every single letter in Hindi to English, and then, after 6 months, they forwarded the mail to us. And those of us who have any experience in radio know that if you get fan mail after 6 months it is not going to build up much confidence in the broadcasts. And it is not that we haven't told the Embassy that we do understand the Hindi language, but it seemed to have no effect whatsoever. And the only reason why we are getting all this mail now, as far as I can determine, is the fact that they have finally got to the point that they do not translate the letters.

Senator MUNDT. I see. They held the letters up for 6 months in the process of translation, and so forth?

Dr. GHOSH. That is right, sir. I would add this: This was one other factor involved in the sudden increase in the mail. We tried to coin-

cide opening of the post-office box with a give-away program. We offered a map of the United States, in view of the fact that most of the people had expressed their desire to know more about the history and geography of the country. We offered a map of the United States and also, later on, a pamphlet about the educational system of this country.

Senator MUNDT. I am very glad to hear you say that, because for over 3 years I personally have been suggesting to the various people in the State Department that one way in which they could increase their mail—I think it is very important that we get mail—is to take a leaf out of the booklet of American broadcasters, and send them something like that, the biography of an American President or something like that as an inducement. I am glad to find that at one place in the world they have finally come to that.

Dr. GHOSH. I might add it took me almost a whole year to convince the people in the Voice to let me do it.

Senator MUNDT. You are a better salesman than I am. I worked on them for 2 years and did not get anywhere. So I am delighted to hear you say that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dooher, you seem to have a very disturbing pattern, I gather; in Korea, for example, the Voice authorized and sponsored broadcasts attacking Syngman Rhee, when he was in a life-and-death struggle with the Communists, protested all of the attacks that you could possibly make on him, gathered them from all the newspapers in the world, rebroadcast them in Korea. In India, you have the order that you cannot attack the Communists.

Do you have any way of accounting for the unusual pattern? It becomes clearer and clearer, it seems, as we get more testimony.

Mr. DOOHER. I have had several other cases within my jurisdiction during the past 2½ years also. It seems to me a terrible softness, which comes only from a lack of dedication to the cold war struggle. That is the only explanation I have for that. There is no dedication on the part of those who are supposed to be master-minding our psychological warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. May I suggest to counsel, not on this point that we are here discussing this morning, but as a general proposition, that I think we should have one of the engineers make a complete study of the broadcasting facilities, and give the committee a map of the areas that we are actually hitting with an audible signal. I have been going over the maps the Voice submitted to the Appropriations Committee, which would indicate that we had complete coverage of all the desired target areas. I find that the testimony taken here has been in direct conflict with the picture shown in these maps. I think we should be able to get either one or several engineers to give us a complete and accurate picture, so that we will know just what target areas we are hitting.

Senator MUNDT. On that point, how much of India do you hit with our signal?

Mr. DOOHER. I believe Dr. Ghosh could handle that. He has studied the audience very carefully.

Dr. GHOSH. The BBC signal emanating from London reaches almost the entire country. The Ceylon relay is aimed primarily to northern India, because that is the territory where the Hindi language is spoken. There is evidence to prove that the signal

reaches more than three-fourths of the country, and in a very satisfactory form.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had testimony that the Ceylonese Government has received the right to censor our broadcasts emanating from Ceylon. Would you have any comment on that?

Dr. GHOSH. Yes, I think the transmitter of radio Ceylon being located on sovereign territory, they have the basic right to do that. But I think so far they haven't exercised that right to censor, although they have a right to do that, I suppose.

Senator MUNDT. I think that would be perfectly understandable. When we were trying to make a contract with Radio Luxembourg, they received that same right. And it seemed to me it is proper that they should, since most of the radio stations over there are owned by the Government, and consequently they have an interest and a concern about what kind of broadcasting is being done, even if it is leased.

The CHAIRMAN. I think in that connection it should be pointed out that the testimony heretofore taken has been that the United States has undertaken to build the facilities in Ceylon. When they are completed, they will be owned by the Ceylonese Government. The testimony has been that of the 108, I believe, members of parliament in Ceylon, 65 belong to the so-called right-wing party; the balance are composed of some Communists and Socialists and other individuals; so that the Ceylonese Government, at present is controlled by what you would call a Republican Party, John? Or a Southern Democratic Party?

So that as of today, with the Conservatives in power in Ceylon, you perhaps would not have too much difficulty insofar as censoring is concerned.

Dr. GHOSH. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question: The engineers have testified that you could hit the target area in India just as well from a station located in Manila, rather than Ceylon. I note that the new budget calls for funds for additional construction in Ceylon. Would it not seem wise that, if it is true, if the engineers are correct that Manila would be just as desirable an area, we should build in Manila, where we would not have this problem of censorship?

Dr. GHOSH. I should say so. Because there is always this constant danger that, Ceylon having a parliamentary form of government, there may be an upset of the present regime at any time, and if the ruling power, the government, takes an antiwestern or anti-American attitude, it is quite possible they might impose restrictions which will eventually affect our broadcasts as relayed from Ceylon. And, in that case, I should think that if the transmitters are located in a more friendly territory, we certainly would profit by it.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say in that connection also that the testimony has been that Ceylon is trading very heavily with Red China, especially insofar as rubber is concerned, and they would be subject to influence, I assume, from that angle. So I gather your advice would be that we should certainly seriously consider constructing the broadcasting facilities in Manila rather than in Ceylon?

Dr. GHOSH. Well, if the signal, according to the engineers' point of view, can reach India satisfactorily, then in that case I would certainly support that contention. At the same time I will say this: That we should continue to relay our programs from BBC London,

because that signal is really getting through satisfactorily without any intermediate relay base.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, we broadcast to India from London?

Dr. GHOSH. We broadcast from out here in this country. I think the station is Cincinnati, Ohio, and from there it is picked up at London, and then relayed from London to India. There are two other points from where our broadcasts are relayed. That is Munich in Germany and Tangier in North Africa.

I might add here that among the languages which are used by the Voice of America, this is one of the languages which has a global audience—the Tangier relay, at least the back end of the beam, reaches South America, and is clear as a bell, and we have today one of the largest audiences in that territory.

Also the Tangier relay reaches East Africa very satisfactorily, and I am told the area contains potentially about 200,000 listeners.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dooher, I wonder if you could answer this question. We have had testimony before the Appropriations Committee to the effect that Argentina refused us the use of her broadcasting facilities because of our attacks upon the present Argentine Government. Do you know whether we are beaming programs into Argentina now, and whether we have been continuing attacks upon the Argentine Government, or what type of programs we are beaming in, or is that outside of your field?

Mr. DOOHER. I do know, sir, that we are strongly heard in Argentina. I know our audience mail from Argentina is tremendous and has been increasing a good deal in the last year. We have a large audience there.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McClellan?

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Dooher, you have testified before the committee before?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. And as I recall some of your testimony, you have referred to what you term a pattern.

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. A pattern of softness, a lack of dedication toward the basic purpose and objectives of this program. Is that correct?

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. That, of course, is just a matter of opinion, yet it comes from one who has been in the best position to observe and to know what the facts are.

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir. There is a point I think I have mentioned before, that during my career I spent 10 months in Communist-controlled government. I can't mention the place for security reasons at the moment. However, there I learned what Communists do, how they do it, how they go about it. I know what they don't like to hear, and what they don't like to hear is just what we are giving them. And when elements try to make it difficult for us to put across that line, I then look around to see if there is a pattern, and I have found it in at least a half a dozen cases during my 2 years with the Voice of America.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, just for the record, you mention a half a dozen places. Will you identify those places so that we can get this more concrete rather than in general terms?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. My own feeling is that with the facilities we have there is a certain element, on the possibility of results that we could achieve by the proper utilization of these facilities. And what I am trying to determine is whether, as a result of that pattern, to what extent we have failed to utilize our facilities and opportunities to the extent of attaining their maximum benefit and usefulness. You keep referring to this pattern, and I am confident you feel convinced that it exists and has been operating, and I would like for you to specifically identify the things now that cause you to come to this conclusion that there has been a definite pattern established and followed, or attempted to be established and followed. And then I should like for you to tell us to what extent this pattern has influenced the results and effectiveness of this program, and to what extent it would have influenced and affected this program had you, in your position, followed that pattern.

I want you to give us just as clear a picture of it as you can, because my own thought is, as far as we have gone in this, that the real core of failure or deficiency or incompetency rests pretty high up. And it has been a lack of a definite, positive, affirmative fighting policy.

Mr. DOOHER. Absolutely, sir. I agree with that.

Senator McCLELLAN. I want you to comment thoroughly for the record now, and let us know exactly how you feel about it, and why you feel that way, and cite specific, concrete things, upon which you have arrived at this conclusion.

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir. I think the chairman can tell you there is one country, one program, I cannot talk about specifically for security reasons, but beyond that I will tell you.

Mr. COHN. I would suggest this, Mr. Doohar, in answering Senator McClellan fully: We have been requested by General Smith not to refer to this country by name, but I think if you can refer to it as country X or something along those lines, you could give Senator McClellan a full picture.

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, I will call that country X in this case.

First of all, we have had fairly full testimony on the attempted cutting of the Hebrew broadcasts, which did not take place because of the fight which we put up. That, to my mind, if it had gone through would have given the Soviet propagandists worldwide another Rosenberg case, another case whereby they could say "the Americans are the anti-Semites and not us." But I will skip that, because I think I have already covered that fully.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. That is No. 1.

Mr. DOOHER. No. 1 is the Hebrew situation.

The second is the Hindi Service, a definite deliberate effort to eliminate the Hindi Service, which, to my knowledge and to the knowledge of Dr. Ghosh and our other experts in the area, was the only effective counterpropaganda medium of the United States Government of the International Information Administration. We were broadcasting strong counterpropaganda which was effective. We were being listened to. We had a clear signal. We were getting audience re-

sponse. And yet, time after time, our public-affairs people in India insisted that we stop spending money on broadcasts, turn it over to the Public Affairs Office in Delhi, and let them spend it.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, you think because you were getting results, because it was being effective, these programs that you were putting out, that prompted this request or effort to have your program and your work stopped, and transfer the whole service to some other source?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir. I wouldn't have said that if it weren't for the specific instructions, specific guidance, which we received, that Dr. Ghosh has told about, that they did ask us to tone down the content of our program. I think the two things tied in together indicate a lack of desire on the part of the Information people in India that we continue this sort of broadcasting.

Senator MUNDT. Now, when you talk about public affairs officers, you are talking about IIA officials in India. Right?

Mr. DOOHER. The USIS, United States Information Service, which is IIA.

Senator MUNDT. Which is now IIA?

Mr. DOOHER. That is the group that reports to Dr. Johnstone.

Senator MUNDT. So what we have, in fact, is one part of the IIA operation based in India working in an opposite direction from another part of the IIA operation operating from New York?

Mr. DOOHER. Unquestionably, sir, to the point where I believe misinformation was given to the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations that went to Delhi to investigate the effectiveness of the Voice. Misinformation was given in a report, which is unclassified, which I have in front of me. I can comment on that further, sir, after I get through with my points.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. You have made two now, the Hebrew—

Mr. DOOHER. And the Hindi, the Indian.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Mr. DOOHER. At another time, when I was in charge of organizing broadcasts to the hundred million minority peoples of the Soviet Union, I had a most difficult time to get a strong policy guidance out of Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? Just for Senator Purtell's benefit, this is Mr. Dooher, who is testifying. And Mr. Dooher is head of the Near East, South Asian, and African desk. Is that right?

Mr. DOOHER. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Dr. Ghosh is head of the Indian desk, and they have had some testimony so far about the former Governor of your State, who is the Ambassador to India.

Senator PURTELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Not of your party.

You could not get policy guidance with reference to your programs for Russia?

Mr. DOOHER. I got policy guidance. That is what I wanted to testify on. It was not the sort of policy guidance I wanted. Here is what the guidance said, in part. It said I was to do nothing in my broadcasts that would outrage the sentiments of Soviet nationalism, Soviet or Russian nationalism. In other words, we were to do nothing that would offend the sensibilities of people who said there was a

Soviet nation, whereas I refuse to recognize that there is a Soviet people. I recognize the Russian people and the various other peoples of the Soviet Union. But this was a specific directive preventing us from——

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, did that mean that you could not attack communism, and communism as a government in Russia?

Mr. DOOHER. It meant, sir, that we should not attack the idea which Stalin created that all the people of the Soviet Union were one and indivisible in support of him; in other words, that there was this great Soviet nation—which really does not exist. You have the Russian people, the Ukrainian people, the Byelorussian people, the Caucasians, and the central Asians.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, you were not permitted to inject into your broadcasts anything which would appeal to the nationalism of the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, and people of that kind?

Mr. DOOHER. We were permitted, after I fought it out, because we got that guidance modified.

Senator MUNDT. But in accordance with that directive, you were not so permitted?

Mr. DOOHER. That is right. It went further, however. It prohibited us from using certain portions of the Soviet Constitution against the Soviets themselves. In other words, those portions of the Soviet Constitution which appealed to the nationalism of these minorities were prohibited to us. In other words, we couldn't be the devil using scripture for his own purpose in this case. So it was given the softening impact, the effort to make it more difficult to really fight a fight in the cold war. That is the third case.

Senator MUNDT. Before we leave the third case, did this directive, in the third case, come from our public-affairs officials, of which we have very few if any in Russia, or did they come from the Washington desk?

Mr. DOOHER. It came from Washington.

Senator MUNDT. Which division in Washington issued it?

Mr. DOOHER. As usual, it came to me through channels, so I can't identify who the originator was. I dislike naming names, for a very specific reason, that in State Department documents, a man signs a document, and it doesn't mean that he is the man who is responsible for that. It goes through channels. For instance, I am quite sure this came to me from Mr. Kretzmann in New York, our Policy Director. However, I am also quite sure that Mr. Kretzmann had nothing to do with writing this document. In other words, it came to me through the channel.

Senator MUNDT. I completely appreciate that fact. That is why I did not ask for a name. I asked you from what division of the IIA.

Mr. DOOHER. It certainly came from IP. It must have. The policy office of IIA. It must have come from them.

Senator MUNDT. Who is the head of the policy office down there?

Mr. DOOHER. At the present time, I think Mr. W. Bradley Connors.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. Let us get No. 4.

Senator MUNDT. Was he the head at the particular time when you got this directive? Or do you say at the present time?

Mr. DOOHER. I believe so, sir, but I am not certain. I am not quite sure at that point. He might have been in charge of Far Eastern policy affairs at that time. I remember there was a period of transi-

tion. He was first in charge of Far Eastern policy, and then he became director of all policy.

The fourth point is a very significant one. This was done in the interest of economy. Economy is a wonderful cloak with which you can cover any sort of action you like, and you usually get approval. Because economy is a very nice thing.

I will mention four broadcasts—but there is another; for security reasons I can't mention it—which were cut in broadcast time last September. Now, all of these broadcasts were to critical areas or Iron Curtain areas.

Senator McCLELLAN. You say there were four of those?

Mr. DOOHER. There were five broadcasts which I know were cut in time. The fifth I again will call country X. One of them was our Turkish broadcast.

Now, our Turkish broadcast is one of the most effective in the world, not just in the Voice of America but in the world. For example, during the period of July, August, and September of 1952, audience response to the BBC Turkish program was 80 letters. During the same period the Voice of America Turkish program received 8,600 letters, a fantastically effective program. Immediately thereafter, the broadcast was cut from an hour to 45 minutes. And I understand it is on the list of broadcasts which are contemplated being cut under the so-called Johnstone plan.

Senator McCLELLAN. You mean being cut out?

Mr. DOOHER. Being reduced to a standby level.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, because it is effective and has been determined to be very effective, we applied the economy to that particular program?

Mr. DOOHER. Economy is probably the only excuse, sir, that could be used with an effective broadcast like that. However, it is even worse. Polish, Hungarian, and Rumanian broadcasts to the Iron Curtain areas were cut for the same reason at the same time.

Senator McCLELLAN. I see.

Mr. DOOHER. The people in the Voice couldn't help it. They were told, "Make these program cuts. Now you choose what you have to cut." What they did: The Voice people decided to cut off the morning programs, so that they could save an 8-hour period of transmitting time. That saves a lot of money. If you have to save money, you have to cut. Now, I will leave it to the judgment of other people as to whether other cuts might have been made without cutting these very effective and important broadcasts.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, I can appreciate that there may be times when certain economies have to be resorted to, to stay within the budget.

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Did you feel that these particular economies, however, were required or instigated for that reason?

Mr. DOOHER. Well, sir, when I was certain of the fact that in the field, in one post in particular, which, again, I cannot mention, there were 130 people working for the United States Government, putting out exactly zero anti-Communist propaganda, I thought that maybe in posts like that, the cuts could be made. In other words, I do know of places which are devoted to cultural and the so-called positive propaganda solely, which admittedly do no anti-Communist propaganda whatsoever. Those were not cut at the same time.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, those were simply a matter of entertainment, educational program, and so forth, and no real, positive anti-Communist propaganda was being used. When it got down to economy, you eliminated those that were really making the fight?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. And favored those that were not aggressive?

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Not aggressive in the real battle against communism.

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. And that was observed by you and can be established by the record, I assume?

Mr. DOOHER. Oh, definitely, sir. No question. The record is available. As a matter of fact, in this particular post, which again is country X, there is a report available. I do not have a copy of it myself. However, I have seen a copy of it several times. It states that in the war against Soviet imperialism, the USIS in this country has been able to accomplish absolutely nothing, because it does not use anti-Communist propaganda.

Mr. COHN. To develop that for Senator McClellan a minute, I think that is extremely important. That is this country X we have been talking about. Is that right?

Mr. DOOHER. That is right.

Mr. COHN. Now, you have the material from our information program getting in there in several ways. First of all, you have the Voice of America, and you have told us they tried to cut down the Voice of America going to that country. Is that right?

Mr. DOOHER. They did cut it down by 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent.

Mr. COHN. By one-third.

Mr. DOOHER. That is right.

Mr. COHN. And in the Voice of America you know for a fact that the broadcasts had an aggressively anti-Communist content; is that right?

Mr. DOOHER. I know it was extremely effective, and we have testimony from our Ambassador to that country to that effect.

Mr. COHN. All right. Now, the Voice of America supplies effective anti-Communist statements going into country X. If the Voice of America were cut down as it has been, or eliminated, the only thing we would have left to get across the truth about our way of life to the people in that country and to counter Communist propaganda would be through the other parts of the State Department information program. Is that right?

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. And those other parts are consolidated under what is known as the USIS, the United States Information Service. Is that so?

Mr. DOOHER. That is right.

Mr. COHN. That includes press and publications, motion pictures, things along those lines?

Mr. DOOHER. Right.

Mr. COHN. And those are pretty much under the public affairs officers who are in that embassy. Is that right?

Mr. DOOHER. Definitely; yes.

Mr. COHN. And these public affairs officers are responsible to Washington?

Mr. DOOHER. They are responsible to Dr. Johnstone, who is in charge of IFI, the International Field Organization.

Mr. COHN. In other words, this Dr. William Johnstone, Jr., one of the top officials of the International Information Administration in Washington, has under him some 8,000 of these public affairs officers who man the embassies throughout the world and are in charge of the United States Information Service in these various posts throughout the world. Is that so?

Mr. DOOHER. In 88 United States offices overseas.

Mr. COHN. So, in other words, if you cut out the Voice of America or reduce it, the only thing we have left to depend on in countering Communist propaganda and getting across the truth is the United States Information Service as administered by these public affairs officers?

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. Now, is it your testimony that in this country, country X, where they cut down the Voice of America broadcasts, the Voice of America officers, through the USIS, were not getting across anti-Communist statements?

Mr. DOOHER. That is my testimony.

Mr. COHN. And did you refer to some specific written report you have seen?

Mr. DOOHER. I have seen one specific written report and have had many verbal reports from officials returning from that country.

Mr. COHN. And what was the effect of that written report?

Mr. DOOHER. The effect was that the USIS was unable to distribute any anti-Communist propaganda whatsoever in that country.

Mr. COHN. That they were doing absolutely nothing.

Mr. DOOHER. They were doing nothing.

Mr. COHN. Did that report say what the Russians were doing while we were doing nothing?

Mr. DOOHER. That report said the Russians were very effective, through their libraries and through their Communist Party in that country—that they were doing very effective work.

Mr. COHN. Did any of these PAO's or people connected with them in this country X try to get you people in the Voice of America to tone down the anti-Communist content of your broadcasts?

Mr. DOOHER. They did, to the point where they said that our broadcasts were—the quotation was—"warmongering."

Mr. COHN. They also told you that your broadcasts with an anti-Communist content were warmongering and should not go to country X?

Mr. DOOHER. That is right.

Mr. COHN. This came from the PAO's in that country?

Mr. DOOHER. I would like to point out, though, that the so-called warmongering broadcasts specified two scripts which were broadcast to 46 other areas by the Voice of America. In other words, this was not a specific thing written for this country. This was a house script, as we call it. It was only declared warmongering by the PAO in this particular country.

Mr. COHN. So the PAO in this particular country said that these broadcasts, which I understand reflected the policy of the United States Government—is that right?

Mr. DOOHER. They were approved policywise.

Mr. COHN. Were warmongering on our part. And they tried to get you to tone down the anti-Communist content.

Mr. DOOHER. That is right.

Senator McCLELLAN. Is not "warmongering" the same term that Communists would have likely applied to these programs?

Mr. DOOHER. That is a very interesting question, sir, because at the same time the Soviet radio was broadcasting to country X attacking the Voice of America broadcasts and requesting that they be cut. The Soviet radio asked the same thing.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, we were complying with the Soviet request, were we, in making this reduction?

Mr. DOOHER. Certainly the action came at approximately the same time.

Senator McCLELLAN. So they were related at least with reference to time?

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. And also with reference to the term used to express the objections?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes. We were called warmongers. We were called the blood drinkers of Wall Street, by the Moscow radio station at that particular time.

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask whether you have any evidence from country X that the Ambassador or Minister to that country associated himself with the PAO officer in feeling that these were warmongering broadcasts, or whether he, on the other hand, felt they were worthwhile and effective?

Mr. DOOHER. Well, sir, first of all, I was told he associated himself, with that, but I didn't believe it. I waited until he came back for consultation. When he came in for consultation, I had a conference with him, and we worked out a memorandum of conversation together, which I think later on we can put into the testimony, in which it was stated that what we were doing was exactly what he wanted us to do.

In fact, he wanted us to step up the content, to make it even more pointed. So we were doing exactly what our diplomatic chief wanted us to do.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, the PAO were not honestly representing the view of the Ambassador?

Mr. DOOHER. That seemed obvious.

Senator MUNDT. They were telling you one thing, to stop these anti-Communist broadcasts, that they were warmongering and all that, and when you went to see the Ambassador personally, he said that was not true at all, that the broadcasts were fine, that he wanted more of them, and he wanted them effective and anti-Communist?

Mr. DOOHER. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. Did you advise the Ambassador of what the PAO's had been telling you and he refused to associate himself with their statements?

Mr. DOOHER. In fact, he specifically told me that the broadcasts should not be cut but should be stepped up.

Senator MUNDT. To the best of your knowledge, are these PAO officers still functioning in that same capacity in country X?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Can you give us No. 5 now? You have given 4.

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir. I gave 5.

Senator McCLELLAN. Country X you regarded as No. 5?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes; the Turkish broadcasts were No. 4. The Hindi, the Hebrew, and the Soviet minorities guidance.

Senator McCLELLAN. Country X makes the fifth?

Mr. DOOHER. Makes the fifth; yes. And then I had reference to the Polish, Hungarian, and Rumanian broadcasts which were cut also, as additional evidence. It is actually eight languages that were cut. However, I would like to develop the matter further, because it was a softening through 4 different methods, or 3 different methods, anyhow.

The first was through the efforts to have us tone down our anti-Communist broadcasts. That was method 1.

Senator McCLELLAN. Softening through four methods. All right.

Mr. DOOHER. Tone down the content of our broadcasts. I have given three examples of that.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Mr. DOOHER. The second was to reduce the air time of the effective anti-Communist broadcasts. There are five examples of that.

Senator McCLELLAN. Reduce the air time of what, did you say?

Mr. DOOHER. Of the effective anti-Communist broadcasts. There are five examples of that.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Mr. DOOHER. The third method was efforts to eliminate, completely, effective broadcasts. The Hebrew and the Hindi are two examples there.

Senator McCLELLAN. There are two examples of that?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right.

Mr. DOOHER. The fourth method was what I think I am going to call the Dr. Johnstone plan, since he is the one who originated it, in a document, the IIA Newsletter, which, in effect, would turn the control of all the media over to the public affairs officers in the field. In other words, the public-affairs officer in country X, who didn't believe in anti-Communist broadcasts, would be the boss and could tell me in New York that I couldn't broadcast anti-Communist propaganda, under this 88 country plan, the so-called 88 Voices of America plan. If we had a good public-affairs officer—and we have many good public-affairs officers, I must say—in my area I know of 4 or 5 who are extremely cooperative. If they are good we will have good broadcasts, but if they are bad, then the broadcasts also will be milky-white and not effective whatsoever.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, Mr. Dooher, you have testified in some detail with reference to these factors upon which you came to the conclusion that a definite pattern was being followed. Will you tell us now, taking into account the facilities you have and the money you had to spend and the program that you felt was in keeping with the intent and spirit of gaining our objectives, to what extent these policies and these actions that you have referred to affected or influenced the effectiveness of this program?

Mr. DOOHER. Well, sir, in two of my countries, again nameless for obvious reasons, they cut the actual time in which we could do effective propaganda. That was the effect. Everything else, I have been successful in fighting off, I think.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, assuming they had all been successful, what I am trying to determine is: What would have been the effect of our Voice of America work and the work that is set out for it and the program that it is intended to carry out? What would have been the effect, had all these influences been successful in being brought to bear, as related to what could have been accomplished with the same money, the same facilities, and a definite, positive program, as you wanted to carry out, and what would have resulted had all these factors been sustained, I will say, and put into effect?

Mr. DOOHER. If these had been all put into effect, we would have a program, a propaganda program, over the Voice, that would have been so ineffective that I personally would have resigned. I wouldn't have carried on a program of that kind. It would have wasted the taxpayers' money. There would have been no reason whatsoever for broadcasting to these areas if all of these factors had been carried to their logical conclusion.

On the other hand, if we had full support in what we were trying to do, we could have—and did where I really put up a fight—accomplished the goals outlined for us by Government policy. In other words, in country X and another country, in three countries, I think we could prove documentarily that our broadcasts were effective in changing the minds of the people who ran those countries. I think we can very definitely prove that. I know in 1 country of my 15 countries when a parliamentary deputy attacked the Voice of America for a statement it did not make, the foreign minister of this country, got up and defended the Voice of America. Now, that, to me, is effective. And this is a so-called neutralist country.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, they were not able to have adopted or carried out a number of these patterns or soft attitudes, attempts to try to reduce the effectiveness of the program. They were not successful in attempting to carry that on; is that correct?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, had they been successful, can we reasonably assume that they would have taken further means to have made more ineffective and less forceful the entire program?

Mr. DOOHER. Well, sir, they were not successful, but they still recommended further means to try to reduce the effectiveness. When they couldn't force us to take out the anti-Communist material, when we fought against the reduction in air time, when we fought against the elimination of programs, they came up with this master plan, which I think was the final recommendation by Dr. Compton, which again, I say I do not blame him for. He was taking advice from his experts, the higher echelon I spoke about before, the people in IIA in Washington. And his final recommendation was that all broadcasts to the free world be put on either a standby basis or eliminated. In other words, "this is a psychological war, but we will stand by." The Soviet won't stand by.

I have here a document, which, again, is unclassified. I can read from it.

The Soviet Union today is broadcasting 695 hours a week to these areas where we would stand by.

To country X, for example—

Senator McCLELLAN. When you say "stand by," do you mean suspend the program in this country?

Mr. DOOHER. I don't think that was meant. I think it was meant we would stay on the air for 15 minutes, just so we would have a little team available in case they decided to expand again. But they also intended to eliminate many broadcasts.

The recommendation was to put on a standby broadcast or to eliminate all broadcasts to the free world. The Soviet Union isn't standing by or eliminating. It is increasing. I have one of these books, showing that every year there are more and more Soviet broadcasts. You take, for example, country X, where I broadcast 7 hours a week. The Soviets broadcast 45 hours a week. It is a very ticklish situation there. Rather than be standing by in this country, we should be increasing the intensity of our efforts.

You take India, Pakistan, and the South Asia area, where Dr. Ghosh broadcasts 3½ hours, and our Urdu service. They are broadcasting 7 hours and 30 minutes a week.

In other words, we are a pretty small voice in this psychological war. I think we are doing a fine job. I think we are actually countering Soviet propaganda. But not if we have to stand by. And that was a recommendation which was made public, I believe, immediately after Dr. Compton's resignation. That, I believe, was part and parcel of the so-called Johnstone plan.

The effort has been for some time to decrease the Voice, the radio Voice. And yet to my mind it is the only one we can really count on to put over American policy. Because we are the only ones who are not in the target countries. We are here in New York and Washington.

If the Secretary of State says we must take a very firm line, we must be anti-Communist, say, in country Z—well, the USIS people in country Z can do nothing, because they are on the sovereign territory of a foreign country. But we in New York can broadcast exactly what the Secretary wants. It is the medium which Washington controls. It is the medium which Congress controls, which the Secretary of State controls, and which the American people control. The other media are, to put it one way, censored, because they are on the sovereign territory of another state.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, if we are to take your testimony at full value, it occurs to me that the real job to be done down here is to develop the facts as related by you, assuming those are accurate and can be substantiated by the report. The real job is to expose this condition by the work of this committee, and bring it to the attention of the new administration of the State Department, to the end that they can pursue this further and actually point up the responsibility within the State Department and within the Voice and the IIA, and then remove those who have been responsible for this policy and these patterns that you speak of, and replace them with people who are competent and who are dedicated to this task.

Now, if we can perform any service here, I think that should be the objective of this committee. And I am very anxious to have placed on the record these things that can be substantiated so that a correct

and a full reevaluation can be had of this entire program and of the policy that has been pursued in order that it might be corrected, and we can get this Voice of America again on the right track, so that we can get effective results.

Now, one other question: Every time we undertake to do something here, the critics are always saying, "Oh, well, it is a group of disgruntled former employees." Now, you are not a former employee.

Mr. DOOHER. No, sir. I am an employee.

Senator McCLELLAN. You still have your position?

Mr. DOOHER. I have my position.

Senator McCLELLAN. And you are making this fight in response to the committee's invitation or request for your presence?

Mr. DOOHER. This is the third time I have appeared, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. You are making this fight in the service of the Voice of America in the hope that you may get these conditions corrected?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir. I didn't start the fight before this committee. In May 1952, I wrote a memorandum to my superior officer and asked for a meeting to discuss just this thing, which I said was, in that memorandum, a negation of the congressional intent in granting us funds.

In January of this year, I wrote to my contacts in Washington, the people I have to write to, pointing out four of these cases, which I said showed a very disturbing trend. So I did not simply wait for this committee to be formed to put up this fight on this same issue, that there is a pattern. I began this about a year ago.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, you tried to bring this to the attention of those responsible, in the hope that they might share your views about it, recognize the situation, and take the appropriate action to change this trend?

Mr. DOOHER. I did. And before I came before the committee, I wrote to my superiors, told them what I was going to say, in short.

Senator McCLELLAN. Sir?

Mr. DOOHER. In other words, I informed my superiors of exactly what I intended to say. This was not done under the table. I specifically went on record saying, "Now, this is what I intend to testify about."

So this thing has been quite a fight, for over a year now. I came back from overseas service in September of 1950, quite wide-eyed. I didn't believe these things were going on, until they began to affect the actual programs under my supervision.

And then, when I finally detected the program, which was a year ago, I went on record and said, "This is a pattern."

Senator McCLELLAN. So you certainly cannot be placed in the category of a disgruntled former employee?

Mr. DOOHER. That is right, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. You are in the service. I assume you feel like you want to dedicate yourself to this task and make it most effective, and therefore you are trying to be constructive. You were before you came before the committee. You were trying to be constructive within the organization, by calling attention to these things and undertaking to arouse those in superior authority to this situation and get them to take appropriate action to correct it?

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Dooher, your testimony has been very disturbing, but very helpful, and well documented, I might add.

It seems to me the demonstrative type of evidence which can be checked. You have not given us a lot of generalities, a lot of ethereal cases, but you have given us some specific cases,

I would like you to address yourself, if you will, to this question: What, in your opinion, can this committee do or can the new team in the State Department do to correct this rather unsavory pattern of activity that you have discussed? In some instances, it was because the ambassador of a certain country lacks a realistic approach, let us say, to the problem confronting them.

In country X, it is the fact, apparently, that we have some Public Affairs officers who either maliciously or ignorantly have been giving some very, very detrimental advice to this country. In other instances, it is because the policy group here in Washington have sent you directives which are unworkable, if this is really to be a fight against communism.

So, while we have a pattern, it apparently is not a pattern which has been planned by any one specific individual.

Mr. DOOHER. Not a conspiracy, sir; no.

Senator MUNDT. It is a pattern that evolves out of the fact that here, there, and elsewhere we have people who, for one reason or another, do not recognize the Communist international conspiracy for what it is and have no realization of what we should do with our funds and our Voice and our USIS to counteract it.

So I wish you would address yourself to the question of where we go from here now, what the new team, what the new director, Dr. Johnson, who has assured this committee and has assured this Senator personally, that he has the same attitude that you have, that this is a fight against communism, that we are either going to win the cold war or have to fight a hot one, and that we have no business throwing the taxpayers' money around if we have not got a pattern or a blueprint.

And I wish in whatever you have to say for the record, you would now say, as counsel to this committee or to the new team in the State Department, what can be done so that we can achieve the optimum results we want out of this program.

Mr. DOOHER. Sir, I believe Dr. Johnson has certainly started on the right foot as far as we are concerned. I know he has had talks with Mr. Puhan, the chief of our program operations, whom I think you know. He has addressed the thing properly. He has gone about carefully consulting with everybody. His own new team are talking with the people in the Voice, and I think they are very carefully trying to find out what is wrong and how to correct those wrongs, and I think the committee has done a remarkable service in bringing to light some of these facts that, frankly, were very difficult to get through channels to the people in Washington who could take action.

Channels, you know, are absolutely essential in Government work, but channels sometimes have the very bad habit of getting clogged. That is what I found with many of my complaints. They went through channels but I didn't know where the channel ended. Certainly we didn't get action at the end of the channel.

So I think that what is being done is what should be done. I think that bringing these things to light, these constructive points, these constructive things, shows that the Voice and certainly other media, too,

can do a fine job if they are properly organized, properly led, if they have the dedication that is so essential to winning this cold war. Without the dedication, I think neither the Voice, the movies, nor anything, can work.

Senator MUNDT. It is largely a problem of personnel and personalities.

Mr. DOOHER. Absolutely. Personnel are most important.

Senator MUNDT. One other thing. I would not want you to leave the record with the impression, unless you do it intentionally, which I do not think you do, although I recognize you are a radioman, and a shoemaker sticks to his last, but I would not like to have you leave the impression that these 88 offices set up in USIS, which function in terms of a great many services, including pamphlets, printed material, bulletins of information, scientific and technical aid to the countries involved, motion pictures, public addresses—I would not like you to leave the impression that necessarily those cannot be used to fight communism. In certain countries, yes, where the Communists are in control. In certain countries, yes, where they are so close to the periphery of the curtain where it might be considered almost a revolutionary act for the local country to permit it. But in other countries, such as Western Europe and Central Europe and parts of Asia, at least it is my opinion that they can become an equal of radio and perhaps a more effective weapon than radio.

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir. I can give one example of where the public-affairs office is doing a splendid job, in Turkey, an absolutely splendid job. We are a team working with the public-affairs officer in Ankara and Istanbul. We are one unit working together.

Senator MUNDT. I am delighted to hear you say that, because I have visited the public-affairs office in Turkey, both in Istanbul and Ankara, and certainly I agree 100 percent with you. And since on occasion we have had the names of people tossed into this record who have been unhappily involved, I wish you would name this public-affairs officer who is doing a good job.

Mr. DOOHER. The man who has really worked with us, Mr. Joyce, who now is the regional planning officer in Istanbul, has done a superb job.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Doohier, one or two questions.

We have had a great difference of opinion among the experts, the so-called experts, as to the type of broadcast most desirable, if the Voice is continued, in the friendly countries.

Senator MUNDT. What do you mean "if"? "When" it is continued. Or as it is continued.

The CHAIRMAN. I will let the question be amended in that fashion.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Some have urged that in the friendly countries we should have nothing but the hard-news broadcasts and analysis of the news, in other words, following pretty much the British Broadcasting Co.'s line; and that only in the Communist countries should we beam the so-called anti-Communist propaganda.

Others have suggested that the anti-Communist material be beamed to all countries, friendly and enemy, or I should say, friendly and unfriendly.

Would you care to comment on that?

I have in mind the comment that Dr. Compton made when he left the IIA, to the effect that he thought in unfriendly countries we should not attempt to put out the so-called strong anti-Communist propaganda. And whether I agree with that or not, I think there is considerable merit to the suggestion.

Mr. DOOHER. Well, sir, that is what I would call the "standby" attitude. We mustn't forget that the enemy is putting out his strong anti-American and anti-free-world line. I have found that even to the so-called neutralist countries, good factual anti-Communist commentaries are most effective.

To give you an example: When the Soviets turned anti-Semite, people told us that we shouldn't broadcast anything to the Arab world, because we would only make the situation worse. Well, we have some pretty good area people in our Arabic services. We put one of our men to writing commentaries. He wrote commentaries to the effect that this anti-Semitism of the Soviets might tomorrow be anti-Moslemism, very effectively. It was picked up in General Naguib's own personal newspaper in Cairo and printed in the Egyptian press. That is effectiveness when the head of a state's own paper picks it up and uses it. And I would hate to see us lose the opportunity of doing that, even in the so-called neutralist areas.

In country X there is no question about the effect of our anti-Communist propaganda. The press is using it all the time, monitoring and picking up our broadcasts. What they like are the commentaries.

BBC has an excellent news service. If I could comment here on what I call the myth of BBC, I would like to, because we are always being told we should be like the BBC because that is the best broadcasting service in the world.

Maybe I am a little proud of VOA, maybe too proud of it, but the fact is that the audience response insofar as my area is concerned, runs from 4 to 1 to 100 to 1 in our favor. That is the only way you can measure it. If the people write to you, they are interested. If you get 1,600 letters a month from a so-called neutralist country, that is important. Because, first of all, these countries in some cases are illiterate to the extent of maybe 90 or 95 percent. And a thousand letters from one of those countries might be like 20,000 letters from a European country. And don't forget that the few cents they have to spend on stamps over there is a big cut out of their paycheck.

Senator MUNDT. How are we set up? Are we set up so that when we get 1,600 letters from a country they are not answered, or are they always answered?

Mr. DOOHER. They are always answered.

Dr. Ghosh is making sure now that his letters are always answered, for example.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you get into that, let me get your position absolutely clear on the record. Your thought is, and I gather you feel very strongly about it, that if we are to have a Voice, we should expose communism for what it is, regardless of whether we are exposing it in a friendly country or in an enemy country?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that we should not revert merely to a broadcast of hard news and analysis?

Mr. DOOHER. No. I think that that can be done by other media.

The CHAIRMAN. I gather you feel rather strongly about that?

Mr. DOOHER. I feel very strongly about that. I feel even in countries where there is supposed to be great sophistication, such as France, there we should be exposing communism just as strongly as we are in country X or Turkey or in the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have your comment on this situation, Mr. Dooher.

We have gone into it to some slight extent before.

The evidence before this committee and the Appropriations Committee has been that the Voice has been rather vigorously attacking the present Government of Argentina. Let us assume for the time being that you may not favor the present regime in Argentina. I say assume that for the purpose of your answer.

Do you agree that the function of the Voice is to attack governments throughout the world which we do not heartily approve of? Or is the function of the Voice to attack international communism?

Mr. DOOHER. Well, I, myself, have never attacked the government of any area toward which I was broadcasting except behind the Iron Curtain.

I think you should have one big goal. You should not scatter your shot. I think you should have one target, keep your eye on that target, keep pounding away at that target.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the very competent engineers that testified the other day was asked the question, if he were a member of the Communist Party, if he had been under orders from Moscow, would he have followed the same pattern of sabotage of the physical setup? I am not speaking of the broadcast now, but of the physical setup; locating stations in the wrong place, building the wrong type of antenna, the same type of pattern that has been followed.

His answer is: "Yes," he would.

I know you are not an engineer. But let us shift to what you call a pattern insofar as the material broadcast is concerned. Let me ask you this. If you were a member of the Communist Party, if you were under orders from Moscow, would you have performed, do you think, the same function the Voice performed in Korea, namely, when Rhee was in a life-and-death struggle with the Communists, and an election was coming up, and the Communists were trying to unseat him, constant attacks upon Rhee over the Voice?

Repeating my question: If you were a member of the Communist Party, is that the type of pattern you would have followed?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir; I believe you could make a comparison with Soviet broadcasts at the same time and see that they followed the same line. We have this example in India, where the thing complained about is that our broadcasts are not very welcome over there. Here is a violent attack by Blitz, the leading Communist paper in India.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the Communist paper in India objected to your broadcasting the statement of Indian leaders?

Mr. DOOHER. They objected to our existence. And, by the way, they have named and blacklisted Dr. Ghosh and his entire staff. In other words, these men who came to serve America are on the Communist blacklist. This is it.

The CHAIRMAN. I may be getting outside of your realm now, Mr. Dooher.

Do we have any comparison between the money being spent by Communist-controlled countries for their voice, if we can call it that, their propaganda efforts, as compared to the amount of money we are spending?

Mr. DOOHER. No comparison of money, sir, but, again, we have a comparison of the number of hours of broadcast, to which you must add the thousand transmitting stations the Soviets are using to jam our broadcasts. And that is a very important factor. It is just as expensive to jam, I believe, as it is to broadcast.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not imagine they were trying to jam those broadcasts into Korea, were they?

Mr. DOOHER. I doubt it very much. As a matter of fact, it is interesting to note that they have started jamming Dr. Ghosh's broadcast to India. They are picking up the signal from Tangier to Ceylon and jamming it in between.

The CHAIRMAN. Some measure of the effectiveness of your program in the eyes of the Soviet would be the effort they expend on trying to jam. Is that right?

Mr. DOOHER. That is right.

Now, on the Hindi and Hebrew programs, we have an effort to jam since we started.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we should ask Dr. Johnson for this.

If you could give us some estimate of the comparative attempt to jam the various programs throughout the world, it would be some key as to how they are regarded by the Soviet.

Do you think you could do that?

Mr. DOOHER. I think there is such a thing as a jamming map which shows the centers of jamming. I recall that about a year and a half ago, when we began broadcasting in the Caucasian languages—I was in charge of those at the time—the center of jamming moved from the Leningrad-Moscow area down to the Caucasus; the main reason being, I think, that we were broadcasting in Georgian, Stalin's own language, and he didn't want anybody in Georgia to hear about his past life, I assume. But that was an actual fact.

The maps prepared before and after show that the center of jamming has moved. I think you probably could, from our facilities people in New York, get a jamming map.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any further comments, any further advice, that you would like to give in regard to the future of the Voice? We would be glad to hear it.

Mr. DOOHER. No, sir. As one who has not been associated with the Voice for too long—after all, I am a Foreign Service staff officer—it is not really a situation in which I was trying to protect my baby, but I have seen as one who has come in from the field that the Voice is a terribly effective weapon that can't be matched overseas, because you don't have the facilities overseas.

And I believe it should be cleaned up and strengthened, and there is no question that the Voice of America has its faults. I think the committee has brought this out, and everyone will admit it. But the important part is that where it doesn't have those faults it has proven to be an extremely effective instrument of countering Communist propaganda, and I think we should strengthen those parts and give

them full support and make clear what they are supposed to do. I mean, now that we know that we are supposed to be countering Communist propaganda, we can move ahead, now that we won't have this softening effort, this constant softening effort.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you very much.

Senator Purtell, any questions?

We will recess the public hearings now until next Tuesday morning at 10:30.

We will have public hearings every morning then and executive sessions every afternoon.

There will be an executive session this afternoon at 2 o'clock.

There will be an executive session Monday at 10:30.

And I may say that the sessions next week will not concern themselves primarily with the Voice but will concern themselves more with other elements of the information program, although there is a certain amount of dovetailing, and some of the testimony will concern the Voice.

And thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the hearing was recessed until Tuesday, March 24, 1953, at 10:30 a. m.)

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT No. 59

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
February 23, 1953.

Re Voice of America—Shipborne Transmitters

Senator JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,
*Chairman, Committee on Government Operations,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: I have followed with interest accounts of the hearing you are now conducting into the Voice of America operations. In that connection I should like to provide you with some information which has come into my possession from the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Mutual Security. I had originally intended to direct this committee to conduct inquiries into the matter but I feel that since you are already conducting such an inquiry it would be appropriate for me to furnish this information to you and request that you furnish me the results of your investigations into the subject.

The Voice of America now has in operation one ship equipped with electronics equipment for the purpose of beaming broadcasts into the Iron Curtain countries; approximately 90 men are required for the routine functioning of this ship; the ship is called *Vagabond A*. Similar equipment is now being installed in a second ship called *Vagabond B*. In the budget estimates for fiscal year 1954 the State Department is requesting \$3,714,000 to begin operation on a third such ship to be called *Vagabond C*.

Vagabond A, the only such ship now in operation, is anchored at the island of Rhodes. This ship has 2 short-wave transmitters of 35 milliwatt-hour and one 150-kilowatt medium-wave transmitter. It broadcasts through antennas supported in the air by a helium-filled balloon. I have been advised by a technician whose ability I have reason to believe is adequate that it is not possible with the present development of electronics to utilize the full power of the transmitting device with antennas such as this. In addition to this technical difficulty there is the obvious weakness of depending on such a device, namely, that the continuity of broadcasting cannot be maintained since the balloon is subject to the vagaries of stormy weather and high wind.

In fact, I was advised that recently one of the balloons broke loose from the moorings and was lost; I am advised also that the cost of a helium-filled balloon is approximately \$15,000.

I understand that the ship as it functions at the present time utilizes antennas located on the Island of Rhodes itself. Competent technicians in the field have said that it would be of definite advantage to have a mobile transmitter presuming the technical difficulties which would prevent effective service could be overcome, since it is more difficult to jam signals coming from unknown and varied directions. However, these advantages are conditioned upon overcoming such technical difficulties. It seems that the primary difficulty is in the receiving antennas; in order to have consistent reception it is necessary to have more than one antenna so that a signal fading on one antenna could be picked up on another. This could be accomplished on land but not on the ship at the present stage of electronics development.

It appears, then, that if the receiving antennas must be located on land and if the transmitting antenna is far more effective if located on land then it would be much less expensive to have the whole operation based on a permanent site on land.

The difficulty of transmitting a program without effective land-based antennas with the knowledge available in the scientific field now could be overcome by (1) having a live broadcast from the ship; this does not seem feasible since it

would be more difficult, if not impossible, to carry the staff required for such an operation on shipboard: (2) the practice of flying recordings to the ship from the nearest land operation; this also seems impractical.

As of a recent date the Voice of America broadcast from the *Vagabond A* 5 hours and 45 minutes per day. Of this 1¾ hours was a simultaneous relay of broadcasts received either from New York or from one of the relay stations abroad. Thirty minutes of the time was spent transmitting transcriptions and 3½ hours was spent broadcasting "repeats." These "repeats" were programs previously received on their equipment and recorded on tape for rebroadcast by *Vagabond A* at a later time.

While I do not have complete facts available and it is for that reason I am transmitting this information to you, it would appear that until the technical difficulties in connection with broadcasting from a ship are overcome that we do not actually have mobility in *Vagabond A* and it seems reasonable, therefore, that the Voice of America might perfect their original equipment before attempting other experiments.

In addition to these technical difficulties it has been alleged that it is contrary to provisions of international law to broadcast from the high seas for public consumption such as the Voice of America program envisages.

With the information I have available it appears that we are being asked to appropriate almost \$4 million for the construction of another "mobile" transmitter that is not mobile and I personally feel that no such appropriation should be approved by the Appropriations Committee until it can be adequately demonstrated that such a device will actually function. I further believe that the Voice of America should be required to furnish complete data on the cost of constructing and operating these experimental units.

With every good wish, I am,

Sincerely,

STYLES BRIDGES.

EXHIBIT No. 60

MAY 19, 1952.

I—Mr. Reed Harris

IBS—Foy D. Kohler

Contract Administration for VOA Facilities Projects

This is in reply to your memorandum of April 11, 1952, concerning the technical and auditing personnel at our construction project sites, with which I wholly agree.

I regret that the reply which I am obliged to make to your inquiry is not a happy one. This is another matter which founders on the divided responsibilities of IBS and NAO, my views on which have been well known but unheeded since August 24, 1950. On the whole, I feel fairly secure as respects engineering supervision of projects, with IBS staff engineers on the spot from the beginning of operations on all major projects: Jean Seymour on *Vagabond* and now assigned to Baker East; Jesse Holland assigned to Baker West; Charles Brannen on John, and Charles Smith on Jade, both under the direction of George Chapman in Manila; Carl Finley and John Hall on Cast; James Alley on Negate; Victor Farrell for Curtain Antennae; and William Brady standing by in London to take over Dog. In addition, the consultant firm of Francisco & Jacobus is controlling construction of the Curtain Antennae with an architectural engineer at each site; and the firm "U. S. Consultants", reporting to Chapman, is under contract to inspect and certify compliance with drawings at John and Jade. This has given us at least minimum technical coverage of every project and full all-around coverage of most. In a few locations our engineers are perhaps not ideally suited, however, on problems of site preparation and building construction, and should be supplemented in these fields.

On the score of site audit from a fiscal and administrative point of view, the Department is wide open (except to the extent that our engineers have performed some of these functions, despite their lack of training or of responsibility and authority). To date only one accountant has been sent to any of the projects by NAO, namely, Otto Strohmer, who was assigned on March 21, 1952, to Manila, from which point he is apparently expected to handle both John and Jade. Another accountant, Joseph Sanders, has been stationed in a rear echelon office in San Francisco since July 1951.

As we see the administration of CPFF contracts, it is essential that the following types of personnel be provided:

1. Project engineer

Technical supervision of physical construction and electronic installation requires the services of at least one resident project engineer, together with such assistant project engineers as the size, scope, and complexity of the project makes necessary. His primary responsibility is to insure compliance with the terms of the contract insofar as technical construction and adherence to plans and specifications is concerned.

2. Project accountants

One or more project accountants are required at the site of construction with responsibility for a continuing audit of all claims before they are forwarded for payment. The duties include determination that claims documents are in proper form, that the work represented by them fall within the scope of the contract, and that all claims are authentic. He is responsible for protecting the Government's fiscal interest in the project, and should also maintain budgetary control and provide accounting reports needed in the management of the operation.

3. Time checkers

An essential element of any CPFF contracts includes a continuing site review of personal services claimed by the contractor. This involves determining that payroll charges are made only for individuals who are actually on the job, that the rates of pay provided are appropriate for the work the individuals are performing, that overtime is properly approved and performed, that individuals are not included on the payroll who should be carried as overhead cost rather than project cost, and that the actual cash payments made are in accordance with the charges shown on the payroll itself. This type of activity is a continuing process throughout the life of the contract at the site of the actual construction. It can only be accomplished by a continuing inspection operation, involving a virtual patrol of the project, and physical presence at the paymaster's office on payday.

4. Material checkers

One or more material checkers (whose functions on smaller projects can be combined with those of time checkers) are required to assure the proper safeguarding and disposition of equipment, supplies, and material delivered to the site. The material checker verifies through receiving reports the delivery of material for which billings are made by the contractor to the Government, supervises the contractor's storage of material so as to avoid loss through theft or deterioration, and arranges for the proper disposal of surplus and excess material to the Government's advantage in accordance with established regulations.

The functions described above obviously can be performed only at the project site. When the question was originally raised as to how we would administer our contracts back in 1950 and the early part of 1951, it was decided that NAO would assume these responsibilities, with the exception of the assignment of the project engineers which remained a responsibility of IBS. While I do not believe the specific functions were spelled out in as great detail as I have done above, there was no question as to the responsibility for these activities since items 2, 3, and 4 pertain directly to the audit responsibility, and since NAO clearly was assigned the duties falling within these categories, as evidenced by the following:

1. Memorandum from Mr. Alva Meyers, Jr., to George Herrick dated February 14, 1951:

"Reference is made to your memorandum of January 20, 1951, under the above subject (audit and administration of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts). Provisions are being made by the NAO within our staffing pattern to render the audit and administration of cost-plus-fixed-fee-contracts service."

2. Excerpt from a memorandum from Mr. Alva Meyers, Jr., to Mr. William Wright dated April 24, 1951:

"* * * DF and NAO are in agreement that, since NAO will be responsible for the administration of the contract, NAO should have primary operating audit responsibility and DF should function in its usual technical consultative and supervisory relationship to NAO * * *."

3. Reports from the Embassy at Manila and other reports from our engineers have repeatedly called attention to the difficulties being encountered by the failure to supply needed auditing staff.

4. On January 16, 1952, Mr. Herrick sent me the following memorandum concerning this problem. I think it important to quote this memorandum in its entirety:

"I regret to inform you that the present auditing capabilities of NAO and OIB are not satisfactory for the successful completion of the construction program.

"At the present time, I cannot properly service the cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts and, therefore, am not cognizant of expenditures during the prosecution of the contracts.

"I call to your attention that the Grove, Shepard, Wilson, & Kruge contract has been in existence since January 29, 1951, and as of this date we still do not have an auditor in the field representing NAO to pass on these vouchers.

"The same condition applies to the various other construction projects under way, such as the curtain programs, *Vagabond*, etc.

"We are placed in the highly improper position, in order to expedite matters, of primarily auditing these vouchers by members of our own staff, who should not legally nor morally be involved in such activities since this is the sole function of the A area.

"I also call to your attention that one of the most important tools of proper management and construction, which is continuous audit as differentiated from postaudit, is absolutely nonexistent. Continuous audit is necessary to maintain budget control of the contractors so that the end object of marriage of the project and the budget upon completion is successful.

"As a result of these administrative conditions which face me and the responsibility which the Department and Congress has placed upon me, I find my position intolerable.

"This situation must be resolved as rapidly as possible, and until this situation is resolved I can only say I will do my best to carry out these projects within the confines established, but under the circumstances I cannot accept full and total responsibility for noncompliance."

5. The following is the reply made by Mr. Alva Meyers, Jr., on January 21:

"Reference is made to Mr. Herrick's memorandum of January 16, 1952, to Mr. Kohler regarding the subject indicated above.

"Although we have been unsuccessful in assigning an auditor to the base of the operations of the Grove, Shepard, Wilson & Kruge contract, vouchers covering the Manila operation have been audited and paid through our authorized representative in San Francisco. Even that situation is expected to improve within the next week, for we are planning to send Mr. Sanders from San Francisco to Manila and Mr. Baker from DF in Washington to relieve Mr. Sanders in San Francisco. Vouchers covering the *Vagabond* project are being audited and paid through the fiscal branch of NAO and the payments are currently made.

"A study is being made as to the propriety and necessity of having an auditor on the premises of the Bethlehem Steel Co. full time to closely observe the *Vagabond* operation. A decision in this regard will be reached immediately.

"Our difficulty has been in obtaining FBI clearance for applicants and getting them on the job before some of the defense agencies pick them up on their payrolls. At the present time there is a great demand for the type of personnel who qualify for positions such as we must procure if our audit and accounting program is to be successful. We not only rely on our own Personnel Branch to recruit for these positions, but we have also enlisted the aid of FP in Washington. A number of applicants are now under investigation and we hope we will soon have sufficient personnel to adequately fill vacancies which we expect to arise in the near future.

"I am sorry that unfavorable conditions as suggested in Mr. Herrick's memorandum have been unavoidable and I assure you that recruitment has been of most vital concern to us since the beginning of the construction program, and will continually be a matter of prime importance as the program proceeds." (Underscoring supplied.)

6. In January 1952, the New York administrative office issued a manual on administrative audit procedures for cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. While this manual is a very helpful document, it does not fully cover the required types of procedures for handling these contracts, and it is somewhat untimely in terms of the fact that construction has been proceeding for a considerable period of time.

As a result of the failure to supply the needed staff at the project sites, we have been severely handicapped in several ways. Apart from the burden placed on the engineers to certify as to receipt of materials and other billings for service rendered which he is obviously not equipped to do by training or experience, it has interfered with the real purpose for which his assignment to the project is made. In addition, we are placed in the untenable position of not auditing and controlling our operations in the proper manner. We are not able to tell where we stand financially on our various construction projects, and must rely on the

contractor to provide information as to expenditures. This has proved wholly inadequate even for our needs and, of course, is downright dangerous to the Government's financial interests.

This entire problem was reviewed in some detail on May 13 when Mr. Kimball visited us in New York. As a result of his visit, it has been decided to assign Alva Meyers and Robert Francis the job of developing as soon as possible recommendations for remedial action. The assignment has been broadened to include the whole problem of contract administration, including procurement matters. I expect that their report will be available within the week and that we will then be in a position to make a decision on what is to be done. I think it is fair to assume that we will immediately require a number of auditors and other personnel to be assigned to the project sites. In this connection, we will require everyone's help in locating qualified and cleared personnel and in expediting their transfers to the field.

I repeat that I am unhappy to have to give you this report. I am sure that there are extenuating circumstances on the side of NAO, including recruiting difficulties. I personally regard the system as the basic fault and have long hoped that this could be rationalized before an inevitable crisis arose, involving personalities. But the facts remain that necessary functions have not been performed; that the resultant situation is serious (including the question of costs of *Vagabond*, *John*, and *Jade*); and that we must all cooperate in finding a prompt and workable solution.

I have discussed this matter in general terms with Dr. Compton and request that this memo be brought to his attention.

cc: IMA—Mr. Kimball

IBS/L—Mr. Micocci

IBS—Mr. G. Herrick

IBS—Mr. J. Thompson

IBS—Mr. R. Francis

NAO—Mr. Meyers

NOTE.—Copy circulated to rest of EB

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

September 8, 1950.

MEMORANDUM

To: George Q. Herrick.

From: Lewis J. McKesson.

Subject: Trip report, United States Navy, August 6, 1950, re Megowatt shipboard installation.

Re: Mr. Seymour's memo August 18, 1950.

The subject matter was discussed at length with the following officers in Captain Beltz's and Captain Englund's offices on August 6, 1950:

Capt. W. H. Beltz, code 800, electronics.

Capt. W. Pryor, code 801, electronics.

Capt. Englund, code 460, ship conversions.

Comdr. Andrews, code 950B, electronics.

I furnished a brief description of the transmitter, giving cubic contents, weight, power requirements, etc. Various type ships which might be suitable for the conversion were considered and the following data was obtained:

Tankers.—The type T2 are now all in active service in either maritime or Navy use. During the war two ships were converted to fresh-water distilling ships and these now are in the naval reserve fleet. The electrical data of these ships with electric drive are:

Hull	Kilo watts	Volts	Frequency	Auxillary
T2-SE-A1.....	5,400	2,400	3/62 cycles.....	2 x 400 Kw-440VAC.
T2-ST-A1 (Navy AV) Distilling ships.	5,400	2,400	3/62 cycles.....	2 x 400 Kw-440VAC.
T2-SE-A2.....	6,890	3,500	3/50 cycles.....	

Some nonelectric ships of the T2-A and T3 class are inactive in the naval reserve fleet.

No Liberty ships (G2 hulls) have electric drive, although a large number of these are available through either the Navy or Maritime Commission.

The general opinion of the officers was that there would be little difference in cost or time in converting the various types of ships to operate the megawatt transmitter. The size and space requirements of diesel units and large transformers did not seem to cause any concern to Captain Englund.

The Navy has a conversion (nonradio) in a Liberty ship where the power required and equipment are comparable to our job. The only cost estimate of conversion I could get was somewhere between \$3 million and \$6 million (includes electronics).

Cost of operation for a Liberty ship was obtained from Commander Andrews as follows:

	<i>Per day</i>
Operating supplies (consumable)-----	\$103
Port charges (auxiliary, fuel, and power)-----	127
Fuel-----	583
Lubricating oil-----	12
Maintenance and repair, including annual overhaul, spare parts, etc.-----	347
Miscellaneous services (pilots, etc.)-----	55
Total-----	1,227
Personnel, 60 civilians-----	834
Subsistence-----	90
Total average operating of Liberty ship:-----	2,151
Per day-----	766, 865
Per year-----	

To the above add the following radio expenses:

Director-----	1
Chief engineer-----	1
Supervisors-----	3
Senior engineers-----	14
Junior engineers-----	12
Captive balloonist-----	1
Administrative officer-----	1
Medical corpsman-----	1
Secretary-----	1
Total-----	35
Salaries-----	\$169, 820
Allowances-----	124, 358
Subsistence-----	19, 162
	\$313, 340
Tube costs-----	48, 261
Transmitter maintenance costs (balloonist cost, etc.)-----	16, 100
Miscellaneous transportation of radio personnel on leave, sickness, etc-----	10, 000
Total operating cost-----	1, 154, 566

Mr. Harmon's estimate of the operation of a shore-based megowatt transmitter including two 35-kilowatt shortwave transmitters is \$946,937.

The above ship estimate is based on the assumption that the daily cost will be approximately the same whether under way or stationary. Stationary operation is based on 24-hour operation.

The possibility of using an escort carrier (CVE *Kaiser* class) was investigated. Essentially no conversion costs would be involved and all equipment could be installed on the hangar deck. Deck mounting appears practical for all units including three 1,240-kilowatt diesel units. Some of these ships have electric drive, but do have steam capacity to drive turbo-generators. Mr. Walker is investigating this in lieu of diesel units. All OVE carriers are in reserve status so that it might not be difficult to divert one or more.

The antenna problem had been referred to H. R. L. whose preliminary verbal reports were quite negative. However, Mr. Seymour's and my preliminary data looks quite practical and this will be worked up as soon as possible.

Captains Beltz and Englund suggested that if this work is to be carried further, it will be necessary for them to have a directive from the Chief of Naval Operations. They suggested that an initial "study directive" be initiated and then a number of men would be assigned to work on details upon which firm recommendations could be made.

cc: Messrs. Charles Pease
Julius Ross
William Harmon
Jean Seymour (Munich).

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